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ABSTRACT 
 “Main Street, America: Histories of I-95” fills a historiographical gap by arguing 
the Interstate Highway System can only be accurately understood through the study of 
local histories. The existing literature tends toward national, system-wide evaluations and 
consequently fails to capture the complexity of the Interstate Highway’s interaction with 
the communities through which it passes. By focusing on the backbone of the Interstate 
Highway System, I-95, this dissertation demonstrates responses to Interstate Highways 
were dependent on the interplay of myriad local factors. Additionally, it argues that I-
95’s effect on communities was determined by local conditions. Studying individual 
communities along a single route results in a new way of understanding the Interstate 
Highway System. Rather than serving as a simple catalyst of economic growth or a 
harbingers of destroyed cities, I-95 (and by extension, the larger Interstate Highway 
System) emerges as a far more interesting subject, one with a history more complex than 
previously understood.  
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INTRODUCTION 
THE ROAD BEHIND, THE ROAD AHEAD 
 In August of 1969, the Interstate Highway System was in its thirteenth year of 
construction. With 28,000 of the 42,500 originally-planned miles complete and 5,000 
additional miles in development, the transformation of the American landscape was well 
underway. In many locations where segments of the system had opened to the public, 
community leaders, politicians, and the media praised the technological marvel. 
Elsewhere, Americans eagerly awaited construction; yet the news was not entirely 
positive: the target completion date established in 1956 loomed a mere three years in the 
future, the updated completion date of 1974 looked increasingly unattainable, and 
financing battles in Washington plagued the program. In addition, thousands of miles had 
been added to the original plan, exacerbating the problems. In some locations, opposition 
to highway construction had been increasing since the 1960s and now presented a public 
opinion obstacle the Interstate Highway System had not yet faced in its early years. In the 
midst of this tumult, U.S. News and World Report published an article highlighting scores 
of locations where the network’s development had been delayed. The magazine called 
attention to specific trouble spots, such as a proposed cross-Manhattan segment 
connecting New Jersey and Brooklyn and a stretch of highway bisecting the French 
Quarter of New Orleans. In total, the article counted sixty-six disputes poised to disrupt 
277 miles of highway construction. The article was damaging to the Interstate System at 
a moment it could not afford negative press.
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“Trouble for Freeways” suggested the controversies listed were representative of 
increasing opposition to the entire project.1  
 J.O. Bowen, publisher of the construction trade journal Dixie Contractor, 
responded with a fiery letter to U.S. News and World Report’s editor, noting factual 
errors and calling into question the representativeness of the article. Bowen’s primary 
criticism of “Trouble for Freeways” was its implication that a number of local issues 
amounted to a system-wide problem. Bowen wrote, “On the national scale that you 
attempt to reflect, the difficulties in locating and building a freeway is not a problem, but 
a finely grained, heterogeneous complex of local problems that are susceptible of no 
major, national, or overall solution.”2 As a representative of the industry building the 
highways, Bowen’s opposition to any coverage casting doubt on the network’s progress 
and eventual completion was to be expected. However, Bowen’s specific critique of the 
magazine’s argument set him apart from most of his contemporaries.  
Bowen’s fellow commentators frequently extrapolated micro experiences to 
conclusions about the Interstate System as a whole. For example, in a status report of the 
Interstate Highway System published just two months prior to the U.S. News and World 
Report article, the New York Times suggested that the same concerns motivated 
opposition to Interstates in New York City and Philadelphia, and this experience would 
be replicated in additional urban areas when construction inevitably reached new city 
                                                 
1
 “Trouble for Freeways,” U.S. News and World Report, August 11, 1969, 77. 
2
 J.O. Bowen to David Lawrence, 26 August 1969. Herman Talmadge Collection, Subgroup C, 
Series VIII, Subseries A, Box 308, Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies, 
University of Georgia Libraries, Athens. Emphasis his. Bowen’s article was never published. Archive 
hereafter abbreviated as “RBRL.” 
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limits. Of New York and Philadelphia, the New York Times misleadingly wrote, “City 
officials and civic groups contend that certain Interstate urban links will destroy scenic 
and historic values, and cause undue hardship to the families and small businesses that 
will be displaced.”3 Not only were the protests in these cities not representative of the 
urban experience elsewhere in the United States, the opposition within these cities was 
diverse in motivation. New York’s primary opposition was partially based on a fear that 
highways would destroy ethnic neighborhoods, as the Times article suggested, but there 
was also a vocal contingent of environmentalists who feared the effect of Interstate 
Highways on public transportation funding. Meanwhile, in Philadelphia, primary 
opposition came from individuals worried about property values.4   
 Similarly, other observers touted the benefits stemming from the highways 
without an appreciation of local context. This view assumed the Interstate Highways 
were so overwhelming as harbingers of positive change that they could overcome any 
local realities; experiences in one place would translate to another, regardless of how to 
the two locations may have differed. For example, as highway officials and civic leaders 
plotted the course of I-95 through South Carolina, Charleston’s News and Courier told 
readers they could expect tremendous development where I-95 would eventually intersect 
I-26. As evidence, the newspaper pointed to Spartanburg, South Carolina, where the 
intersection of I-85 and I-26 had been “the greatest single catalyst to Spartanburg’s recent 
                                                 
3
 Joseph C. Ingraham, “Status Report on the Interstate Road System,” New York Times, June 8, 
1969. 
4
 For an overview of diversity in urban highway opposition, see Raymond A. Mohl, “Stop the 
Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities.” Journal of Urban History 30 (2004): 674-706.  
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economic growth.”5 The News and Courier overlooked the fact that Spartanburg’s 
highways intersected fewer than ten miles from the city center while I-95 would intersect 
I-26 at least twenty-five miles away from downtown Charleston. The paper also 
discounted the tide of industrial development surging through Spartanburg prior to the 
construction of I-95 as compared to the economic stagnation in Charleston since the close 
of the World War II. 
Observers across the United States eventually came to realize what Bowen had so 
eloquently expressed in his letter to U.S. News and World Report: Interstate Highways 
were the product of the diverse political, cultural, economic, and social environments 
they traversed. In 1965, for example, Georgia governor Carl Sanders commented that 
“the problems on I-95 have been locally based.”6 During the initial decades of Interstate 
construction, however, few seemed to share Bowen’s insight. The historical record is 
replete with examples of individuals treating the Interstate Highway System as a 
homogeneous entity. 
The historiography of the Interstate Highway System reflects the common 
tendency of historical actors to view the System as a network of roads without variation. 
Fueling the historiographical blindness toward heterogeneity is the philosophical slant of 
much of the earliest literature. Highway detractors authored many of Interstate Highway 
histories in the 1960s and 1970s, and their works are very critical of the System. Mark 
Rose characterizes most of the writers during this period as “social critics” who were not 
interested in the history of the Highway System so much as arguing against further 
                                                 
5
 “Bring I-95 Near the Sea,” News and Courier, April 30, 1963. 
6
 Carl Sanders to Sam L. Varnedoe, 20 September 1965, Carl Sanders Collection, Series I, Box 4, 
RBRL. 
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construction.7 The contributors to this critical point of view generally saw highways as 
destroyers of cities and the cause of America’s pernicious reliance on the automobile.8 
With the intent of arguing against Interstates in principle, these scholars were disinclined 
to treat the roads with nuance.  
Some social critics maintained their campaign against Interstate Highways for 
several decades and continued writing long after the network was largely complete.9 By 
the 1980s, however, a handful of Interstate Highway studies emerged that aimed to 
understand the complex history of the roads. Mark Rose’s Interstate: Express Highway 
Politics (1990) and Tom Lewis’ Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, 
Transforming American Life (1997) stand as the best-researched and most thoughtful 
analyses of the Interstate Highways. More recently, Earl Swift’s The Big Roads: The 
Untold Story of the Engineers, Visionaries, and Trailblazers Who Created the American 
Superhighways (2011) contributed to the limited collection of scholarly interpretations of 
                                                 
7
 Mark Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990), xiii. 
8
 Jane Leavitt contends that the United States should stop building highways in most cases, as she 
says they are the primary cause of urban sprawl and the overall decline in the quality of urban life. In the 
introduction, Leavitt makes clear her position, proclaiming, “This book is about the men and institutions 
who promote highways and how they destroy our churches, schools, homes and parks.” In making this 
case, Leavitt singles out Interstate Highways as the most harmful. Jane Leavitt, Superhighway—Superhoax 
(Garden City, NY: Ballatine Books, 1970), 9. See also A.Q. Mowbray, Road to Ruin (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1968); Richard O. Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and the 
Condition of Metropolitan America (Philadelphia: Lippincott,1975); and Jon R. Meyer and Jose A. Gomez-
Ibanez, Auto Transit and Cities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., 1981). 
9
 In Asphalt Nation, for example, Jane Holtz Kay argues for a “depaving of America,” a massive 
scaling back on road construction in favor of expanded public transportation. Kay sees the United States of 
the late twentieth century as disenchanted with highways, saying, “A landscape sacked by its highways has 
distressed Americans so much that even this go-for-it nation is posting ‘No Growth’ signs on development 
from shore to shore.” Jane Holtz Kay, Asphalt Nation: How the Automobile Took Over America and How 
We Can Take It Back (New York: Crown Publishers, 1997), 9. 
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the Interstate Highway System. Collectively, these studies provide an excellent account 
of the political, social, cultural, and technical contours of the most ambitious public 
works project of the twentieth century. They filled historiographical voids by detailing 
the major players at the national level, analyzing the debates in Congress that culminated 
in the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, and providing accounts of how the roads had 
affected Americans—positively as well as negatively.10 These contributions, taken with 
earlier studies, have resulted in a body of literature that competently details the history of 
the Interstate Highway System at the national level.  
 The propensity to think about the Interstate Highway System only in national 
terms, however, has resulted in an incomplete and sometimes flawed understanding of the 
subject.   Studies of the Interstate Highway System that attempt to analyze the network as 
a whole  overlook or downplay the significance of local realities on the contour of the 
network’s history. Lewis’ Divided Highways, for example, uses episodes from across the 
country as it paints a picture of the Interstate experience. These local accounts are 
insightful and well-researched, but Lewis presents each as emblematic of the national 
                                                 
10
 Popularly known as the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act, the Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1956 codified the financing structure that made the Interstate System possible and initiated 
construction. The history of this landmark legislation is very well documented in most studies of the 
Interstate System.  
For an examination of intersection between highway planning and politics, see Bruce E. Seely, 
Building the American Highway System: Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1987). For studies of the effects of Interstate Highways on urban centers, see: Raymond Mohl, “The 
Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966–1973, ” 
The Journal of Policy History 20, no. 2 (2008), 193-226. A few interesting studies of Interstate Highways 
have come out of the field of Geography. These works tend to focus on the ways Interstates alter the 
patterns of urban society. See: Peter O. Mueller  “Transportation and Urban Form: Stages in the Spatial 
Evolution of the American Metropolis” in The Geography of Urban Transportation, eds. Susan Hanson 
and Genevieve Giuliano, 59-85. 3rd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2004). 
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story. For example, Lewis commits a chapter to analyzing the urban revolts that plagued 
the Interstate Highway System in the 1960s and 1970s. He uses the resistance to I-10 in 
the French Quarter of New Orleans as his case study, and he provides an excellent 
account of the historical and political context for that specific highway battle. However, 
Lewis submits what observers came to call the “Second Battle of New Orleans” as 
representative of contemporaneous urban revolts while providing only a paragraph each 
to the struggles in Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington, New York, and Boston.11  
Lewis misleadingly implies New Orleans is interchangeable with any of its 
contemporaneous highway protests when seeking an understanding of the urban revolts. 
The desire to write a national history of the Interstate Highways drives Lewis to write an 
account of what happened in locations across the country, but he cannot commit the 
space to explain why. Holding up one episode as an explanation is inherently flawed, as it 
implies an equivalency across communities that simply did not exist. Each location’s 
experience with highways directly resulted from circumstances particular to that 
community, and to date, national accounts of the Interstate Highway System have failed 
to capture the deeply textured reality of the network’s history. 
                                                 
11
 Tom Lewis, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming American Life 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 179-210. 
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A handful of location-specific investigations do exist.12 They successfully 
contextualize particular episodes in the history of the Interstate System and admirably 
explore the interplay between local reality and the highway; however, as stand-alone 
studies, they do not allow for comparison, and no conclusions can be drawn about the 
representativeness of the case study on the System as a whole. Ultimately, these accounts 
reveal much more about the community under consideration than they do about the 
Interstate. With national studies that fail to explain the significance of location on one 
hand and microstudies that fail to comment on the System, writ large, on the other, the 
historiography needs to  bridge the gap and account for local texture while attempting to 
understand the broader history of the Interstate Highway System. One approach that 
satisfies this aim is to study individual roads. And, despite what has now become 
considerable literature on the Interstate Highway System, few works take this approach.13  
                                                 
12See: Joseph F.C. DiMento, “Stent (or Dagger?) in the Heart of Town: Urban Freeways in 
Syracuse, 1944-1967,” Sage 8, no. 2 (2009), 133-161; Douglas H Haebuer, The Baltimore Expressway 
Controversy: A Study in the Political Decision-Making Process (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1974); Richard Henry Ginn, “Interstate-40 Through Overton Park: A Case Study of Location Decision-
Making,” Master’s Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1970; and John E. Seley, “The Kink in Nashville’s 
Interstate-40,” in The Politics of Public-Facility Planning, ed. John E. Seley (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Rowan & Littlefield, 1983), 57-66. 
13
 Roads predating the Interstate Highways have been the focus of dedicated studies much more 
than have the Interstate Highways. Route 66, in particular, has been the subject of an expansive body of 
literature. See, for example, Quinta Scott and Susan Croce, Route 66: A Highway and Its People 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988) and Peter B. Dedek, Hip to the Trip: A Cultural 
History of Route 66 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007). Books have been written with 
individual Interstate Highways as the subject; however, they are generally lacking in depth of research or 
analysis. See, for example, Diane Perrier, I-81: The Great Warriors Trace (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 2010). 
 
 
9 
 
I-95, the backbone of the Interstate Highway System, is the ideal road for such a 
study, as it traverses a diverse cross-section of the United States. It also warrants 
dedicated study in its own right given its singular significance to the country. Despite 
this, there are no dedicated studies to the road. Stretching 1,917 miles from south of 
Miami, Florida, to the Canadian border in Maine, I-95 passes through fifteen states, feeds 
forty-six seaports, and serves 103 commercial airports. On an average day, 72,000 
vehicles drive on I-95, but traffic volume can reach 300,000 vehicles on holidays and 
other peak travel periods. Of all the miles driven on American roads, I-95 constitutes 35 
percent. The I-95 corridor, consisting of counties that lie within twenty miles of the road, 
constitutes only 10 percent of the United States’ land area but is home to 37 percent of 
the country’s population, nearly 110 million people. This zone’s economic output is 
staggering; it bears $4.7 trillion in economic production every year, which accounts for 
almost 40 percent of the national GDP. In fact, if the I-95 corridor were an independent 
nation, it would have the third largest economy in the world.14 Despite its exceptional 
                                                                                                                                                 
There are a few works that do a wonderful job exploring the history of individual roads. Angus K. 
Gillespie and Michael Aaron Rockland’s Looking for America on the New Jersey Turnpike (Piscataway, 
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992) brilliantly argues the eponymous road reflects the values of 
the engineers who designed the road, the politicians who control it, and the citizens who travel upon it. 
More recently, Anne Mitchell Whisnant’s Super-Scenic Motorway (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006) explored the role of the Blue Ridge Parkway in the economic development of 
southern Appalachia and the relationship of the road to the notion of “the public good.”  
 
14
 “I-95 Facts and Stats,” I-95 Corridor Coalition, accessed February 13, 2011, 
http://www.i95coalition.org/the-coalition-2/i-95-facts/. Portions of website adapted from NPR analysis of 
U.S. Census Bureau Data. All figures accurate as of  February 13, 2011.  
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importance to twentieth—and now twenty-first—century American history, no scholarly 
work has focused on it.15  
I-95 proves to be an excellent lens for a study of the relationship between roads 
and the communities they traverse. I-95 passes through or near some of the most 
populous cities in the United States; it also cuts through farmland, small towns, and 
coastal communities. A drive up or down I-95 provides the tourist with an impressive 
view of the diverse American landscape, from the largest urban centers of the country to 
picturesque tobacco fields, from the pine forests of Maine to the palm groves of southern 
Florida. In some places, I-95 drew traffic off older highways, such as U.S. 1, and in other 
places, it connected communities via a major highway for the first time. I-95 aided in the 
economic development (or redevelopment) of some regions, such as the Research 
Triangle of North Carolina, and elsewhere destroyed the livelihoods of citizens who used 
to make a living off the travelers on old highways.  
To say Americans welcomed or resisted I-95 would be grossly simplistic. In some 
places, observers celebrated I-95 as a herald of progress; in others, they resisted it as a 
noxious force. Some community leaders fought to route I-95 through their towns. In other 
locales, environmental and historical preservationists fought to keep precious resources 
out of its path. Some cities welcomed I-95 in hopes it would revive downtown 
economies; elsewhere municipal leaders and residents feared the highway would destroy 
                                                 
15
 Dianne Perrier’s Interstate 95: The Road to Sun and Sand (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2010) purports itself to be a cultural history of I-95; however, the highway is mentioned preciously 
few times. The book instead focuses on the I-95 corridor, specifically its history prior to I-95’s 
construction.  
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urban centers. An understanding of I-95 requires a complete understanding of the 
circumstances under which it came to be in its full complexity and texture. 
A dedicated study of I-95 yields conclusions that other works on the Interstate 
Highway System have not been able to reach. The present study reveals community 
attitudes toward the highways were incredibly complicated and were dependent on a 
calculus of socioeconomic status, proximity to the proposed route, aspirations for one’s 
community, and a number of additional factors. Since I-95 cuts through a diverse 
segment of the United States, the complexity of this calculus becomes especially 
apparent. 
 This  study of I-95 also reveals that more local people favored the highway than 
the historiography indicates. While much of the literature paints a picture of concerned 
citizens standing up to business and political proponents of the highways, the story of I-
95 suggests that citizens, both political and apolitical, frequently supported the 
construction of superhighways. Additionally, differences of opinion among politicians, 
businessmen, and other community leaders come to light. Highway supporters frequently 
cited the arguments employed by the highway lobby when convincing the United States 
to build the Interstates when explaining their support of I-95. This suggests the highway 
lobby’s influence was far more pervasive than historians have previously argued. 
Whereas the current literature focuses on the lobby’s influence over politicians and some 
civic leaders, the story of I-95 reveals the arguments trickled down through many layers 
of society due to previously overlooked efforts of the lobby, especially the American 
Automobile Association. 
12 
 
 This study of I-95 also reveals that many observers saw symbolic value in the 
Interstate Highways from the moment of inception. The historical record is replete with 
individuals viewing the Interstates as symbols of progress, modernity, and wealth. 
Beyond this, Americans frequently framed I-95, specifically, as a symbol of national 
unity. At a time when the media and national leaders frequently reminded Americans of 
regional differences through accounts of civil rights activities in the South, many viewed 
I-95 as a thread that would bind the North and South together. 
It is important to note that no study of I-95 can be truly comprehensive, especially 
one that aims to understand the local histories associated with the road. There are simply 
too many towns and too many people impacted by the highway for a fully inclusive 
investigation. Through carefully selected and representative case studies, however, a 
scholarly endeavor can tell a broad story with a limited scope. Anne Mitchell Whisnant’s 
excellent Super-Scenic Motorway stands as proof. While the book does not account for 
every town the Blue Ridge Parkway passes or evaluate every opinion expressed of the 
road, Whisnant does a remarkable job of illustrating the complexity of the Blue Ridge 
Parkway’s history by evaluating well-chosen case studies.16 
No period in the life of I-95—or any Interstate—was as revealing as the time 
before construction begins. Before routes were made official and bulldozers began 
overturning earth, communities experienced periods of speculation and rumor, followed 
by the official planning phase, when engineers conducted studies and interested parties 
attempted to influence the route and other characteristics of the road. While the history of 
I-95 certainly transcends this stage, the period provides the most insight into what 
                                                 
16
 Whisnant, Super-Scenic Motorway. 
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motivated historic actors and serves as the most fertile ground for investigation. As such, 
this study explores many routing controversies but also explores other stages of I-95’s 
development. 
Before delving into local context, it is important to establish the national contours 
into which I-95 appeared. In that regard, Chapter 1, “A New Vision Has Come to 
Motoring Man,” explores highway advocates’ arguments in favor of Interstate Highways. 
Drawing heavily from the collections of the American Automobile Association, this 
chapter briefly traces the events leading up to the 1956 signing of the Federal Aid 
Highway Act, which moved the Interstates from dream to reality. The legislative battle 
culminating in this landmark legislation has been well documented by several scholars, 
so this chapter provides only a cursory survey of the important milestones. Instead, it 
focuses on the efforts of the AAA and other highway proponents to espouse the benefits 
of Interstate Highways and explores the arguments used. Then, using two I-95 ribbon 
cutting ceremonies as case studies—one in Richmond, Virginia and one in a rural area on 
the Maryland/Delaware state line—the chapter demonstrates how the benefits that 
highway advocates chose to highlight were highly dependent on locality.  
Chapter 2, “People and Progress in Wilmington, Delaware,” examines a 1957  
routing controversy in the industrial Mid-Atlantic city. As one of the first urban centers to 
receive I-95—or any Interstate Highway, for that matter— Wilmington presents an 
intriguing opportunity to study urban responses to the Interstate before the “urban crisis” 
of the 1960s and 1970s. In these early years of Interstate Highway construction, few 
people argued Wilmington did not need or want I-95. Rather, the Wilmington story is one 
of “Interstate hot potato,” where every group argued the highway would be a great boon 
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to the city—so long as it was routed through somebody else’s neighborhood. A proposed 
route along Jackson and Adams Streets drew considerable attention since it was favored 
by the Delaware State Highway Department and serves as the main narrative thread in 
this chapter. The discussions surrounding this route reveal how urban highway 
controversies proceeded before serious doubts about the benefit of Interstate Highways 
were prevalent. In an environment where the benefits of highway construction were 
rarely questioned, how individuals balanced their desire for community progress with 
personal preservation makes for a fascinating counter narrative to the dominant “urban 
resistance as urban revolt” narrative.  
The value of Interstate Highways was not accepted as definite when Delaware 
moved to extend I-95 into Wilmington’s northern suburbs in 1965. The communities of 
Arden and Ardentown took a vastly different approach to resisting the Interstate than did 
their southern neighbors nearly a decade earlier. Whereas the residents of downtown 
Wilmington generally wanted the road built so long as it did not route through their 
neighborhoods, Arden and Ardentown residents saw little value in I-95. The difference in 
attitudes between these two episodes in Wilmington’s history was partly driven by the 
elapse in time and partly driven by the characteristics of the communities involved. 
Chapter 2 concludes by considering the factors that defined the different courses taken by 
the Jackson/Adams Street and Arden controversies. 
Chapter 3 investigates resistance to I-95 in the communities between Trenton and 
Newark, New Jersey. With events transpiring over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, 
New Jersey’s encounter with I-95 fell squarely into the urban revolt period and arguably 
stands as highway opponents’ most successful campaign. The communities of Princeton, 
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Hillsborough, and Piscataway make for significant case studies because they provide an 
opportunity to understand how and why large towns—not major urban centers—
responded to the threat of Interstate Highways. These communities have been largely 
overlooked in the literature on highway resistance, as past studies have favored revolts in 
metropolises. This chapter rectifies this historiographical gap and, in so doing, assesses 
how demographics, politics, and culture of these towns gave shape to the resistance 
efforts.  
Not all communities opposed Interstate construction during the 1960s, and 
Chapter 4 uses  southeast Florida coastal cities and towns to illustrate this. Concurrent 
with the opposition in New Jersey and Wilmington’s northern communities, Florida held 
state-wide elections in which West Palm Beach, Fort Pierce, and other Florida cities 
became central subjects. At issue was whether the state of Florida had purposefully 
delayed construction of I-95 in order to maximize profits on a parallel toll road. In 
decrying the alleged actions by the state of Florida, the people of these coastal 
communities demonstrated an intense desire for I-95. The pattern of southeast Florida’s 
development and structure of the region’s economy served as the most significant engines 
behind support for I-95. 
Chapter 5 explores a 1963 controversy in South Carolina where two communities, 
Charleston and Florence, engaged in rival lobbying efforts to sway the route of I-95 
toward their respective borders. While the previous case studies reveal alliances between 
residents and politicians, churches, economic boosters, and others, everyday citizens were 
largely absent in South Carolina’s routing controversy. This chapter seeks to understand 
the motivating factors that compelled Charleston and Florence’s lobbies to push for 
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favorable routings and also considers why most residents chose to stay silent while 
politicians and economic boosters engaged in the debate. 
 Chapters 1-5 largely deal with planning and building the Interstate. Chapters 6 
and 7 consider the effects of I-95. Once routings were finalized and the road was built, I-
95 began the next phase of its life, affecting the future of communities and the day-to-day 
lives of its neighbors. Here, too, local realities played a critical role in the history of I-95. 
Chapter 6 explores the effect of I-95 on Jackson Ward, a predominately African-
American community in Richmond, Virginia. Once considered the “Harlem of the 
South,” Jackson Ward’s thriving commercial, cultural, and social scenes were disrupted 
by the arrival of I-95, which bisected the neighborhood. This chapter considers to which 
extent I-95 facilitated the downfall of Jackson Ward and the extent to which Jackson 
Ward’s local circumstances gave shape to I-95. 
 Chapter 7 examines coastal southeast Georgia to understand the effect I-95 had 
on communities it bypassed. McIntosh County, Georgia had built its economies—
legitimate and illicit alike—off the traffic U.S.1 funneled through. I-95 drew these drivers 
a few miles to the west and left the people of McIntosh County searching for answers. 
The sudden absence of out-of-state drivers passing through McIntosh County also served 
to dethrone a corrupt police chief who had built significant power through his ability to 
control the activities along U.S. 1. Part of this power included bending the communities’ 
race relations to his will; in this way, the appearance of I-95 just outside McIntosh 
County’s borders dramatically changed the very underpinning of society in this region of 
coastal Georgia. 
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When taken in total, this dissertation aspires to what J.O. Bowen accused U.S. 
News and World Report of failing to do in 1969: it aims to understand the “heterogeneous 
complex of local problems” that plagued an Interstate Highway System.17  It also 
transcends Bowen’s call by attempting to illustrate that everything about I-95 is a 
“complex,” the problems and benefits; the support and resistance; the local and the 
national. In short, I-95’s history is far more complicated than previous research suggests. 
Forty years after Bowen recommended U.S. News and World Report take note of local 
circumstances when attempting to understand Interstate Highways, this study heeds his 
advice. 
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CHAPTER 1 
“A NEW VISION HAS COME TO MOTORING MAN”18 
 
American University President Paul F. Douglass was an unusual choice to deliver 
the keynote address at the Annual Meeting of the American Automobile Association 
(AAA) in early November, 1947. Since the AAA’s founding in 1902, club members had 
come to annual conventions expecting speeches on topics ranging from road financing to 
the importance of increasing public awareness of the organization’s activities. Dictated 
by the AAA’s status as an inchoate organization whose future depended upon the growth 
of the personal automobile and the enthusiasm of its members, these past addresses 
served the purpose of giving attendees  direction for the coming months. Past speeches 
had encouraged members to grow the organization’s membership and informed delegates 
of AAA initiatives that would serve as selling points when recruiting new members. 
Previous speakers included local club leaders, fundraising experts, and policy wonks. Dr. 
Douglass, a renaissance man who dabbled in politics, city planning, law, and journalism, 
among other interests, was notably different from every past keynote speaker.  His 
speech, likewise, broke from tradition. Far less bureaucratic 
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and far more visionary, his address, “The Civilizing Road,” audaciously challenged AAA 
members to imagine their efforts in the context of human history. Beginning with early 
man’s advent of  “direct paths over which men and animals moved to supply their 
immediate physical needs” and concluding with a vision of roads that would one day tie 
the world together, Douglass argued for the importance of roads in the story of 
mankind.19 Underlying Douglass’ account of the history of roads was the argument that 
the AAA stood to set the course for the next turning point, to take the next step toward a 
day when roads would promote freedom across the globe. For an organization that had, 
since its inception, focused on important but quotidian business of automobile ownership 
and use, Douglass’ call seemed revolutionary. 
Those who followed the various AAA publications, however, were not surprised 
by Douglass’ message. AAA leaders had been planning for a superhighway push as 
World War II raged in Europe and the Pacific and had revealed portions of their plans 
throughout the 1940s. Those in attendance consequently understood the implicit message 
in Douglass’ speech. Conference attendees would not simply return to their home towns 
and recruit new members; Douglass’ address meant to inspire an army of advocates for a 
state-of-the-art highway system. “The Civilizing Road” served as the opening shot of the 
AAA’s full-blown efforts to persuade the American people and Congress to construct 
what would become the Interstate Highway System. 
The ensuing lobbying and legislative activities that culminated in the Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1956, the law that approved financing of the Interstate Highway System 
and moved the network from dream to reality, has been very well documented. Most 
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notably, Mark Rose’s Interstate: Express Highway Politics does a remarkable job of 
distilling the myriad interest groups and numerous compromises into a succinct and 
insightful narrative. Other observers have contributed additional research on this subject. 
Tom Lewis’ Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming 
American Life traces the historical antecedents of the system and offers illustrative 
biographical analysis of the key players. More recent works by Earl Swift and Dianne 
Perrier have provided further analysis of the Interstate System’s formative years. Swift’s 
The Big Roads accounts for much of the same material as Lewis’ earlier Divided 
Highways, but introduces more players to the story. Perrier’s work is a long history of I-
95, which, among other topics, explores how Native Americans used the route of I-95 
long before European settlers arrived on the continent and, later, how nineteenth century 
railroads sparked the tourism industry that would later rely heavily on I-95. As a result of 
these works and others, the origins and administrative history of the Interstates are well 
understood. The existing literature, however, has failed to adequately explore one of the 
most important aspects of the Interstate System’s history. While the legislative battles 
and lobbying efforts were undeniably vital, they would have had little effect without the 
war for public opinion that began in the 1940s and continued long after construction 
commenced.  
At an estimated cost in the billions of dollars, many Americans were not 
immediate supporters of the initiative to build a new nationwide highway system.20 Such 
a construction project would require new taxes, additional federal involvement in state 
affairs, and tremendous financial obligations by the states. When Americans first heard of 
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plans for the Interstate Highway System, countless questions arose. Questions about 
financing: Who would pay? Would non-users pay a disproportionate amount? Questions 
about administration: Who decided where roads would go? Would these be toll roads? 
But most importantly, questions about value: Why were these roads necessary? Were 
they worth the cost? Until highway advocates could convince the American people, the 
business community, state governments, and ultimately, Congress of the value of such an 
undertaking, there was little hope for realization of the plan. Convincing these groups of 
the Interstate Highway System’s value required identifying arguments that would sway a 
majority of Americans and then wielding these arguments effectively.21  
Those who joined the effort to actualize the unprecedented building program 
employed myriad arguments. The literature, with varying degrees of accuracy, notes the 
benefits of Interstate Highways according to advocates of the System. The arguments, 
when mentioned, are usually introduced as part of the legislative debates—not as 
arguments used to sway public opinion. The least sophisticated accounts have reduced 
the numerous and complex arguments in favor of a modern highway system to three: 
greater economic growth, increased driver safety, and improved national defense. These 
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studies also occasionally submit unsubstantiated claims that will, desire, or pride played a 
role in garnering support. In The Roads that Built America, for example, Dan McNichol 
argues “the roots of the System are militaristic and defensive, with a large dose of 
national pride thrown in.”22 Those inclined to believe McNichol’s interpretation of the 
reasons America built the Interstate System are likely informed by the oft-cited story of 
how Eisenhower, upon seeing Germany’s Autobahn in action during World War II, was 
determined to see America construct a competitive highway network. While the story of 
Eisenhower’s experience is true, advocates of the Interstates rarely invoked national pride 
when making the case for the superhighways during the 1940s and 1950s. Instead, 
purported benefits were often more tangible. Rose and Lewis posit economic growth, 
driver safety, national defense, social progress, and the relief of urban traffic as the key 
benefits touted by highways boosters. While certainly the most complete list of benefits 
in the current literature, it is not comprehensive. Interstate advocates certainly submitted 
these five benefits when promoting the highway program; however, they also often 
employed additional pro-Interstate arguments that the historiography has overlooked. 
This chapter begins by surveying the origins of the Interstate Highway System. In 
so doing, it provides a brief summary of the milestones covered in several previous 
histories of the superhighway network. This account, however, focuses on the public 
relations component of Interstate history. As such, the AAA appears prominently, as it 
played a significant role in the formation and proliferation of the pro-Interstate 
arguments. The AAA and its fellow highway boosters recognized the importance of 
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tailoring the pro-highway message for specific audiences. While the general arguments in 
favor of the superhighway network remained throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, 
boosters highlighted particular benefits depending on the target audience. Often, boosters 
changed the message based on the particular historical, cultural, economic, or social 
environment of the locality they addressed.  
Boosters did not cease promoting the benefits of Interstate Highways when the 
Federal Aid Highway Act passed in 1956; in fact, their efforts increased after they won 
the initial battle to build the System. Even though the Highway Act established a means 
of paying for the construction, financing was a perennial fight in Congress. The Highway 
Trust Fund became a target as some elected officials wanted to use the funds for other 
initiatives, which led to the Trust Fund serving as a pawn in Congressional battles. Each 
year, some member of Congress held the annual disbursement to the account as ransom 
in budgeting negotiations. As such, highway boosters never felt safe reducing the 
intensity of their advocacy, and their fear worsened through the 1960s as some urban 
areas began to vehemently resist Interstate development. Sympathetic congressmen, such 
as Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy, mounted campaigns to divert highway funding 
for public transportation and other “urban friendly” initiatives. This threat further 
motivated highway supporters to sustain their advocacy efforts. Despite this unrest—and 
perhaps due to the continual efforts of highway supporters—the Interstate Highway 
System developed, mile by mile, year after year. Segments of the Interstate Highway 
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System continued to open for nearly fifty years after the Federal Aid Highway Act of 
1956.23  
The completion of segments of the Interstate System was the subject of much 
fanfare, an opportunity for civic leaders to celebrate their state or municipality’s 
accomplishment and for local citizens to glimpse or even test drive the roads that 
promised to usher in a new wave of development and safety. Highway advocates seized 
upon these ribbon-cutting ceremonies as high-visibility spectacles from which they could 
champion the construction of additional miles of asphalt. Two ribbon-cutting ceremonies 
along I-95, one in Richmond, Virginia in 1958 and another on the Mason-Dixon Line 
between Maryland and Delaware in 1963, saw speakers and attendees extol the 
superhighway. These two events witnessed highway advocates not only celebrate the 
frequently cited benefits of highways but also draw attention to benefits that scholars of 
the Interstate System have generally overlooked. Additionally, these events provide 
excellent opportunities to explore how advocates altered the pro-highway arguments 
based on locality. Ribbon-cutting ceremonies, regardless of the location, were an 
opportunity to push for further highway construction and also to celebrate the long 
struggle that culminated in a stretch of brand new asphalt.   
ANTECEDENTS AND MOMENTUM 
The Interstate Highway System, as imagined during and immediately after World 
War II, was the latest manifestation of a persistent and long-running drive for good roads 
in the United States. Since the first man took the wheel of an automobile, the need for 
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better roads had been apparent. Prior to the rise of the personal automobile, bicycle 
enthusiasts were the primary group championing the construction of new roads or 
improvements to the existing. By the turn of the twentieth century, automobile advocates 
had grown in number to the point they appropriated the Good Roads Movement from the 
bicycle lobby. The Good Roads Movement, under the leadership of automobile 
enthusiasts, promoted the Lincoln Highway and later, the Dixie Highway, which 
provided car owners the ability to tour the United States while driving east and west, and 
then north and south.24 These routes were part of the informal network of auto trails 
network that served as the best option to drivers in the early twentieth century.  
By the 1920s, the inadequacy of America’s system of auto trails was apparent. 
Usually privately funded and poorly maintained, these roads simply could not sustain the 
number of cars and trucks using them each day.  The federal government, recognizing the 
economic benefit of roads capable of facilitating automobile traffic, instituted the United 
States Numbered Highways in 1926. Many of the auto trails established earlier in the 
century, the Dixie and Lincoln Highways included, became part of the system after 
considerable upgrades. As the nation’s first integrated and government-maintained road 
network, this system pushed the United States into the modern age of transportation, 
which only fueled the popularity of the personal automobile. Even as the United States 
Numbered Highways developed, observers questioned their long-term effectiveness, as 
they were incapable of handling the ever-growing traffic of the United States and were 
                                                 
24
 Several good histories of these roads and the Good Roads Movement, in general, exist. See, for 
example, W.C. Hilles, “The Good Roads Movement in the United States, 1880-1916” (master’s thesis, 
Duke University, 1958); Drake Hokanson, The Lincoln Highway: Main Street Across America (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1999); Howard L. Preston, Dirt Roads to Dixie: Accessibility and Modernization 
in the South, 1885-1935 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991).  
26 
 
notoriously dangerous. The United States fell into a cycle of building roads intended for 
yesteryear. As Mark Rose observes, “The pace of road building never kept pace with 
traffic increases nor with visions for faster traffic, social and urban change, and economic 
improvement.”25 As the 1920s wore on, one truth became increasingly apparent: the 
United States required a system of highways built for the automobiles and traffic volumes 
of the future. 
The Great Depression slowed the growth of the personal automobile ownership 
rates, but a new highway system remained on the minds of some American leaders. The 
Hoover administration briefly considered the job-creating potential of a massive highway 
building program, but it was Harold Ickes who first submitted a formal proposal for such 
an initiative. In 1933, Ickes proposed a state-of-the-art, limited-access, nationwide 
superhighway network as a New Deal public works project. The notion intrigued 
Franklin Roosevelt, who went so far as to develop a financing plan for the initiative, but 
the President ultimately opted to invest the government’s resources elsewhere, declaring 
highway programs “do not provide as much work as other methods of taking care of the 
unemployed.”26  
Wartime restrictions on gasoline, oil, steel, and rubber had drastically reduced the 
opportunity—and thus, appetite—for recreational driving, and the public consequently 
deprioritized better roads during the early 1940s. Nonetheless, the idea of a postwar 
highway construction program persisted throughout WWII. Federal Roads Commissioner 
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Thomas Harris McDonald and his engineers began developing a plan for a national 
express network in 1941, but Congress stymied the program when it heeded the desires of 
farmers, who wanted rural routes developed and improved, and interstate trucking 
companies, who vehemently opposed the fuel taxes required to build such a system. The 
American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) similarly advocated a 
40,000-mile expressway network in 1943 but ran into the same opposition as the Federal 
Bureau of Public Roads.27 Automobile manufacturers, gasoline distributors, tire 
companies, and other enterprises also shared visions of a massive postwar road building 
program but found little success advancing beyond the idea phase. By the time Paul F. 
Douglass delivered “The Civilizing Road” to the Annual Meeting of AAA Delegates in 
1947, the AAA and other advocates of a superhighway system had been watching roads 
fail to live up to expectations for nearly forty-five years and saw few signs the complex 
problems that had prevented previous initiatives from succeeding would relent any time 
soon.  
The AAA developed the superhighway system strategy that ultimately succeeded, 
as marked by the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, during World War 
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II.28 As the nation’s preeminent club for automobile and driving enthusiasts, the AAA’s 
interest in Interstate Highways was natural. The organization viewed the Interstate 
System as the catalyst that would bring the United States fully into the automobile age, 
further encouraging the proliferation of the personal automobile as the nation’s primary 
form of transportation. The AAA presented its plan to the club’s members throughout the 
war, and the strategy clearly demonstrates the organization understood why previous 
superhighway proposals had failed. The AAA did not make recommendations about how 
many roads should be built or the path they should take, choosing instead to focus on the 
framework necessary to push through the required legislation.29 In February, 1945, AAA 
leadership presented some specifics of its plan in the organization’s flagship publication, 
American Motorist. The AAA called for a unified network of roads of “national” and 
“interregional significance” administered by one federal agency that would coordinate 
efforts with the states; the federal Public Roads Administration would identify routes in 
conjunction with state highway authorities.30 The AAA’s deference to the Public Roads 
Administration and states on route development points to the level of comfort the 
organization had with the proposals the parties had developed previously. With the 
exception of Harold Ickes’ and Franklin Roosevelt’s ephemeral plan, which consisted 
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only of three north-south and three east-west routes, proposals universally recommended 
connecting most major metropolitan areas. Both the Bureau of Public Roads and AASHO 
plans called over 40,000 miles of concrete, and this satisfied the AAA. 
States had previously balked at any highway program that saddled them with 
construction costs. Under the AAA proposal, states would pay no more than half of the 
construction and maintenance expense, and federal funds would come from general 
revenue instead of a tax on fuel or automobiles. This strategy served the double function 
of placating the states and the interstate trucking lobby. Under the AAA’s financing plan, 
trucking companies would benefit from more efficient roads but would not pay more than 
any other industry. The plan also capped the contributions required by the states, 
guaranteed significant federal contributions, and addressed concerns over the 
apportionment process. Apportionments for the United States Numbered Highway 
System were the subject of much consternation, as the federal government distributed 
funds for very specific components of projects instead of the project as a whole. As such, 
delays were common while funds were short for a single maintenance shack even though 
the overall road was under budget. In an attempt to improve the process, the AAA 
recommended the Public Roads Administration develop a total cost per state for highway 
construction, which would be distributed, earmark free, for highway construction and 
maintenance.31 This plan also transferred significant control to the states, which reduced 
tension among those who feared a public works project of this magnitude gave 
Washington considerable opportunity to meddle in state administration. 
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The AAA remained close to the legislation as it made its way through 
Congressional committees and the larger legislative process. However, pushing the 
legislation through Congress was not the AAA’s primary activity during the 1940s and 
early 1950s. Instead, the AAA spent most of its time rallying support for a system of 
superhighways. This strategy was based on astute observations of the prior highway 
battles on the part of the AAA leadership. AAA leaders recognized the single greatest 
factor in the failure of previous legislation was a lack of vocal and enthusiastic support 
for the initiative. Regardless of the areas of contention, the AAA believed Congress 
would agree on legislation if business leaders and others with a vested interest in the 
Interstate Highway program grew vocal enough about their desire to see the roads built. 
To this end, the AAA was determined to rally road advocates for its postwar push and 
recruit as many new supporters as possible.  
The organization began coalition building in the early-to-mid 1940s, with club 
members across the country soliciting the support of any businesses that would support 
the cause. Senior leadership took responsibility for securing the support of larger 
organizations that would provide the weight necessary to push through legislation. 
Lower-ranking officials and local clubs solicited the support of less influential 
businesses. To this end, AAA leaders spoke to as many businesses and organizations as 
possible that stood to benefit from a superhighway system. These addresses often took a 
similar shape. The speaker would paint a picture of advanced, almost futuristic, 
automobile travel in an attempt to make audience members doubt their ability to 
comprehend how different life would be when the new era of transportation arrived. In 
the case of businesses, especially, the future was to be very lucrative for those who 
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capitalized on the growth of automobile travel; those who did not seize upon the 
transformative power of the Interstate Highways would struggle to survive.  
The AAA designed speeches to exploit audience fears that business would pass 
them by. For example, speaking to the Southern Hotel Association in 1944, AAA 
National Travel Director Elmer Jenkins encouraged the audience to imagine the future of 
automobile travel and its implications on the hospitality business. Noting that “we still 
have 80-mile an hour cars and 40-mile an hour roads”, Jenkins imagined the nature of 
driving after the war.32 In some regards, Jenkins’ list of automobile enhancements 
demonstrated considerable prescience, as it included shatterproof windshields, air 
conditioning, and easy-care upholstery. In other regards, Jenkins’ imaginings took longer 
to come to fruition or still remain the material of science fiction: tubeless tires, silent 
vehicles achieving fifty miles per gallon, transparent roofs, and cars that received traffic 
information via radio signal. These futuristic cars, Jenkins claimed, would be able to 
travel over one hundred miles per hour on a new system of superhighways; as driving 
became safer, more efficient, and more enjoyable, Americans would take to the roads in 
unprecedented numbers. And their driving would take them further from home more 
frequently. As they drove to distant locales for vacation, Americans would need lodging. 
According to Jenkins, the “hotel men” in attendance stood to grow their business 
exponentially if they advocated for the new highways.33 The AAA delivered a similar 
message to affiliated and unaffiliated automobile clubs and organizations representing 
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gasoline distributors, restaurateurs, automobile manufacturers, and business owners in 
would-be tourist destinations throughout the 1940s. In each case, the message was 
essentially the same: the audience would benefit greatly by supporting the AAA’s efforts 
in pursuing a modern highway system and a future without a new highway system was 
far less lucrative. 
The tremendous dedication of the AAA to coalition building and advocacy of a 
superhighway system is apparent in the official organization records from the 1940s and 
early 1950s. Senior leadership traveled extensively and on a near-constant basis as they 
attempted to stoke interest in the highways. For example, the AAA’s Executive 
Committee meeting minutes from February 13 and 14, 1947 shed light on the fervor with 
which the organization advocated for a new highway system during the 1940s. Since the 
previous Executive Committee meeting, held just three months prior, AAA President H. 
J. Brunnier had traveled to Cuba to meet with the Federation of Inter-American 
Automobile Clubs, to Mexico to meet with a national club, and to Los Angeles, 
Columbus, and Toledo to speak to various clubs in the United States. Other officers 
maintained similarly busy schedules in their pursuit of support.34  
Ultimately, numerous interested parties came together to advocate the AAA plan. 
In one sense, the alliance was formal. The “Road Gang,” consisting of approximately 250 
individuals representing scores of industries, met in Washington on a regular basis to 
discuss strategy. Tom Lewis notes that membership in the Road Gang was secretive, and 
the group left few records behind. Nonetheless, the group’s players and their activities are 
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easy to identify because, as Lewis notes, “what it did was so predictable.”35 Membership 
certainly included representatives of the AAA and the Automobile Manufacturers 
Association. It is reasonable to assume other represented interests consisted of oil, 
cement, asphalt, tire, and construction companies. Congressmen Albert Gore, Sr. of 
Tennessee and George Hyde Fallon of Maryland, arguably the two most important 
legislators to the eventual success of the requisite highway legislation and eventual 
cosponsors of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, likely participated as well.36 In 
another sense, the AAA alliance was informal, consisting of individuals and 
organizations that never sat down as a unified body but threw their support behind the 
AAA. Included in the informal alliance were wealthy automobile enthusiasts, small scale 
businesses tied to the driving industry, members of the AAA and other automobile clubs, 
and various businesses associated with the tourism industry that were not represented by 
national organizations. 
Despite the considerable support the AAA found with businesses and politicians, 
the organization’s leadership soon realized capitalizing on business interests would not be 
enough to advance legislation that would fund the Interstate Highways. The framework 
the AAA proposed proved ineffective at curtailing all of the old complaints about a 
massive highway-building program. The AAA proposal’s requirement that states match 
federal contributions dollar-for-dollar, as they had done since the first federal highway 
bill in 1916, became less palatable as cost estimates steadily increased. By 1955, the 
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estimated cost exceeded $100 billion.37 President Eisenhower advocated using tolls to pay 
for the construction (what he called “self-liquidation”), but highway engineers resisted 
anything that would slow the flow of traffic. Trucking companies and bus lines refused 
additional taxes on the equipment necessary to conduct their business, such as tires. The 
American Petroleum Institute opposed additional federal taxes on fuel. The AAA itself 
shirked any additional fees that would fall to personal automobile owners. As the various 
interest groups debated the appropriate approach to funding the program, Americans 
became increasingly uneasy about moving forward with highway construction.  
A 1947 memo prepared by the AAA’s Public Relations Committee for the AAA 
Executive Board captures the lackluster support for the Interstate Highway System after 
the first few years of advocacy. Despite the AAA’s “all out” efforts “in support of a high 
priority for the 40,000-mile National System of Interstate Highways” the Public Relations 
Committee saw little reason to be enthusiastic about the support the nation’s elected 
officials and state highway administrators had shown for the project. The AAA identified 
three primary problems. First, legislators were more interested in the development of 
local and farm-to-market roads. Second, “some highway officials appear[ed] to lack 
enthusiasm for giving any priority to the system.” And third, the “most progressive state 
highway officials” were “appalled when they contemplate[d] the cost of the system and 
the conflicting demands and confusion of thinking in the fiscal area of road policy.”38 At 
this point, the AAA acknowledged the need to change course. Convincing those in 
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decision-making capacities and America’s business leaders to agree on terms for the 
Interstate System would be an uphill and potentially fruitless road. Instead, the AAA 
aimed to convince the American people—those empowered to exert their will upon the 
elected officials—that Interstates were imperative for the future safety and prosperity of 
the United States. The memo referred to this initiative as “missionary work,” and the 
AAA would spend the next twenty years writing the Interstate Gospels and evangelizing 
to the nation.39  
MANUFACTURING SUPPORT 
 In order to broaden the appeal of the Interstate System, the AAA began 
incorporating talking points on the major benefits of the network into almost all of its 
speeches and began appealing to entities outside the universe of businesses that would be 
affected by the building program. Hotel, gasoline, tire, and automobile enterprises would 
not constitute enough support to push through the legislation; somehow the AAA needed 
to sway other types of businesses, such as retail, and the general population. The AAA 
proved particularly adept at identifying which pro-highway arguments would resonate 
with which audiences. As Executive Vice President Russell Singer pointed out in 1958, 
“We in the AAA have a wide variety of publics and our efforts and our materials were 
aimed at special target publics in the hope of getting maximum cooperation from each.”40 
 To support its public relations campaign, the AAA created and distributed media 
containing the pro-Interstate message. For those in decision-making capacities within the 
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transportation arena, “The Motorists’ Program for Better Highways” contained the 
complete AAA vision and a comprehensive explanation of the Association’s proposal. 
The brochure “How to Get Better Highways NOW” took aim at opinion leaders outside 
the motor club and highway fields and contained highlights of the AAA’s program. A 
leaflet entitled “You Can Help Get Better Highways” was included with all AAA mass-
mailings to both members and non-members. The AAA’s popular Trip-Tik,  detailed 
maps of specific routes used by drivers on road trips, began including information on 
Interstate Highway benefits. When drivers felt frustrated with the slow pace or heavy 
traffic on the old U.S. Numbered Highways, the Trip-Tik would tell them where the 
closest motel was and would remind the driver how much better the trip would be if the 
Interstate Highways existed. The Trip-Tik included a tear-out postcard pre-populated 
with a message on the benefits of Interstate Highways and was designed for easy mailing 
to members of Congress. The AAA also prepared two scripts for radio use. One was 
general in nature, intended for use if a news program interviewed a local club executive. 
The other script highlighted “the family interest in better highways” and was intended to 
sway women. Additionally, the AAA produced countless signs, billboards, and other 
media all promoting reasons the Interstates would benefit the United States.41 
While the AAA and other highway advocates tailored speeches, magazine 
articles, newspaper editorials, and other means of communicating the pro-highway 
message to myriad audiences, the one theme that appeared in almost every salvo was the 
connection between Interstates and economic development. In the earliest years of the 
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AAA’s lobbying effort, passing mention was made of the economic benefits of Interstate 
Highways. A 1944 issue of American Motorist suggested that the construction program 
would employ “large numbers of men” and would save federal and state governments 
money though lower road maintenance costs.42 After the AAA launched its campaign to 
win the American people over to the Interstate Highway cause, the suggested economic 
benefits of the highways multiplied. Not only would the Interstates directly and indirectly 
employ legions of men and women, the Interstates would increase land value. A 1967 
economic benefit study of I-26 outside of Columbia, South Carolina commissioned by 
the federal Bureau of Public Roads and the local Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research found the construction of I-26 negatively impacted some land value, but in 
total, had significantly increased the value of the property it touched. The report pointed 
to a fifty-three acre tract of land that appraised for one thousand dollars per acre in 1956 
and sold for three thousand dollars per acre in 1961. The major change in the intervening 
years, of course, was the appearance of I-26.43 
Road proponents usually presented the economic benefits of Interstate Highways 
as simple logic: better roads meant more travelers, more travelers meant increased 
demand for gasoline, restaurants, and hotels. Better roads eased the movement of goods 
from factory to store, reducing costs and increasing sales. In fact, the mere activity of 
shopping was to be more enjoyable—and therefore more frequent—after the construction 
of Interstate Highways, as the trip to the store would be less stressful.  At a speech 
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marking the fortieth anniversary of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956, AAA President 
and CEO Robert L. Darbenet reflected upon the need for the Interstate System at mid-
century. He noted: 
World War II was over. The Korean “conflict” had come to an end. And the 
country had enormous pent-up demand for goods and services. Despite this 
potential for prosperity, economic growth would be hampered unless the country 
had a safe and efficient network of arteries through which the lifeblood of 
commerce could flow.44 
 
Once built, Interstates would encourage Americans to buy new cars. They would travel 
greater distances, consuming more fuel and tires. They would employ the services of 
additional mechanics. In total, Interstate highways would completely transform the 
American economy by creating new industries and providing an enormous boon to 
others.45 According to the AAA and its allies, the Interstate System would serve as the 
beating heart of the twentieth-century economy. 
Tourism undoubtedly stands as one of the industries whose mid-to-late twentieth 
century development was largely dependent upon the Interstates.  Likely because the 
image of American families loading up the station wagon for a trip to Florida was more 
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accessible than the abstract notion of money multipliers and gross domestic product, 
tourism was also the example of Interstate-fueled economic development most frequently 
invoked by proponents of the Interstate Highway. The arguments made in the name of 
tourism consequently permeated the national conversation about highways. In 1969, a 
Georgia resident wrote to Senator Herman Talmadge to complain about an experience 
she and her husband had while driving through Savannah. Calling Highway 17, I-95 
predecessor in the area, a “disgrace,” Mrs. William Bellah questioned, “How could any 
tourist want to come to Savannah after driving that old-fashioned, outmoded road?” She 
concluded her letter by stating, “Anyone entering Georgia by this route can tell how far 
behind we [Georgians] are.”46 Mrs. Bellah’s letter reflects the reach of the Road Gang’s 
message. Upon experiencing a less than ideal road, she knew to immediately think of the 
impact on tourists. Then, through conditioning, she knew Highway 17’s problem was its 
age; it was, she believed, too old to be acceptable. Georgia, if it wanted to be perceived as 
modern and in-line with the rest of the country, needed to invest heavily in its roads. 
Senator Talmadge, in response, knew what Mrs. Bellah was suggesting. His only 
resolution to her complaint was to say, “As you know, Interstate 95 is scheduled to 
replace Highway 17 when completed.”47 The answer, it seems, was new roads. Highway 
17 would remain an open road even after I-95 opened to the public, but Talmadge, as an 
advocate of the Interstate System, saw only the promise of the new highways.  
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The United States embarked upon its program of Interstate Building during a 
period when leaders saw incredible value in tourism. To be sure, much of the value was 
economic. But in the wake of World War II and in the throes of the Cold War, some 
believed the experiences gained through traveling would provide a humanitarian benefit 
as well. In a short essay discussing the experiences of Americans traveling through 
Europe in the mid-1950s, John Steinbeck wrote, “I believe that tourists are very valuable 
to the modern world. It is very difficult to hate people you know.”48 Steinbeck and others 
believed the tensions that dominated the post-war years could be alleviated if people 
simply took the initiative to meet those who did not share their backgrounds, culture, and 
value. In the United States, leaders applied Steinbeck’s opinion to domestic travel. In this 
way, another benefit of the Interstates closely tied to economic development was the 
frequently employed argument that Interstates would increase connectivity and by 
extension, improve society. Highway supporters frequently spoke of the shorter travel 
times the Interstate System would permit and argued this would allow for closer ties 
between people and communities. The Interstates would, they argued, allow smaller 
satellite cities and towns to become more united with the larger urban center. People in 
neighboring communities would exchange ideas and experiences more readily. 
Ultimately, boosters argued, Interstates would make the country a more united nation, 
literally and figuratively. The wish to see Interstates tie communities together was 
widespread as the highway program developed. A 1972 issue of American Motorist, for 
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example, suggested I-95 would serve a greater purpose, as “it connects and pulls together 
diverse sections of the Nation…It truly joins the North and South.”49  
In 1954, Vice-President Richard Nixon, dedicating a new AAA headquarters in 
Florida, addressed the safety and timesaving benefits of the highway network that was 
then making its way through Congress. His comments focused, however, on the “more 
intangible” benefit of the increased travel the roads would permit. “It has tended to break 
down sectional barriers, it has brought our people together, and by bringing our people 
together, it has made our people understand each other better than they had previously,” 
he said.50 Other Americans adopted the philosophy that tourism could help address social 
issues as well as boost the economy. John F. Kennedy was arguably the most vocal 
proponent of this mindset.  Kennedy’s See the U.S.A. program encouraged foreigners to 
travel to the United States as a means of improving the United States’ balance of 
payments but also to realize the humanitarian benefits Steinbeck discussed.51  As a 
companion initiative, Kennedy introduced “See America Now,” which aimed to 
“encourage Americans to see more of the historic and scenic areas of our country and to 
stimulate their wider use of our magnificent recreational facilities.”52 While certainly 
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aimed at further improving the United States’ balance of payments, See America Now 
was also designed to alleviate regional tensions. 
The civil rights strife of the 1960s had piqued American cognizance of regional 
differences between the North and South. As Dewey Grantham noted: 
An aspect of…resurgent sectionalism was the intensifying emotional involvement 
of white Americans in other regions [than the South], whose reactions to 
momentous racial events of the decade included rising antipathy toward white 
southerners, mounting sympathy and support for black southerners, and 
increasing identification of the South as the source and embodiment of the race 
problem in the United States.53 
 
With tensions on the rise, Kennedy looked to tourism to help alleviate the strain on the 
country. The Johnson Administration advanced Kennedy’s initiative after his untimely 
death, re-branding the program as “Discover America.” In a contribution to a 1965 
edition of American Motorist, Vice President Hubert Humphrey claimed, “Your President 
and this government are taking a positive, affirmative, active interest in travel, in tourism, 
in seeing to it that more Americans get to know about their country.”54 Humphrey then 
revealed the true thinking underlying the program: 
I might add that there is a certain political therapy in this. When people get to 
know more about their America, they are less critical of it. They have a better 
understanding of the other fellow’s problems. They have a little better 
appreciation of his mores and cultural habits. This is a great, big country, and it is 
so big that few of us have had time to even sense its greatness or its diversity.55 
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It is clear the Johnson Administration saw humanitarian value in increasing travel within 
the United States. Johnson could wield increased tourism as he fought the regional 
divide, and the Interstate Highway System would be a powerful weapon in this fight. 
Humphrey’s American Motorist article included a photograph of the Vice 
President partaking in exactly the sort of cultural exchange he hoped other Americans 
would experience if they used the new Interstate Highways to see their country. In the 
photograph, Humphrey stands on the ground in Colonial Williamsburg. He is dressed in a 
suit and is shaking hands with a young African-American man dressed in colonial attire. 
The young man is riding a horse, which puts him significantly above the Vice President. 
Looking up, Humphrey is smiling. While the words of Humphrey’s article made no 
mention of race or segregation, the accompanying photograph says everything the 
Johnson Administration hoped Discover America would accomplish. 
After economic development, the most frequently mentioned benefit of the 
Interstate Highways by boosters was “progress.” The theme was not limited to social 
progress, such as the improved race relations hinted at in Humphrey’s American Motorist 
article.  Progress, as Robert Collins has noted, became something of a hegemon in the 
postwar American mindset, as “progress for the sake of progress” became the norm. 
Whether militaristically, diplomatically, socially, technologically, culturally, or 
economically, progress was the goal of mid-century America.56 Or, as the prescient Lewis 
Mumford wrote of the American pursuit of progress in 1934, the country perceived 
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progress as “a good in itself independent of direction or end.”57 Highway boosters strove 
to tie the notion of progress to the Interstate System through an unrelenting effort to 
mention progress, in all its forms, whenever they discussed the superhighway program. 
As Lewis and Rose note, advocates did attach the Interstates to social progress, but they 
also intended for would-be supporters to view the highways as progress in whatever 
realm they were passionate about, whether it be social, economic, or other.  
Among the more practical benefits of Interstate Highways, the AAA positioned 
driver safety as one of the chief benefits of the new system. Driving had grown 
increasingly hazardous in the United States in the 1940s. By 1956, the United States 
experienced one automobile-related injury for every 670,000 vehicle miles and one death 
for every eighteen million vehicle miles.58 The Interstates would, the AAA argued, make 
driving more safe for two reasons. First, the roads would be designed to handle modern 
cars at higher speeds. Second, the Interstates would be characterized by limited access, 
meaning drivers could only enter and exit the road at designated spots. This increased 
control of the flow of traffic would make for a safer driving experience. In 1960, the 
AAA estimated that 4,000 lives annually would be saved by way of the Interstate 
Highways.59 
The growth in traffic had not only made driving a more dangerous activity by 
mid-century, it had also created tremendous traffic in America’s urban areas. The 61 
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million passenger cars on the road by 1960 had shifted America’s residential patterns. 
The 1950 census showed a thirteen percent increase in “central city” population but a 
thirty-five percent increase in suburban growth.60 The existing highways were not 
designed to handle the new traffic patterns, and gridlock became a defining characteristic 
of the urban experience. The AAA positioned the Interstates as a solution to the growing 
urban traffic congestion. Pointing to the Los Angeles Freeway as an example of what 
modern roads could do for a city “frequently cited as the horrible example of over-
motorization,” the AAA argued what had been constructed of the Freeway had already 
“speeded up rush-hour traffic and reduced the load on nearby surface streets.”61 When 
critics pointed to the gridlock that immediately formed on sections of the Interstates that 
had opened, the AAA argued this was the result of an incomplete network and that “a 
completed freeway system will distribute traffic.”62 
Americans have come to associate the Interstate Highways with national defense, 
and for good reason. “Defense” is in the official name of the network; today, it is known 
as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, and it 
was enabled by the National interstate and Defense Highway Act of 1956. Additionally, 
the story of Eisenhower finding inspiration for the roads when he saw how well the 
German Autobahn moved military equipment and personnel during WWII is well known. 
Some also know that Eisenhower participated in a military exercise in 1919 designed to 
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test the American roads for military readiness. A three-mile long caravan of personnel 
and vehicles traveled from Washington, D.C. to San Francisco. It took sixty-two days, 
averaging five miles per hour. Unsurprisingly, the 1919 roads were declared inadequate, 
as the caravan spent considerable time pulling vehicles out of the mud— a disastrous  
situation if circumstances required the movement of troops across the country as quickly 
as possible.63 Furthering the popular association of the Interstates with “defense” was the 
AAA, who included national defense as a benefit in many of its attempts to rally support 
for the Interstate program. Defense served as a strong selling point during the 1940s and 
1950s, as it played on Cold War fears and helped the system appear as an imperative 
instead of a luxury.  
A 1951 memo prepared by the AAA for Charles E. Wilson, the Director of the 
War Department’s Office of Defense Mobilization, clearly demonstrates the AAA 
recognized the effectiveness of defense as an argument in favor of the Interstate Highway 
System. The War Department had historically treated highways as expendable, which the 
AAA viewed as a key reason highway construction halted during World War II. In the 
memo, the AAA attempts to convince Wilson to consider roads as critical to American 
mobilization efforts. The memo reveals the inadequacy of the early 1950s highway 
system. The network included 7,500 bridges that were too weak to handle military 
vehicles. The system also featured 668 grades too steep for some military trucks. Much of 
the network was also too narrow for military vehicles. In summary, the AAA declared, 
“Everyone concerned with the defense emergency MUST be impressed by such great 
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deficiencies.”64 Leveraging Cold War jitters, then, was not solely employed on civilians, 
but the military establishment as well.  
The national defense argument carried considerable weight and appears to have 
found many sympathizers. When the Kennedy administration contemplated using 1.5 
percent of highway research funds “for general transportation planning and research in 
urban areas,” an internal memo argued against the idea, noting the Department of 
Defense “would resist tampering with highway trust funds.”65 Additionally, AASHO 
cited national defense as the most important reason to complete the Interstate System in 
1967.66 Among all the segments of the Interstate Highway System, I-95 was most 
frequently discussed in the context of national defense given the high percentage of the 
national population living within proximity of the route and the number of military bases 
along the east coast. When citizens in Princeton, New Jersey revolted against I-95 in 
1976, H.R. Del Mar, a Major General in the United States Army, wrote to Senator 
William Harrison A. Williams, Jr. expressing the military’s desire that the wishes of the 
community be ignored. Noting that I-95 “extends the entire length of the East Coast,” Del 
Mar claimed a break of I-95 in Princeton would “degrade the strategic value of the 
network.”67  
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In the end, the Road Gang’s arguments in favor of Interstate construction gained 
considerable traction. One need only review the newspaper and magazine articles of the 
1940s and 1950s to see how pervasive the arguments became. A very representative 1955 
article in the Atlanta Journal notes that superhighways were “long overdue for defense 
and safety reasons” and goes on to note the roads would serve as a “pump-primer” for the 
nation’s economy.68 The public relations campaign proved incredibly successful at 
overcoming decades of inertia. The compromise that ultimately  resolved the impasse and 
secured the funding for the Interstate Highway System came about in 1956. The final 
hurdle, namely the fiscal apportionment between the federal government and the states, 
fell when the Boggs-Fallon Bill and the Highway Revenue Act emerged from 
Congressional subcommittee. Combined, they created a Highway self-liquidating 
Highway Trust Fund, which theoretically overcame the risk of the traditional “pay as you 
go” approach to highway financing by eliminating the threat of the funding disappearing 
at any moment. The Trust Fund gave pro-road Americans confidence the project would 
not be derailed by political divisions while construction was underway.69 These bills also 
put a 90-10 split in place between the Federal government and the states, thus alleviating 
state concern that they would be burdened with expense obligations they could not meet. 
With the financing question solved, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 came to 
fruition. Eisenhower, recovering from a heart attack at Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center, signed the bill into law. He gave the AAA one of the pens used to sign the 
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legislation as acknowledgement of his appreciation for the role the organization played in 
bringing the Interstate System to fruition.  
It should be noted that a compelling competitive thesis on the forces that resulted 
in the public throwing support behind the Interstate exists. In the conclusion to Motoring, 
a fascinating account of the psyche that gave rise to American car culture, John A. Jakle 
and Keith A. Sculle challenge the thesis that defense or even economic arguments 
ultimately convinced the United States to move forward with constructing the Interstate 
Highway System. Instead, they argue “what enabled passage [of the 1956 Highway Act] 
was less the potential to move military equipment and personnel than the potential to 
move pleasure-seeking motorists.”70 Jakle and Sculle are not speaking of tourists, per se, 
but rather any American that gets pleasure out of driving an automobile. By their account, 
Interstate Highways ultimately came about in 1956 because, by that point, enough 
Americans had developed a desire for the ability to travel safely at high speeds that the 
nation could no longer put the action off. Statistics suggest timing played a key role as 
well. In 1950, 60 percent of American families owned an automobile. By 1956, the rate 
had increased to 70 percent. By 1960, 77 percent of American families would own an 
automobile.71 As they write, “Highways may have been justified on grounds of military 
defense or economic prosperity…but the growing numbers of motorists…made highway 
building not just politically feasible but compelling.72 By their account, the United States 
federal government ultimately funded and built the Interstate Highway System because it 
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became politically prudent for them to do so when the number of constituents demanding 
the roads outweighed the number resisting them. And the constituents did not support 
construction out of a desire to protect the nation, grow the economy, or save the lives of 
drivers, as the AAA would have preferred they done; instead, Jakle and Sculle argue the 
average American began to support the Interstates once he or she owned a personal 
automobile and discovered the pleasure and autonomy of driving. 
If Jakle and Sculle are correct, the public relations campaign and interconnected 
pro-highway arguments outlined in this chapter were effectively moot; according to 
Motoring, Americans did not need to be convinced to support highways, as their growing 
penchant for driving was enough fuel to push through Interstate Highway legislation. 
While an interesting argument, Jakle and Sculle weave a troubled logical web, as they 
cannot prove elected officials did not need to be convinced of benefits. Nor can they 
discount the effect of the pro-highway public relations campaign. If elected officials 
passed the Highway Act of 1956 because it was politically compelling, there would have 
been little reason to justify it in speeches, constituent correspondence, and other channels 
years before and years after 1956. Most likely, the public’s desire for Interstate Highways 
was inexorably linked to highway proponents’ efforts to convince the United States of the 
network’s value. After all, highway advocates aimed the public relations campaign at the 
populace as well as politicians. 
THE RESULTS OF RHETORIC: TWO CASE STUDIES 
Despite the significant public debate and conversation about Interstates dating 
back to World War II, the residents of Richmond, Virginia did not know what to expect 
when they turned out for the dedication of the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike on June 
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30, 1958. This segment of highway, which had been championed since 1947, had 
struggled to gain traction until the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 provided the requisite 
funding. As part of the nascent Interstate Highway System, and at a total cost of seventy-
six million dollars, the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike took the designation of I-95 and 
gave the city a direct, high speed connection to Petersburg, about twenty-five miles to the 
south.73 One of the first segments of Interstate Highway open to the public, I-95 opened 
in Richmond amidst a seemingly united, optimistic, and jubilant citizenry.74  
The dedication festivities were an opportunity for the local community to 
celebrate the city’s status as one of the first urban areas in the country with a thirty-mile 
segment of operational Interstate Highway. The day before the road officially opened, 
local businesses inundated the Richmond Times Dispatch with notes of celebration and 
self-congratulation. Thalhimers, a local department store, purchased a full-page ad 
featuring a stylized “Good going, friends” against pictures of a toll plaza and an 
illustration of I-95 weaving through Richmond’s downtown. The E.G. Bowles 
Contracting Company spent advertising dollars to declare, “We’re proud to have played a 
part in the construction of the new expressway.” The Atlantic Bitulithic Company 
proclaimed, “Virginians are proud of their new expressway…we are proud to have 
furnished miles of asphalt used in it’s construction” [sic].75 The moment inspired a local 
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hardware store to encourage residents to “have confidence in the knowledge that you are 
a citizen of this magic metropolis with a potential far greater than our father’s ever 
dreamed was possible.”76 An insert in the Richmond News Leader invited the public to 
attend the opening ceremony and “see …what makes your capital city move, breathe, and 
grow.”77 
The crowd included two former Virginia governors and the current governor; 
members of the city’s business elite; the local, state, and regional media; and thousands 
of curious and enthusiastic citizens. The proceedings featured only two speakers, T. 
Coleman Andrews, the president of the Richmond Retail Merchants’ Association, and 
Mayor F. Henry Garber. Andrews’ status as the first speaker says volumes about the 
pretense under which I-95 was sold to the Richmond community. Above all else, 
supporters of the project argued that the Interstate would serve as a catalyst to the city’s 
retail stores. Specifically, highway boosters fingered downtown retailers, whose 
department stores lined 7th and Broad Streets, as the beneficiaries of I-95. These retailers, 
in turn, rallied behind the project.  
I-95 entered Richmond in the midst of an economic boom. Since World War II 
ended, Richmond’s downtown had experienced growth and a dramatic increase in wealth. 
Between 1948 and 1950, construction outlays in the city increased more than $15 million, 
or nearly forty percent. Approximately 85 percent of construction outlays went to new 
construction, not renovation. Additionally, manufacturers added $304 million in 
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industrial output.78 As was the case across the country, much of this development came at 
the expense of existing businesses in the city center. While manufacturing and 
commercial development was strong within Richmond’s core, the city’s residential center 
steadily slid into the suburbs. Between 1946 and 1956, Richmond’s metropolitan 
population increased from just over 300,000 to 400,000; yet, almost all of the growth was 
outside of the city center. Meanwhile, car registrations increased dramatically. By time I-
95 opened, there almost the same number of cars as telephones in Richmond.79 
Thalhimers and other Richmond department stores had experienced a steady growth in 
business in the immediate postwar years, but as 1960 approached, they saw business 
increasingly flowing to the strip malls of the bedroom communities just outside of the 
city.  
The Richmond retailing community believed better transportation would solve the 
problem. As Andrews said in his dedication speech, “One of the problems of retailing 
today is inadequate arteries to provide the smooth and convenient flow of traffic to and 
from metropolitan areas.”80 I-95 was to be the key artery pumping citizens who now 
resided between Richmond’s core and Petersburg back to the city for their shopping 
needs. With easier travel, the logic went, shoppers would return to shop even if they no 
longer lived within the city. The AAA and other highway proponents espoused this 
opinion when they spoke of the economic value of Interstates. In a 1960 brochure 
published by the AAA with the aim of addressing the questions surrounding the effect of 
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increased car ownership and highway construction on downtowns, the organization 
argued that highways were the only way to keep businesses alive in city centers. Without 
increased highway access to city centers, “the trend toward neighborhood rather than 
downtown shopping would be greatly accelerated,” the brochure claimed. It continued, 
“Central business districts face many problems…but there would seem to be no more 
direct route to economic suicide than to eliminate the business they now enjoy from 
automobile passengers.”81 Richmond’s downtown retail establishment accepted the 
AAA’s argument and tied their future to the belief I-95 would counteract the shifting 
residential pattern. As Richmond officially opened I-95 to traffic, the  retailers’ 
spokesman believed the future was secure, as he proclaimed the Turnpike “the greatest 
single achievement in Richmond during our generation.”82 
After Andrews’ speech, Mayor Garber took the podium. “This will, I am certain, 
be my last public appearance as mayor of this city,” he stated. “I can think of no more 
important occasion—no occasion fraught with more potential for our future.”83 Garber, 
who as a city council member had organized some residential communities against the 
route I-95 would take through the city, had ultimately failed. Ed Grimsley, the only 
member of the Richmond media who consistently covered the potential damage I-95 
could cause, said of Garber’s efforts, “On the sidelines fighting a long and futile battle 
against the toll road,” Garber’s group “was not powerful enough to pose a serious threat 
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to the project.”84  Nonetheless, by time I-95 opened to the public, Garber was an adamant 
supporter of the highway. While the route was not one he preferred, Garber could not 
deny the value I-95 presented for the city of Richmond. 
Garber’s speech was full of praise for those who had advocated the highway since 
the 1950s and predictions of economic prosperity. But while Andrews’ talking points 
focused almost completely on the importance of I-95 to the retail district and wider 
economy of Richmond, Garber focused on unifying potential of highways. “It is my hope 
that this new link connecting the cities of Richmond, Colonial Heights, Petersburg, and 
other communities will be a bond that brings us even closer together as we face the 
future,” he said.85 Since automobiles became a dominant mode of transportation, the 
region had struggled to produce a road that could safely and efficiently move people and 
goods between Virginia’s capital and its neighboring urban centers. An early twentieth 
century road suffered years of delays and, right before opening to the public in 1926, a 
key bridge collapsed into the Chopawamsic Creek, thus ensuring decades with no 
adequate road in the region. U.S. 1, the backbone of the United States network of 
Numbered Highways, provided the first reliable, paved route connecting Richmond to 
Washington, but it was built for slower automobiles, and the high death toll between the 
cities resulted in the popular nickname for U.S.1 in the area as “the Killer.” A 1965 
article in American Motorist hailed I-95 as the answer to Richmond’s long struggle with 
inadequate regional transportation, saying the road “offers a speedy, safe, and scenic trip 
that would have surpassed the wildest imaginings of the sorely tried travelers of the past.” 
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With I-95, the article went on, Richmond had direct access to Washington, Baltimore, 
and the New Jersey Turnpike, resulting in “reduced traveling time, decreased cost, and 
increased safety.”86 According to the author, I-95 filled a long-standing transportation 
need and fulfilled all of the Road Gang’s talking points for what made a great highway. 
While the Richmond ribbon-cutting ceremony focused on the city and its 
immediate vicinity, there were signs event organizers were aware of I-95’s broader 
impact, including the role Richmond’s segment of I-95 would play in connectivity on the 
national scale. The organizers almost certainly drew inspiration from highway boosters’ 
argument that Interstates would draw the nation together. After the speakers had finished 
proclaiming the bright future Richmond had in store thanks to the new highway, attention 
turned to the ribbon spanning the asphalt. A single ribbon crossed the four lanes in front 
of a toll plaza beneath a large banner imploring drivers to pay the exact change of twenty 
cents. On the northbound side of the road, the ribbon was blue, while grey fabric spanned 
the southbound lanes. Public radio reporters explained the significance: the blue ribbon 
represented the “Union Army—or at least it’s significant that those heading north are 
going toward Yankee Land.” Meanwhile, the grey ribbon represented “those that will be 
traveling south, further into Dixie.” The Richmond News Leader mentioned the 
variegated ribbon in its coverage of the proceedings but did not speculate on its 
significance.87 The radio broadcast is the only evidence anyone in attendance considered 
the symbolism; yet, there is no doubt the ribbon was purposeful, as the broadcasters 
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prefaced his commentary with “I am told.”88 Who explained the significance is not clear, 
but the organizers wanted to suggest—however subtly—that Richmond played a major 
role in the nation’s past and that I-95 would allow it to remain a significant location in the 
United States’ future. I-95 would bind the North and South, and communities like 
Richmond would serve as a gateway between the regions. 
After the widows of the Richmond Turnpike Authority’s first chairman and first 
general manager cut the ribbon, a beauty queen crowned as “Miss Turnpike” christened 
the asphalt with a bottle of champagne.89 The bottle was only one third full by time the 
bottle broke on account, the Richmond Times Dispatch suspected, of the eighty-five 
degree heat.90 Following a parade grand marshaled by the president of the Richmond 
Retail Merchants’ Association, highway officials allowed drivers to “inspect” the road for 
five hours without paying the toll. In anticipation of a “crush” of curious drivers, fifty-
three state police officers assembled to maintain order.91 Thousands of motorists turned 
out to drive the new highway, resulting in significant backups throughout the city. Just 
hours after Mayor Garber promised residents the Turnpike would usher an era of better 
commuting, there were mile-long lines of cars at every onramp in the city. Police 
ultimately had to shut down a few key onramps in order to clear the congestion. While 
built for upwards of 25,000 motorists at a time, the Richmond Times Dispatch estimated 
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“this figure was probably exceeded by several thousand” on account of residents’ 
excitement and curiosity.92  
Highway ribbon cuttings continued to draw crowds long after Richmond’s 
dedication ceremony. When I-95 opened in a rural area on the Maryland and Delaware 
border five years later, nearly 10,000 people turned out. These attendees came not just to 
marvel at the new highway but also to hear President John F. Kennedy speak at the road’s 
dedication.93 While the Richmond highway dedication was a local celebration featuring 
local players, the ribbon cutting of the Delaware Turnpike or Northeastern Expressway, 
as I-95 was called in Delaware and Maryland, respectively, was ostensibly a national 
affair. Kennedy’s presence was the most obvious sign that the November 14th ceremony 
had national implications, and the selection of Robert Moses as the emcee of the event 
further indicated the larger import. Undoubtedly the most prominent and influential 
advocate of highway construction in the twentieth century, Moses’ presence provided the 
day’s events with a sense of engineering and civil planning significance in addition to the 
political significance suggested by the President’s presence. Given the speakers of the I-
95 ribbon cutting, it would be easy to overlook the local flavor of the day’s events. 
Despite the national figures and their attempts to make the dedication of I-95 on the 
Maryland/Delaware state line a national event, however, it is important to note local 
history, local players, and local circumstance influenced the festivities in key ways that 
reflected the local nature of I-95.  
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When Delaware Governor Elbert Carvel and Maryland Governor J. Millard 
Tawes began soliciting Kennedy’s participation in the dedication ceremony in October 
1963, they believed pointing out their segment of I-95’s significance to the national 
transportation network would lure the President.94 In a letter to Kennedy, Governor 
Carvel noted the Delaware Turnpike “eliminates the last major bottleneck between 
Boston and Washington on the present super highway system.” He went on: “There is no 
other project of this magnitude to be completed during the next few years…which will 
mean so much to the traveling public.”95 The Chairman-Director of the Maryland State 
Roads Commission noted the segment of I-95 would “close the gap in the important 
Atlantic seaboard expressway system and…make a vital contribution to the economic 
strength of the nation.”96 Tawes wrote, “We of the two States consider this a most 
important milestone in the development of a transportation system that is needed to move 
people and goods, and to strengthen the economy of the Atlantic Seaboard.”97 This 
strategy worked, and Kennedy agreed to attend the ceremony, believing it to be a good 
opportunity to push his larger transportation agenda and to highlight what his 
administration had accomplished in regards to Interstate Highways. An early draft of his 
dedication speech recounts how the Kennedy Administration worked to resolve the 
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Interstate funding crisis of the early 1960s and advanced a plan to overhaul the federal 
transportation tax structure.98  
Kennedy could not have selected a better location to discuss the Interstate 
financing crisis of the preceding years. The Northeast Expressway / Delaware Turnpike 
had always been envisioned as a part of the Interstate Highway System, but when a 
recession in the late 1950s created a Highway Trust Fund shortfall, funds to build the 
road turned to a trickle. Not wanting to delay construction of a road that had been in the 
works since the mid-1950s, Maryland and Delaware collectively decided to move 
forward with building the road without federal funds. Instead, the states installed toll 
booths, and the proceeds paid for the highway. The segment still tied into federally-
financed portions of I-95 to the north and south, and consequently the portion of highway 
in question carried the I-95 designation even though it came to existence outside the 
confines of the Interstate System.  
Kennedy’s plan to use the Northeast Expressway ribbon cutting as a platform 
from which to promote transportation policy remained in place until the last minute. At a 
briefing for reporters attending the trip to the ribbon cutting ceremony, Kennedy Press 
Secretary Pierre Salinger revealed he did not know precisely where the ceremony would 
be held. When one reporter asked for the specific town, Salinger joked, “It is on the 
highway between here and there.” Another reporter informed the first—and Salinger—
that the ceremony was “on the Mason-Dixon line between Elkton, Maryland and Newark, 
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Delaware.”99 It is unclear if this was the first time the Kennedy Administration 
considered the historic significance of the ceremony site, but the next draft of the 
dedication speech used the setting as a springboard for a speech about the Interstate’s 
historical significance and potential for the future of the region.100 The realization 
informed every moment of Kennedy’s visit to the ceremony site, as every step Kennedy 
took was orchestrated to acknowledge the significance of the border. 
Shortly before four in the afternoon on a chilly November 14, 1963 a series of 
three helicopters appeared on the horizon. After two bouts of disappointment upon 
realizing the first helicopters did not carry the President, it took the crowd a few moments 
to mount a fully enthusiastic greeting when the third chopper landed. It touched down in 
a field straddling the state line. President Kennedy emerged, and flanked by Carvel, 
Tawes, and a congressman from each state, followed a “freshly laid grass pathway” 
toward a platform that had been erected especially for the event.101 The platform, too, 
spanned the border. The podium from which speakers would address the ten thousand 
indviduals in attendance stood in the very center of the podium, right on the symbolic 
dividing line of North and South.  
For its entire history, the Mason-Dixon Line was a demarcation of difference, 
meant to draw distinction between what was on one side versus the other. Charles Mason 
and Jeremiah Dixon established the line as a means of settling a border dispute between 
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the colonies of Pennsylvania and Maryland in the 1760s. The Penn and Baltimore 
families quarreled over the boundary for nearly a century before Mason and Dixon 
attempted to establish a clear line of demarcation. Over time, the line became the 
symbolic dividing line between free and slave states and between North and South.102 
Maryland and Delaware, formed out of three Pennsylvania colonies, eventually moved 
past the border dispute, but the six-hundred pound limestone Mason-Dixon Boundary 
Stone marking the border remained a constant reminder the colonies—and eventually 
states—were fundamentally different.  
Local newspapers were among the first to publicly discuss the significance of the 
Northeast Expressway and Delaware Turnpike converging on the Mason-Dixon Line. 
William Frank, the most prolific journalist in Delaware during the 1960s, saw the 
highway’s opening as a historic moment with significance far greater than the 
transportation needs of the twentieth century. “The governors of Delaware and Maryland 
are about to undo…what Mason and Dixon began to do exactly 200 years ago,” Frank 
wrote.103 A political cartoon in the Wilmington Evening Journal depicted Carvel and 
Tawes shaking hands across a line drawn in the earth. In the cartoon, each stands upon 
the text of his state’s respective portion of I-95 (Tawes on “Maryland Expwy” and Carvel 
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on “Delaware Tpk.”). Behind the governors, Mason and Dixon are perched on rocks 
scowling at the men breaking down the border they created.104 
On the chilly November afternoon in 1963, Kennedy’s spoke from the platform 
carefully constructed across the Line. Kennedy’s speech was, on the whole, unremarkable 
but does reflect the pervasiveness of the arguments advanced by the AAA and its allies. 
Like others who participated in dedication ceremonies, Kennedy employed the highway 
lobby’s arguments in favor of Interstates. The system would, Kennedy said, save eight 
thousand lives each year. He also touched on the economic benefits of the road, noting 
nothing other than transportation infrastructure “has a greater impact upon the Nation and 
no industry has a greater opportunity to affect our economic progress.”105 Kennedy spoke 
of the importance of the Northeast Expressway to the interconnectivity of the region, 
noting the road would be a key thoroughfare when “the whole area, stretching from 
Washington to Boston, will be one gigantic urban center.”106 The President was not alone 
in his use of AAA pro-highway arguments when speaking of I-95 in this region. 
A Maryland State Roads Commission news release, published a few weeks before 
the I-95 dedication, also demonstrated an acceptance of the highway lobby’s arguments 
in favor of Interstate Highways. The release primarily focused on the safety benefits of 
the Northeast Expressway. Citing the one thousand commercial and private access points 
on U.S. 40, the road largely replaced by the Northeast Expressway, the Maryland Roads 
Commission argued I-95 would significantly reduce the 1,450 accidents and 950 
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automobile-related personal injuries each year due to the new highway’s limited access 
structure.107 The release also noted I-95 “is expected, because of its strategic location in 
the Boston-Washington corridor, to play an important role in lifting the economy of 
Baltimore City, as well as the counties of Baltimore, Harford, and Cecil.” Additionally, 
the release went on to say the highway “is expected to be used by a large group [of] 
commuting workers who have their jobs [in the city] and maintain their residences in the 
Baltimore area.”108 Clearly, the Road Commission accepted the argument that Interstates 
would strengthen regional economies through the easier flow of goods and people and 
that they would allow residents to easily travel back and forth between their downtown 
jobs and suburban homes. 
Governor Carvel appears to have been equally swayed by the pro-highway 
arguments. A fact sheet he disseminated to any constituents who inquired about the 
Delaware Turnpike called out the safety benefits of the new road as opposed to U.S. 40: 
“In 1960 there were 25 people killed on the Route 40 stretch, 1,134 persons injured and 
1,950 traffic accidents. The left turn problems, crossover movements, [and] stopping for 
signal conditions will not occur on the new expressway.”109 
While I-95 in Richmond and on the Mason-Dixon Line opened at different times, 
to different crowds, and to different fanfare, both ribbon cutting ceremonies gave 
officials—local and national—the opportunity to express their views of the Interstate. 
The media, in their coverage of the events, revealed another interpretation of the road’s 
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significance. Finally, letters to the editor and politicians’ constituent mail provide insight 
into a third take. Taken in whole, these sources suggest that those who chose to celebrate 
the opening of I-95 were generally optimistic about the future the highway would help 
forge. The value people saw in the road, however, varied wildly. Many saw economic 
benefit, others viewed I-95 as an asphalt symbol of progress. To the most pragmatic, I-95 
represented an easier commute to work. To the most visionary, I-95 offered a chance for 
a divided nation to reunite.  
Events marking the opening of I-95 were overwhelmingly positive affairs. Yet, if 
one studies the events carefully, underlying discord becomes apparent. In Richmond, 
nearly one thousand homes and a black commercial district fell as I-95 carved through 
the heart of the city. Largely ignored as I-95 demolished one of the most prosperous 
black middle classes in the South, Richmond’s black population was excluded from the 
city’s ribbon cutting ceremony. On the Maryland/Delaware state line, the Wilmington 
NAACP picketed, calling out the irony of pushing for interstate and interregional 
cooperation while ignoring the need for interracial civility.110 Meanwhile, Governor 
Carvel received a letter from one constituent asking for an invitation to the dedication 
ceremony so she could see how the land stolen from her was to be used.111 While the 
speeches celebrated the benefits of the highway as presented by the AAA and the rest of 
the highway lobby, and businesses along with other community members celebrated their 
communities’ progress, I-95 had already made its share of enemies. Whether these 
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enemies would mobilize and whether they would be heard varied greatly from place to 
place as I-95 bulldozed its way through the eastern United States. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PEOPLE AND PROGRESS IN WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 
 
In late September, 1957, a most curious spectacle appeared in the Shipley Street 
shop window of Matthews Brothers in Wilmington, Delaware. Whereas a passersby 
might stop on an average day to gaze at the store’s offerings, and a small crowd might 
come together to admire a Christmastime display, the most recent presentation drew a 
much larger gathering of individuals clamoring for a good vantage point. Matthews 
Brothers, shortly after the Delaware State Highway Department unveiled the route I-95 
would take through the city, displayed the state’s official model of the superhighway. 
Measuring nearly seven feet long and three and a half feet wide, the model was an 
impressive demonstration of the momentous change on Wilmington’s horizon. The 
model itself was also an admirable feat. The city’s buildings were accurately and 
painstakingly miniaturized, as were the tracks and trains of the B&O Railroad. Tiny 
shrubs and trees implied the beautification to be pursued along the highway.  
 Within a few minutes of its unveiling, a crowd had appeared and looked on with a 
variety of emotions. Some were impressed by the grand scale of the road. Others thought 
of the opportunity the highway presented for the city. Still others played a round of 
“where’s my house?” For some, the game reached an upsetting conclusion upon 
realization their streets were not on the model. The homes in which some of these 
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bystanders lived vanished beneath the eight lanes entering Wilmington from the 
southwest and carving a path through the city’s western neighborhoods.112  
 Those distraught by the absence of their homes on the Matthews Brothers display 
were among the first Americans to experience the destructive potential of Interstate 
Highways. By 1957, state governments across the country had acquired considerable land 
for the development of Interstate Highways, but most of this land was rural and did not 
require the destruction of homes. Urban development was far more impactful, both in 
terms of magnitude of change and number of families affected. In time, urban 
communities would learn how to most effectively resist Interstate development or—more 
basically—engage the government on the topic of Interstate routing and construction. 
Wilmington, as one of the nations’ first metropolitan areas to undertake urban Interstate 
construction, served as a laboratory for the urban experiences that would follow in the 
1960s and early 1970s. In Wilmington’s story, one sees  communities wrestling with 
whether construction was desirable, government entities forging highway construction 
policy, and individuals like those staring into Matthews Brothers’ window deciding how 
to respond. While other urban centers would eventually face similar controversies and 
engage in similar conversations, Wilmington’s experience was the unique product of a 
particular time and place.  
 Between 1957 and 1965, two significant controversies arose as I-95 carved a 
course through Wilmington. The first dealt with the path I-95 would take as it entered the 
city from the south. The other, later, controversy took place in the Arden and Ardentown 
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communities of northwest Wilmington and questioned whether an exit and road-widening 
project was necessary if the residents presumably serviced by the exit did not want it. 
Taken together, these controversies paint an intriguing tapestry of the variables at play 
when individuals considered whether to support or resist Interstate Highway 
development. In these debates, Wilmington residents took sides based on how the route 
affected their homes, businesses viewed the routes through the lens of commercial 
opportunities, political leaders considered long-term plans for Wilmington (and short 
term implications for their reelection prospects), and other stakeholders introduced 
additional rationales. Additionally, the debates illustrate the inherent conflict between 
highway officials, who put a premium on engineering principles, and residents, who 
valued their quality of life. 
EARLY RUMBLINGS: THE BANCROFT PARKWAY AND AN EASTERN OPTION 
 By the time financing became available to move forward with Interstate Highway 
construction, state officials across the country were several decades into their search for 
possible routings. Most states had decided on potential—but not finalized—routes by 
1956.  Delaware was no exception, and in February of 1957, Delaware’s State Highway 
Department unveiled three options for Interstate construction in and around Wilmington. 
The first option entered Wilmington center along the Jackson and Adams Street corridor 
on the city’s west side. A second option traced the route of the extant Bancroft Parkway 
further to the west of the city center, and a third option swung around the city’s eastern 
edge. 
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 As other scholars have noted, engineers applied the norms of their profession 
when making decisions regarding Interstate Highways.113 These individuals, usually 
operating as employees of state highway departments, believed the roads’ design should 
provide motorists and the government maximum benefit since they would fund the 
construction. During the early discussions about the construction of a new federal 
highway system, engineers had advocated limited access highways since they would 
provide the best driving experience. Once the Interstate Highway Act received 
Eisenhower’s signature and the planning phase officially began, engineers argued that 
routes ought to be selected for traffic flow and cost efficiency because these 
characteristics best served the perceived stakeholders—those who would fund and use the 
road.114 The Delaware State Highway Department’s engineers planned Wilmington’s 
Interstates with these aims in mind. When citizens or concerned groups raised questions 
outside the scope of traffic flow and cost efficiency, engineers paid them little attention. 
For example, when a conservation group questioned whether the health of the 
Churchman’s Marsh had been considered when developing the Bancroft Parkway plan, 
the Deputy Chief Engineer responded only that engineers liked the route because it 
required a relatively low level of costly property acquisitions and would be a cost-
effective route. He made no mention of environmental concerns despite the question to 
which he was responding.115 
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 At times, Delaware’s engineers were blatantly dismissive of the concerns of 
residents. One longtime Wilmington resident characterized the Highway Department’s 
initial approach as paternal: “They at first stated that if we did not behave they would call 
Papa and, he, the Federal Government, would come in and condemn our property.” 
Acknowledging a change in tone since the earliest public outreach efforts, the resident 
described the new message as less insulting but no more compromising: 
Suave, politely spoken (and no doubt well-intentioned) representatives of the 
State Highway Department are telling us that, despite the public protest, we need 
some new super highways (as large as the New Jersey Turnpike) and that, like it 
or not, we are going to get them—and where the Highway Department says.116 
 
Even the most diplomatic of Highway Department employees could not mollify angry 
residents. Deputy Chief Engineer William J. Milller, Jr. explained to one such individual, 
“Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to locate such highways without some property 
damage if they are to truly serve the areas in which they are to be located.”117  
The Jackson-Adams Route would provide easy access to the city center and, by 
the Delaware State Highway Department’s estimates, would serve eighty percent of 
Wilmington’s local traffic. On the downside, the path required the condemnation of 
nearly one thousand homes, scores of  businesses, and would require destroying sections 
of five parks and recreational areas.118 On the other hand, the eastern option required far 
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less destruction.119 In fact, most of the land required to build along this route was either 
undeveloped, vacant industrial space, or a landfill. According to Wilmington’s highway 
engineers, this route would displace few people and businesses, be among the most cost-
effective options in terms of land acquisition expense, and posed few construction 
obstacles. The tradeoff, however, was that the route did not provide easy access to the 
city center and consequently provided significantly less user benefit.120 The westernmost 
option involved upgrading the extant Bancroft Parkway to meet Interstate Highway 
standards. The path would skirt the city’s western edge, requiring far less destruction than 
the Jackson-Adams option but, like the eastern option, would effectively bypass the city. 
Wilmington residents overwhelmingly struck out against both options that 
circumvented the city, and the Bancroft Parkway and eastern option only gained the 
support of those who opposed the Jackson-Adams Route for personal reasons. State 
engineers interpreted the public response as a call for a route that provided maximum 
usefulness to drivers, even if the utility came at a higher cost. Those who would be most 
directly affected by the road—those whose communities and property would be 
sacrificed for I-95—could not convince Wilmington’s engineers that their concerns 
should influence the determination of an optimal route. By the late spring of 1957, the 
Delaware State Highway Department, placing a premium on the extent to which the road 
would benefit the majority of the city’s businesses and residents, threw its support behind 
the Jackson-Adams Route for I-95. As a result, the city of Wilmington entered the 
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summer of 1957 with the intention of building along the route that would displace the 
largest number of people and businesses.  
THE JACKSON-ADAMS STREET CONTROVERSY  
When word leaked that the Delaware Highway Department had developed a 
preference for the Jackson-Adams route, the working class white families who lived in 
the neighborhood quickly mobilized and formed the Delaware Expressways Committee, 
with Judge Thomas Herlihy, Jr. as chairman and counsel of the organization. On May 6, 
the Expressways Committee presented its criticisms of the downtown path at a public 
hearing sponsored by the Delaware State Highway Department. Technically, the 
hearing’s aim was to receive public opinion on all three routes under consideration, since 
no route had been publically sanctioned by the Highway Department. In actuality, the 
meeting was a forum for those opposed to the Jackson-Adams route. Speaking on behalf 
of the Committee, F.L. Brevoort, Jr. said the Jackson-Adams plan would “result…[in 
the]…biggest traffic jam Wilmington has ever known” because it would feed drivers 
simply trying to get from one side of the city to the other directly into the most congested 
part of town.121 Other speakers argued for the merits of alternate routes in an attempt to 
dissuade the Highway Department from the only downtown route under consideration. 
Despite initial opposition, the Delaware State Highway Department and city of 
Wilmington officials reached a tentative agreement on the Jackson-Adams Route on June 
29, 1957. The decision immediately met additional resistance, especially from the 
Republican City Council President. Close to retirement, Frank J. Obara was serving his 
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last days in office when the Council endorsed to the Adams-Jackson Route, and without 
the tempering influence of a political future, Obara lambasted everyone involved in the 
decision. By his estimation, the agreement was bad for the people of Wilmington, bad for 
his Republican Party, and bad for any of the officials who voted in favor of the 
agreement. Calling the  City Council’s decision “the stupidest in its history”, Obara 
railed, “Not only did they condone an improper act, displace 3,500 people from their 
homes, [and] disrupt church planning, but they also took the incoming Democrats off the 
hook at one and the same time.”122 Wilmington’s Republicans were serving as lame 
ducks after losing an election earlier in the year, and by Obara’s account, made an 
unpopular decision for their political rivals. Obara’s fellow Republicans seem to have 
approved the route because they truly believed it was the best option for Wilmington’s 
future. Knowing the decision would be politically imprudent, they planned to give the 
route official endorsement because they had the luxury of not answering to voters for the 
action. These Republican councilmen knew the route would face greater obstacles if they 
left the decision to City Council-elect. 
 As the Republican City Council and Delaware Highway Department took steps to 
formally approve of the route, the Expressways Committee looked to legal action as a 
first response. Following the protocol established in the Federal Aid Highway Act of 
1956, the state Highway Department planned on hosting a public hearing on the Adams-
Jackson route on July 10th. Once this obligation was met, the proposal could be formally 
made to the Bureau of Public Roads. On July 3, the Expressways Committee met in 
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Herlihy’s offices to discuss legal action that would bide those in the community who 
disfavored the Jackson-Adams Route time. Representatives of the Committee canvassed 
the Jackson-Adams Street neighborhood to solicit support, and a group of leaders 
presented their case to the Governor “with promise of no publicity.”123 Meanwhile, the 
Taxpayers’ Protective Association, representing those whose businesses or property 
values would be harmed by the route, joined the fight against I-95. 
 Almost immediately, route opponents encountered unexpected complications, as  
the congregation of the Zion Lutheran Church, whose building stood in the path of the 
proposed route and would almost certainly be demolished to make way for the highway, 
began to publically undermine the resistance’s efforts. Not only was the edifice of Zion 
Lutheran Curch endangered by the Jackson-Adams route, so was the congregation. Most 
of the church’s members lived among the estimated 3,500 people who would be relocated 
as a result of the construction. Jackson-Adams Route opponents assumed that, for these 
reasons, the church would support the actions of the Expressways Committee and 
Taxpayers’ Protective Association. To the contrary, the Zion Lutheran Board publicly 
argued the Jackson-Adams Street route was the best option for Wilmington, even if it 
meant relocation for the church and its members. Stating the church had come under 
“extreme pressure” from outside the congregation to oppose the route, the Zion Board 
laid out a list of reasons it supported the initiative. First, the Church argued Wilmington 
needed an Interstate route on the west side of the city in order to maximize the economic 
benefits of the Interstate system. Second, the Church argued, “We cannot argue that exact 
location is so important that progressive development of all aspects of city life must be 
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prohibited from disturbing us.”124 In other words, Zion claimed it supported the Jackson-
Adams Route for purely altruistic reasons, that it would martyr itself for the advancement 
of Wilmington.  
 Zion Lutheran stated it reached its decision in the spirit of community, but few 
believed the claim. The Taxpayers Protective Association, for one, chastised the Church 
for changing its position and attempting to vilify the TPA in the process. As the story 
played out the news, it became apparent that the Zion Church had partnered with the TPA 
in 1950 when the Wilmington State Highway Department planned a different road as part 
of a different highway system in roughly the same corridor as the Jackson-Adams route 
of I-95. When the debate reignited under the guise of the Interstate Highway System, the 
TPA reached out to the Church once more, assuming the two groups would renew their 
alliance. According to the TPA, Zion Church refused to reinstate its alliance with the 
TPA and characterized the request as “extreme pressure.”125  
 St. Paul’s Methodist, which also stood to lose its building as a result of I-95, 
joined Zion Lutheran on July 5. St. Paul’s released a statement that provided insight into 
its decision to move and—presumably—helped explain the sudden shift by the Board of 
Zion Lutheran. In the statement, the St. Paul’s board of trustees wrote that it supported 
the demolition of the current St. Paul’s structure and “that a new St. Paul’s be erected in 
some other location, preferably in the growing suburban areas of our city.”126 While Zion 
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implied it conceded to move for the betterment of Wilmington, St. Paul’s clearly signaled 
the decision to move was in the churches’ best interest.  
 Like the rest of urban America, Wilmington experienced dramatic 
suburbanization over the course of the 1950s. In 1930, Wilmington was home to ninety 
percent of Delaware’s urban population. By 1950, that number decreased to fifty-eight 
percent. Meanwhile, Wilmington’s suburban regions—the Brandywine Hundred, 
Christiana Hundred, Mill Creek Hundred, and New Castle Hundred—which had been 
home to twenty-four percent of New Castle County’s residents in 1930, had grown to 
account for forty percent of the County’s population by 1950.127 Driven by “a reliance 
upon the private automobile, upward mobility, the separation of the family into nuclear 
units, the widening division between work and leisure, and  tendency toward racial and 
economic exclusiveness,” Wilmington’s residential patterns fell very much in line with 
the rest of urban America.128 
The plan to route I-95 through the property of St. Paul’s and Zion’s churches was 
fortuitous timing from the congregations’ perspectives. As the 1950s wore on, more and 
more church members moved away from the neighborhoods the churches had historically 
served. With attendance at low and falling levels, the plan to build I-95 offered the 
churches a palatable solution to their dilemma. The government would, by law, pay 
market price for their existing property, and the churches could use these funds to 
reestablish themselves in the suburbs, closer to the new homes of their past 
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congregations. The construction of I-95 provided churches an opportunity to increase 
attendance and realign themselves with modern demographic patterns without losing 
money on the sale of the existing property.129  
 The leadership of St. Paul’s Catholic Church took the opposite position of its 
Protestant neighbors. Father John H. Walsh argued the human needs of the people of 
Wilmington must take precedence. “St. Paul’s Catholic Church supports progress and 
realizes the necessity of relieving the congestion of traffic…but not at the price of 800 
homes, nearly 200 businesses, and the disruption of the religious life of the people of St. 
Paul’s parish”, he wrote.130 Sacred Heart Catholic Church, located just off the projected 
path of I-95, did not take an official stance as an organization, but the church’s leader, 
Father Paul F. Huber, used his respected position in the community to express concern 
for the people who would be harmed by the construction of I-95 along Jackson and 
Adams Streets. On July 25, Father Huber submitted a letter to the Wilmington City 
Council, noting that he would be “remiss in…[his]…duty” if he did not speak out on 
behalf of his parishioners. By his count, the proposed route of I-95 would consume ten of 
the fifty-nine residential blocks that made up his parish, and 281 of his 800 parishioners 
lived in the ten blocks to be demolished.131 
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 The Catholic churches faced  very different situations than the Protestant 
churches; whereas the actual structures of Zion Lutheran and St. Paul’s Methodist stood 
in the proposed I-95 route, St. Paul’s and Sacred Heart stood just outside the path. Land 
acquisition mandated by the Jackson-Adams route gave the Protestant churches an 
opportunity to reorganize in the suburbs, closer to the people. The Catholic Churches, on 
the other hand, would remain in the Jackson-Adams neighborhood but with far fewer 
residents nearby. Regardless of arguments made, all four churches ultimately chose sides 
based on the effects I-95 would have on their ability to prosper in a changing urban 
landscape. 
Much like Wilmington’s churches found themselves of opposite opinion when it 
came to the Jackson-Adams controversy, the people of Wilmington were similarly 
divided. Samuel Evans, who lived several miles from the Jackson-Adams corridor, called 
on those who tacitly approved of the Jackson-Adams route by questioning whether the 
Highway Department and city officials considered the human cost of their decision to 
route I-95 through a densely populated section of Wilmington. “These people,” Evans 
wrote, “can be considered in no other light but as victims of the few ruling the many.” He 
went on to propose a simple philosophy the city and state highway officials could use 
when routing roads: “place the speedway where it will do the least harm to the smallest 
number of people.”132  
 Mayor Eugene Lammot argued the Adams-Jackson route accomplished Evans’ 
aim, saying it “causes the minimum amount of disruption to the existing neighborhood 
patterns” of Wilmington. Lammot never publicly stated why the Adams-Jackson route 
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was the least disruptive, but he did acknowledge the road was the most expensive.133 
Rather than engage those opposed to the route on the merits of the Adams-Jackson path, 
Lammot employed a red herring by asking what would happen to Wilmington should the 
city not build the road. “Is the price too great for us to pay?…Is the chemical capital of 
the world to be left behind as other cities grow in value and prestige? This, of course, is 
up to our citizens,” he claimed.134 Of course, Lammot’s rhetoric overlooked the obvious 
fact that those opposed to the Jackson-Adams route were not necessarily opposed to the 
road in principle, and resisting the selected route was not equivalent to canceling the 
entire construction project, but Lammot was less interested in genuine debate and more 
interested in moving forward with the construction of Delaware’s newest superhighway. 
For this reason, Lammot also turned a deaf ear to others who questioned the construction 
of I-95 along the Jackson-Adams corridor. Francis Duszak, President of the Pulaski 
Legion, a fraternal civic organization with over fifty years of history in Wilmington, 
wrote to Lammot in September of 1957. Noting that the Jackson-Adams route would 
displace the Pulaski Legion’s headquarters, and the amount offered as compensation 
would not allow the organization to continue offering all of its services to the city, 
Duszak argued that any route that passed through Wilmington’s center would ultimately 
do more harm than good. Whether or not Duszak’s arguments were sound, Lammot’s 
letter in response was dismissive.135 
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 Mere weeks after the new Democratic City Council took office, its members 
began to position themselves as opponents of the Jackson-Adams Route. The News-
Journal polled the twelve members of the City Council after a meeting on July 17, and 
ten of the officials went on the record as being opposed to the plan.136 One councilman, 
Hubert Kenny, declared support for an attempt to rescind the agreement made between 
the previous city council and the state highway department.137 These changes, coupled 
with the general unrest of the citizenry, led the State Highway Commission to postpone a 
mandated public hearing until September 9. As the Journal-Every Evening wrote of the 
decision: 
Two months’ notice is ample time for both advocates and opponents to marshal 
arguments….The Commission’s willingness to face up to the “human values” 
involved in uprooting families from the FAI-2 route shows a realization that its 
responsibility does not end with building highways.138 
 
Indeed, just three weeks after the initial announcement of Wilmington’s agreement with 
the State Highway Department suggested the route was inevitable, the tide began to 
change. Those opposed to the route at least had reason to hope they could affect the path 
of I-95 in their city. The optimism was tempered by some, however. Councilman Kenny 
suspected opposition efforts would ultimately yield few results, and he was certain to tell 
the people of Wilmington that he could not guarantee success. He suspected the project 
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could be delayed, but “expressed little doubt that it would be constructed.”139 One 
resident declared, “The freeway is going to be forced on us no matter how we feel.”140 
 To the extent I-95 would be “forced” in the Jackson-Adams Street corridor, the 
cause was the growing certainty among the Delaware State Highway Department and 
some Wilmington officials that the route provided maximum benefit to the city of 
Wilmington and the wider region. Working from the position that suburbanization was a 
more-or-less permanent trend, and residents would not return to the downtown areas in 
large numbers, most city leaders accepted a different future for Wilmington’s city center. 
Rather than a wealthy, residential downtown, these leaders envisioned a future where 
residents who lived in the suburbs would enter the city for entertainment, dining, and 
shopping. To this end, I-95 would be a key conduit funneling residents from their new 
neighborhoods into the city.141 The project also had implications for the entirety of 
northern Delaware, and political leaders may have been more willing to disrupt the lives 
of some city residents if it meant securing a more prosperous future by tying the suburbs 
to the city. When Mayor Lammot added individuals from the suburbs and other nearby 
communities to his Citizens’ Advisory Council, he tacitly acknowledged Wilmington’s 
future was as dependent on those who lived outside the city as within.  
 Bill Frank, arguably the most influential journalist in Wilmington, wrote a series 
of pleas in his weekly “Frankly Speaking” column in 1957 urging the people of the city 
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to support the Adams-Jackson Street route. He usually echoed Lammot’s position that I-
95 had to run this course because it served the greatest utility to the greater Wilmington 
metropolitan area. At other times, he chastised opponents for being selfish. In one such 
article, he wrote, “I see now where we have not one but almost a half dozen anti-freeway 
groups, made up of citizens whose properties lie along the route of the highway.” He then 
reminded readers that when other neighborhoods were targeted for demolition to make 
way for other roads, these citizens were completely silent. “While it is not becoming for 
anyone to make fun of or poo-pooh their concern for their homes, it must be rather ironic 
for the Union Park Gardens and the Bancroft Parkways folks who may want to ask: 
‘Where were you in your denunciations when we were in a jam?”142 
 Frank was perhaps the most visible member of a large contingent of 
Wilmingtonians who actively supported the Jackson-Adams route. A group calling itself 
the Delaware Citizens for Freeways believed the route would “stimulate economic 
growth and a higher standard of living, [since] Where transportation facilities have 
improved, new industries have moved in.” The group went on to hypothesize that, once 
constructed, the road would attract new industry, create jobs, and improve the overall 
quality of life for Wilmington. Citizens for Freeways made known their support for a 
downtown route, since it best satisfied the governing principle of Interstate construction, 
as they saw it: “The test of any legitimate, sound, and valid argument for or against the 
principles proposed for our consideration as regards FAI 2 is whether or not it is serving 
the greatest good for the greatest number of people.”143 Wilmington’s business leaders 
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came out in support of the Jackson-Adams route and seconded Mayor Lammot’s 
argument that the proposed path struck the appropriate ratio of usefulness and people 
affected. As an organization focused primarily on profits, the human cost of I-95 was of 
less importance to the members of the Wilmington Businessmen’s Civic Association. 
Noting that “no matter where a freeway is eventually located, it will necessitate the 
relocation of some people,” the Association believed “the closer such a freeway came to 
the heart of the metropolitan shopping district, the better it would serve all the citizens of 
our city, county, and state.”144 The organization never substantiated the claim that the 
route disrupted a minimal number of lives.  
 The Wilmington Businessmen’s Civic Association’s statement drew the ire of at 
least one resident who attempted to organize a boycott of all downtown merchants. 
Arguing that the members of the Civic Association only hold their position because their 
homes were not at risk of demolition, the boycotter proclaimed an intent to “do all my 
shopping in the suburban areas, [as] They do at least respect the people who are fighting 
for their cause.”145 The boycotter’s proposed punishment to those businessmen who did 
not side with the residents of the Jackson-Adams Street corridor illustrates how little 
those most impacted by the proposed project understood of the situation and their 
opponents’ motivations. It was a direct consequence of the gradual shift of shopping 
patterns to the suburbs that Wilmington’s downtown businessmen wanted I-95 in the 
Jackson-Adams Street corridor. Organizing a movement to concentrate more economic 
activity in the suburbs would only strengthen the merchants’ resolve. 
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 The Wilmington News-Journal published many letters in which Wilmington 
citizens tried to illustrate the human cost of the Adams-Jackson route. No matter how 
many times the routes’ advocates argued the path minimized the human cost, those 
humans in question responded with pleas for the people of Wilmington to recognize their 
plight, to recognize them as neighbors instead of dehumanized numbers or the even more 
abstract “most opportune to be relocated.” One resident, writing under the name “A 
Human Problem,” wrote to Haber: 
Let me show you through my home where I have lived for 40 years, in which I 
was raised, and where I hope to raise my family, also through some retired 
families’ homes, through some widows’ homes—widows who live on social 
security. Perhaps then, Mr. Haber, you and the rest of the State Highway 
Department will know the exact price of this great open road which, in your 
opinion, stands as progress.146 
 
These appeals—and many similar to it—appeared in newspapers daily in the summer of 
1957. 
 Despite the effort of those to be affected, most within Wilmington either favored 
the Jackson-Adams route or approved of it with silence. Mayor Lammot claimed that, 
between July 11 and July 23, he had received ninety-two messages in favor of the route 
and ten opposed.147 Very few Wilmingtonians wrote to newspapers in support of 
Jackson-Adams residents, and there are no accounts of anyone living outside the 
neighborhood joining protests. State Highway Commissioner Hugh Sharp encouraged 
those who supported I-95 as planned by the State to “stand up and be 
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counted…[for]…we cannot let the growth of our city and the progress of all our citizens 
be subordinated to the fears of the few.”148  
 On July 24, a group calling itself the Central Adams-Jackson Streets Civic 
Association, newly formed in response to the I-95 threat, submitted a letter to the City 
Council. The Association argued that the resolution passed by the former City Council 
during a lame duck session was a “violation of people’s rights,” as the route represented a 
“ravaging of the City of Wilmington by bisecting its heart with a new super freeway and 
the destroying of well-established homes and businesses as well as interfering with 
churches and schools.” Since the resolution had been passed by outgoing representatives 
and no public hearing was held prior to the voting upon the resolution, the Central 
Adams-Jackson Streets Civic Association would join the Taxpayers’ Protective 
Association, the Northern Adams-Jackson Citizens’ Association, and the Delaware 
Expressways Committee in filing a lawsuit to block the construction of the road.149  
 At the very moment it appeared Wilmington was preparing for a long, arduous, 
and ultimately inconclusive fight over the proper route of I-95, the all-Democrat City 
Council upset the apparent trajectory of the debate. At a Council meeting the evening of 
July 25, the City Council voted eleven votes to two to reverse the decision made by its 
predecessor, all-Republican council. Confirming the fears expressed by Frank Obara 
when the Republic Council signed the Adams-Jackson route agreement, the city’s 
Democrats successfully made the unpopular referendum a purely partisan matter and 
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tagged the Republicans with the controversial decision. A resolution passed at the 
meeting declared that the previous contract agreement should be rendered invalid “by 
reason of not having been authorized and negotiated by means which constitute due 
process of law.”150  
 Underlying the Wilmington’s City Council’s action was the belief that the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 failed to ensure due process when selecting routes for 
the Interstate Highways. The legislation required only one public hearing before 
finalizing a route, and the hearing was not held until after the State conducted its studies 
and settled on a route.151 In other words, the law required the State to gather public input 
only after investing significant time and resources into researching routes. The law 
therefore encouraged route selection without due regard for public concerns. The 
Wilmington City Council’s claim that this law violated due process was an interpretation 
of the law based on the belief the procedure all but guaranteed the Delaware State 
Highway Department made its decision prior to holding public hearings.152 
 In striking down the previous agreement between the city and the State Highway 
Department, Wilmington’s City Council did not offer any plans for a new route; instead, 
Council President John Babiarz told a reporter, “The next move is up to the State 
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Highway Department…I wouldn’t want to predict what the ultimate development might 
be.”153 Wilmington’s City Solicitor, who served the Democratic mayor, argued the 
previous arrangement was legal and binding. If the Democratic Council wanted to stir up 
a partisan battle, they did not have all of the city’s Democrats on the same page. One 
Wilmingtonian questioned whether the Council had put politics over the welfare of the 
city: “Whatever they are up to, the Democrats have already done an incalculable amount 
of damage to the city’s good credit and prestige. A city whose government recklessly 
repudiates contracts…is not going to have much luck marketing its bonds.”154 Another 
writer described the Council’s attitude as “public-be-damned.”155 
 One week after abrogating Wilmington’s agreement with the Delaware Highway 
Department, the City Council voted to rescind a second resolution that gave the city 
authority to enter into an agreement with the State Highway Department for the purposes 
of constructing highways. This resolution empowered the city to negotiate with the state 
for the purposes of highway construction. With the resolution nullified, it was not clear 
how Wilmington would proceed with highway construction, as no department within the 
city government had the legal grounds to pursue the legally mandated agreements with 
the state Highway Department and federal Bureau of Public Roads.  
 According to City Solicitor Stewart Lynch, the City Council’s resolutions did not 
carry any legal force or effect. One observer noted, “Is there any reason to take the antics 
of the present City Council seriously?…They are misleading the public by claiming 
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powers which their own legal experts have told them emphatically they do not possess.” 
The observer went on to argue the City Council was devaluing the city of Wilmington by 
scaring creditors and misleading the public.156 One year later, Chief Engineer Haber 
submitted to the General Counsel of the State Highway Department the same City 
Council resolution, and this lawyer agreed with Lynch’s reading point-for-point. In an 
eight-page letter explaining his reading of the resolution, S. Samuel Arsht argued the 
resolution’s charges of “unmitigated fraud” were “completely refuted by the record” and 
that most of the charges of wrongdoing were “personal conclusions which…neither the 
facts nor the law will support.”157  
 The City Council claimed it received fifty cards supporting its stance on the 
Freeway.158 Those within Wilmington who supported the Jackson-Adams route of I-95 
responded with a petition of 2,500 names asking that the state move forward with the 
original plan.159 Keeping with Wilmington’s history, these supporters came from districts 
of the city not immediately in I-95’s path; they would receive the benefit of the road 
without the facing the most brutal of consequences, relocation. Others within the city 
seemed befuddled that those within the road’s path would shirk the opportunity I-95 
presented. One individual, writing to the News-Journal under the name “Spectator” 
argued, “The move offers the fine opportunity to reestablish a new home in a fine new 
community—possibly suburban or even country—where children can have healthful play 
                                                 
156
 “All Sound and Fury,” Wilmington News-Journal, 2 August 1957. 
157
 S. Samuel Arsht to R.A. Haber, 4 March 1958, Bill Frank Collection, Box 11, DHS. 
158
 “State to Act Next Week on Freeway,” Wilmington News-Journal,  2 August 1957. 
159
 “Petition Planned to Back Freeway,” Wilmington Morning News, 2 August 1957. 
90 
 
areas and surroundings—and the man of the house may raise vegetables, berries, and 
fruits to supplement the family income.”160 This letter speaks to the disconnectedness 
among Wilmingtonians. The writer left no evidence of his identity or the section of the 
city in which he lived, but he obviously could not empathize with those in the way of the 
Jackson-Adams Street route. Depending on how one reads the letter, his comments could 
be interpreted as presumptuous or insensitive. He seems to indicate the Jackson-Adams 
Street corridor is not a desirable place to live, and if one cannot live in the same section 
of Wilmington as he, he ought to leave the city all together. Indeed, Wilmington’s 
resistance to or support of I-95 was divided almost entirely by where individuals lived. 
The benefit of the road was not in question; only the relative value of the human cost 
seemed to matter, and many residents saw I-95 as a good value so long as the human cost 
was somebody else’s life. 
 On August 8th, Joseph Piekarski, president of the Taxpayers Protective 
Association, published a detailed explanation of his opposition to the Adams-Jackson 
Street route of I-95. He began by refuting the charge that the route best served the 
economic needs of downtown Wilmington and would benefit urban merchants. Since this 
was one of the most commonly cited arguments in favor of the route, it makes sense that 
Piekarski would look to discredit it first. By his estimation, the Jackson-Adams route 
would draw traffic nine blocks, over a half mile, further away from the Wilmington 
merchant district. Arguments that the route would funnel travelers into the urban 
shopping district were misleading, Piekarski argued. Not only would the road draw 
customers further away from the merchants, the route actually served the opposite 
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purpose of giving residents of Wilmington and outside travelers easier access to suburban 
shopping venues.161  
 Piekarski continued by arguing that both locals and drivers on long distance trips 
disliked traveling through cities, and Wilmington had the opportunity to route traffic 
around the city all together. By Piekarski’s estimation, it made little sense to force drivers 
through the city, which would increase traffic and cause harm to Wilmington’s citizens. 
Piekarski also pointed out one of the least frequently mentioned arguments against 
routing highways through urban centers; Interstates did not yield property or income 
taxes, but the houses and businesses they overtook did. By demolishing blocks of housing 
and commercial development to make way for the highways, cities effectively lowered 
their tax base. Proponents of urban highways would argue the increased sales tax more 
than offset the decreased other taxes, but Piekarski did not accept this argument in the 
case of Wilmington.162  
 Rather than force hundreds of Wilmington citizens out of their homes, shutter 
many businesses, decrease the city’s tax base, and harm the urban merchants, Piekarski 
argued Wilmington would be much better served by an Interstate routing along the 
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Delaware River, to the south side of the city. This route would direct traffic around 
Wilmington, permitting I-95 to serve the needs of Wilmington without any of the 
negative consequences. By Piekarski’s estimation, this routing could be accomplished 
without displacing a single resident or business.163  
 A week and a half later, Leon Weiner, President of the Citizens’ Committee for 
the Freeways, an organization formed to combat the Jackson-Adams resistance, 
responded to Piekarski’s arguments. Weiner’s critique of Piekarski’s stance relied upon 
different interpretations of the same evidence. First, Weiner believed the Jackson-Adams 
route would aid merchants but did not offer much support to his claim. He also chastised 
Piekarski for treating the Jackson-Adams route of I-95 and the FAI 3 route that would 
bypass Wilmington’s downtown to the south and east as an “either/or” proposition, since 
both routes were planned and necessary, according to the initial studies of Wilmington’s 
Interstate needs.164 While Piekarski lobbied that a resolution could be reached where no 
Wilmington residents would be displaced, Weiner dismissed the concerns of these 
individuals outright and went so far as to argue some of them wanted to be relocated on 
behalf of I-95. “Such opposition has been based primarily on personal economic 
considerations,” Weiner wrote, as if to imply these were not valid considerations. He then 
claimed that the entire debate had been clouded by misrepresentations, “distorted 
stories,” and “rumors.” “What are the facts?” he asked. “Actually, some persons who are 
affected are looking forward to selling their home or business…[but]…They fear 
expressing this openly because of the opinion of some of their neighbors. Weiner claimed 
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those who wanted to sell did so because the value of their homes at present was greater 
than the purchase price.165 Weiner’s attempts at softening the human blow only served to 
further enrage those who viewed the highway building project as a inhumane and unfair 
pursuit in the first place. 
 The tumult resulting from the City Council’s actions and the public discourse 
resulted in the State Highway Commission scheduling a new hearing for September 30 
instead of September 16, thus giving all sides ample opportunity to build their cases. The 
decision to schedule another hearing was not universal on the Commission, however, 
with one commissioner, Benjamin Ableman, asking, “Why a hearing? We’ve signed a 
legal contract…To say we will hold a public hearing will mislead the public.”166 In a 
subsequent statement, Ableman declared the Jackson-Adams route a “settled matter.”167 
Regardless of the reservation of some members, the Highway Commission as a whole 
came to accept they could not simply push on in the face of growing opposition.  
 With battle lines drawn, each side of the Jackson-Adams route debate had a 
governmental entity on its side. Those opposed to the route  pointed to the City Council 
as its defenders and argued the City Solicitor and State Highway Commission refused to 
accept the will of the people by ignoring the Council’s actions. The number of people in 
this camp was unclear. On August 20th, the Taxpayers Protective Association claimed to 
have the support of 25,000, but three days later submitted a petition including under 800 
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names.168 As one Wilmington resident stated, “Their delaying action in not accepting the 
vote…shows contempt and disregard for the representatives truly elected by the 
people.”169 The State Highway Department and many who livid outside of the Jackson-
Adams neighborhood attested the City Council jeopardized the future of Wilmington by 
refusing to allow construction to proceed as planned. On another level, what developed 
was a question over representation in the Interstate Highway Process. Those charged with 
making decisions about routes were generally not elected by the people but rather 
appointed by those who had been elected. Since their jobs were not dependent on 
pleasing the people, they instinctively advocated the routes that made the most sense on 
paper. Engineering principles took precedence over human interest.  
 Irving Warner, a resident of West Tenth Street in the Jackson-Adams 
neighborhood, wrote hundreds of letters from 1957 until well after construction of I-95 
began, attempting to obtain an injunction against the downtown construction. As he 
corresponded with local and national officials, he came to understand the extent to which 
human costs did not factor into the engineers’ calculus. A Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads told him the Jackson-Adams route was 
preferred because it was “reasonably direct, and could be developed to facilitates which 
will safely and economically handle the ever increasing volume of traffic.” When faced 
with the human cost of the decision, the Deputy Commissioner explained “Public Roads 
encourages the States to locate highways to minimize property damage and 
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inconvenience to local interests wherever possible consistent with good engineering 
practice and sound economic principles.”170 Since Delaware’s engineers had decided 
servicing Wilmington’s commercial center and facilitating traffic into and out of the city 
center were the primary objectives, and since they prioritized this route because it could 
be achieved at a lower cost than other downtown options, no level of human collateral 
along the Jackson-Adams route was a match for the pursuit of engineering principles. 
 One Wilmington resident, speaking on behalf of small-government minded 
individuals throughout the city—and perhaps country—viewed the Jackson-Adams Route 
controversy as symptomatic of a rising socialist threat: 
The great loss of private property rights inherent in the housing and highways 
laws are a serious loss of individual liberty. Property rights are the basic different 
between a socialist and a capitalist society…The right to own property is now 
seriously undermined.171 
 
To these individuals, the policy of eminent domain exercised by the government to claim 
land for highway construction harmed individuals on a personal level but also threatened 
the underpinnings of American government. Some even perceived eminent domain as the 
vanguard to a larger government threat.172 
 As September began and the public hearing on the route of I-95 loomed in the 
future, the Wilmington City Council did not seem content to sit idle but could not make 
any real impact. Consequently, some of the members resorted to antics that critics viewed 
as childish. When the State Highway Department submitted a letter to the Wilmington 
                                                 
170
 G.M. Williams to Irving Warner, 11 June 1957, Accession 1518, Papers of Irving Warner, 
Personal Papers, General Subject Files, Box 17, HM. Emphasis mine. 
171
 “Not Accidental,” Wilmington Morning-News 17 August 1957. 
172
 The writer of this letter, Marjorie C. Brennan, seems to have confused the tenants of socialism 
with communism, but her intent is clear nonetheless.  
96 
 
City Council acknowledging receipt of the Council’s resolution rescinding the contract 
made by the previous officials, the Council voted on and approved a motion that the letter 
be “received, recorded, and thrown in the waste basket.”173 At a second meeting, the 
Council approved a motion to “hamper, hinder and obstruct” construction of the highway 
along its currently proposed route.174 
 Surprisingly, the entire debate up to this point was held over a theoretical path I-
95 would take through Wilmington, as the State Highway Department had not formally 
selected the plan.  When State formally announced the route on September 17—five days 
before the mandated public hearing—it took the opportunity to go on the offensive, 
laying out its reasons the Jackson-Adams route made the most sense for the city of 
Wilmington. Hugh R. Sharp, Jr., State Highway Commissioner, spoke to the Wilmington 
Lion’s Club on the day the state released the official I-95 route. He charged that 
Wilmington required both FAI 2 and FAI 3 (the easterly route), as Interstate traffic 
through Wilmington was set to double by 1975.175 The proposal’s formal release also, for 
the first time, replaced speculation with solid numbers of what was at stake. The Jackson-
Adams route would require the acquisition and demolition of 652 buildings, 507 of which 
were residential; 312 of the buildings were owner-occupied. 926 families would be 
displaced. The total value of seized property was just shy of four million dollars. The city 
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of Wilmington would lose just shy of $100,000 in tax revenue each year due to the 
demolished properties, and New Castle County would lose an additional $17,000.176 
 At the public hearing where the State Highway Department officially unveiled 
Jackson-Adams route, Leon Weiner, the chairman of the Delaware Citizens for the 
Freeways, noted one group who should have been very happy with the plan. Those 
opposed to the rumored Bancroft Parkway Route should have been elated, by his 
estimation, since all of their concerns were assuaged by the Jackson-Adams Route. The 
planned route moved closer to the center of the city; it required the seizure of thirteen 
acres of parkland opposed to the forty-two required by the Bancroft route; no schools 
would be affected and most at-risk churches had voiced support for the route; and finally, 
the Bancroft Parkway would stay open to the public. Perhaps most importantly, the 
selection of the Jackson-Adams meant those who  lived near the Bancroft Parkway would 
not be displaced. Weiner concluded by inviting Bancroft route opponents “to join with us 
in support of the Adams-Jackson alignment…to speak out loud and clear as they did 
earlier this spring.”177 
 By most accounts, the hearing, held at P.S. DuPont High School, was attended 
overwhelmingly by those opposed to the Jackson-Adams route, with the Taxpayers 
Association of the Delaware Freeway Committee occupying most seats. Per federal law, 
the State Department of Highway representatives in attendance listened to criticisms of 
the route, all of which they had been presented with previously. One observer 
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summarized the meeting in two notions: route opponents said, “Let us have an 
expressway through Wilmington, but it must be put in someone else’s backyard and not 
mine” and when rhetoric broke down, they sought to “discredit and insult highway 
personnel present.”178 
 While there was certainly opposition to the Jackson-Adams route, it could not 
prevent the construction of I-95 along this path. The reasons for this are many. Perhaps 
most importantly, those opposed to the route were almost entirely residents who would be 
immediately affected, and residents of other sections of Wilmington were happy to see 
the road built through the Jackson-Adams corridor if it preserved their neighborhood. The 
near universal agreement that Wilmington required a downtown route did not help the 
opposition’s case. Moreover, Wilmington’s highway engineers, operating under a 
framework that encouraged the construction of a highway that met objectives without 
regard to human cost, were largely unchecked and proved an unmovable force. I-95’s 
opponents eventually gained traction and even garnered the support of some political 
leaders but could not overcome a Highway Department, empowered with federal 
requirements that mitigated the influence of the people, committed to the route who could 
argue only a minority of residents were not in favor. Timing also played a key role, as 
one of the first urban communities to build a downtown Interstate link, Wilmington could 
not reflect on the experience of other communities as it made decisions.  
 By 1965, the state of Delaware had constructed I-95 through Wilmington. The 
Jackson and Adams Streets had begun the process of acclimating to the new reality of 
living adjacent to an eight lane superhighway. Those displaced had begun their new lives 
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in new homes, occasionally in new neighborhoods. Wilmington experienced some of the 
benefits I-95 was purported to bring, such as better access into and out of the city, but the 
downtown merchants continued to struggle. Whether this struggle was the result of I-95 
whisking potential shoppers past their stores at sixty miles per hour or whether their 
decline was foretold by the preceding suburbanization, I-95 had not delivered one of the 
primary benefits it was supposed to bring to the city. 
THE FIGHT FOR ARDEN 
Six-and-a-half miles north of Jackson Street, I-95 crossed over an unassuming 
two-lane street called Harvey Road in the first verdant area one encountered heading 
north out of Wilmington. Had an off-ramp existed at the intersection, one could have 
driven one mile northwest on Harvey Road and found an area called Arden, what the 
Wilmington Morning News called “perhaps the most unique community in the east.”179 
Founded in 1900 by a sculptor and an architect with the intent of putting theory to the 
test, Arden was established on the theory that communities could be self-sustaining if 
citizens paid for the land they used, and shared the earning power of the land. Sixty-five 
years after its founding, Arden found this a successful model, requiring no property or 
sales taxes. The community held all land in the 160 acre community in deed, and the 
citizens held ninety-nine year leases on parcels of the land. They paid rent back to the 
community, and the town administration had enough resources to support numerous 
parks and a thriving arts scene. Immediately adjacent to Arden was Ardentown, which 
lived by the same principles but technically stood as an independent community due to 
some differences in administration. Together, these communities stood as unique and 
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prosperous examples of alternative approaches to city administration and, in fact, 
operated on an alternate take of the government/citizen paradigm. 
 As could be expected, the people or Arden and Ardentown valued their separation 
from neighboring communities. They enjoyed relative proximity to Wilmington and other 
Delaware communities but preferred to operate as independent and somewhat secluded 
enclaves. When the State Highway Department announced in 1965 a desire to widen 
Harvey Road in order to accommodate an interchange with I-95, the people of these 
communities found themselves thrust into similar debates their neighbors six miles to the 
south had experienced not a decade earlier. 
 By the Highway Department’s plans, I-95 would not enter Arden or Ardentown 
proper; instead, the highway would skirt the communities about a mile to the south. The 
only impact the towns would feel was the widening of Harvey Road. Even this was 
enough to enrage the population, as a four lane highway would dramatically alter the feel 
their community had worked decades to cultivate. A road widened to accommodate I-95 
would change Arden from a quaint community of meandering blacktop roads among 
spacious lots and luxurious homes by running a notably less quaint street through the 
heart of the neighborhood. 
 The Delaware State Highway Commission met on November 10, 1965 to decide 
whether to proceed with building the interchange. A group of Arden residents spoke 
fervently against the interchange and corresponding widening of Harvey Road. Donald 
Stephens, longtime resident of Arden, lambasted the Commission with an impassioned 
speech in which he promised the “toughest fight” the Commission had yet faced and 
concluded by quoting John Paul Jones: “We have not begun to fight.” Perhaps exhibiting 
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the hubris one earns when steamrolling community after community regardless of the 
opposition put forth, the Commission was almost insulting in its dismissiveness. After the 
Ardenites left, one commissioner asked the highway department’s legal counsel “what 
chance” the protestors would have in halting the interchange construction. S. Samuel 
Arsht, who as a Wilmington lawyer had watched the Jackson and Adams Street 
communities fight a fruitless battle, held up his hand, formed a zero by touching his 
pinky to his thumb, and smirked.180 
 In 1966, a group of Arden residents filed suit against the Highway Department 
and Highway Commission. Even though the Harvey Road interchange was to be built in 
a relatively rural area, several of the complaints levied in the suit resembled those from 
the earlier Jackson-Adams Street controversy. Here, too, the state of Delaware failed to 
hold public hearings in the spirit of federal law. Also, the suit claimed construction would 
decrease the value of residents’ property. Interestingly, the residents of Arden did not 
own their property, but the trust did. The Ardenites’ lawsuit also made claims about the 
destruction of natural beauty and the interference with a way of life.181  
 Some residents of Arden, outside of the lawsuit, waged a more intellectual 
campaign against the road. One resident, Sandra Hurlong, penned a letter to the 
Wilmington Morning News in which she argued the Harvey Road interchange would hurt 
more than trees and property value; instead, she claimed, the real victim should the 
project continue as planned, was the identity of Ardenites. “The community which 
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provides a source of security for its members through historical ties and a common sense 
of identification is a dwindling phenomenon in America,” she wrote. “Arden is part of the 
everyday life of its members, not because it is just a place to park your car, have your 
dinner, or sleep, but because it is part of the intellectual and emotional being of all of 
us.”182 Arden, as a community of people who had ideological as well as financial ties to 
the land, saw I-95 as a threat to more than their wallets and homes. I-95 was a threat to a 
way of life, to an ideal, and to the bonds that tied people together. While the Delaware 
State Highway Department may have been able to bulldoze through urban Wilmington by 
capitalizing on divisions within the city—neighborhood versus neighborhood, 
primarily—in Arden it found a community uniform in its opposition to the road and fully 
mobilized in defense of their way of life. Another Arden resident proclaimed, “This is not 
planning, it is genocide.”183 
 The state’s desire to build an interchange on Harvey Road did not make 
immediate sense to observers. In the middle of the 1960s, Arden was relatively secluded 
from the rest of Wilmington, separated by acres of trees and fields, as much its own 
community as  part of greater Wilmington. To the residents of Arden and others who 
supported their opposition to the interchange, the state’s claim the interchange was 
necessary in anticipation of future growth seems like a spurious argument. They 
suspected “building for the sake of building,” a phenomenon witnessed elsewhere in the 
country and foretold by Lewis Mumford, among others. One Ardenite captured this fear 
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eloquently when he wrote, “Do not let us awaken 20 years from now to find that, while 
we were on the way to becoming the greatest ‘going-to-be’ nation the world will ever see 
architecturally, we were being fitted with a concrete girdle which was squeezing the very 
joy of life from us whir purporting to serve our convenience.”184  
 Eighty residents of the Arden communities gathered on October 17th and 
unanimously empowered their leadership with broad authority to take all legal steps 
necessary to halt the widening of Harvey Road and constructing the I-95 interchange. 
Those in attendance passed a resolution which summarized their logic for resisting the 
development. An expanded Harvey Road, the resolution explained, “cuts in two the 
Arden communities and destroys the natural beauty built up by the Ardens in the last 65 
years.” In addition to the destructive force of the road, the signatories argued the widened 
road invited “greater use of the roads beyond the requirements of regular commuters 
going to and from work.”185 Bill Frank summed up the Arden position well by mimicking 
the community: 
We the people of this particular rural or suburban village, were happy with old 
narrow country roads. Now, all of a sudden…the highway department wants to 
widen our lovely rural roads into monstrous strips of concrete, planned for 20 
years ahead and at the same time making it easier for more and more to pour 
through our town. We don’t want it.186 
 
Frank, ever a supporter of highway construction in Wilmington, spoke to the Arden 
gathering on October 17th. He told the gathering that any resistance effort would be in 
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vain because the Highway Department was so far into the planning process.187This was 
echoed by an Arden resident with an inside source at the Highway Department and 
further proves the planning procedure laid out in the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 
did not do enough to protect due process.188 
 Desperate, Arden’s leadership reached out to Lady Byrd Johnson, who it believed 
would be an advocate since, as First Lady, she had been a staunch advocate of highway 
beautification  She, in turn, wrote to the Federal Bureau of Public Roads who agreed to 
look into the situation. In response, Rex Whitton, Federal Highway Administrator, 
explained that the interchange was justified, but he encouraged the State Highway 
Department to reevaluate the road widening. In November of 1966, the Delaware State 
Highway Department agreed to only widen Harvey Road in the immediate vicinity of the 
I-95 interchange, thus preserving the two lane road through the Arden communities. It is 
not clear if the political weight of Lady Byrd Johnson forced what was essentially a 
compromise between the state of Delaware and the residents of the Arden communities, 
or if the State only agreed to postpone widening Harvey Road because it could revisit the 
issue in the future. It is also quite possible Arden had the benefit of good timing the 
Jackson-Adams residents did not; in the middle of the 1960s, the urban revolt was 
gaining steam throughout the country, and Highway Departments were rapidly losing the 
ability to steamroll residents.  
Raymond Mohl has noted, “The anti-expressway movement…must be located 
and interpreted within the wider context of the shifting political, legislative, and 
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bureaucratic environment.”189 The Jackson-Adams controversy exemplifies a period 
when the cards were proverbially stacked against residents who held reservations against 
particular highway routings. The Jackson-Adams opposition could not overcome the 
power wielded by the State Highway Department. By the middle of the 1960s, not a 
decade later, the residents of the Arden communities were able to broker a deal with the 
State Highway Department, largely due to the changing political landscape. However, 
there were additional, more local, factors at play as well. The Jackson-Adams opposition 
was fractured and lacked clear leadership. Neighboring Wilmington neighborhoods 
actively supported the construction of I-95 and advocated the Jackson-Adams route. 
Meanwhile, Arden was united in its opposition to the widening of Harvey Road and 
construction of an I-95 interchange. Additionally, there were no neighboring 
communities to support the State’s plans. While the political landscape certainly evolved 
in a way that led to different outcomes, local factors also played critically important roles. 
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Figure 2.1: The Jackson/Adams Route, indicated by the solid red line passing through 
Wilmington’s city center190 
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Figure 2.2: The Bancroft Parkway (left) and Eastern Option (right) relative to 
Wilmington’s downtown191   
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CHAPTER 3 
RESISTANCE IN NEW JERSEY 
 A drive along I-95 in New Jersey leaves the traveler with the clear impression that 
the road is somehow different in the Garden State than elsewhere. There is simply 
something peculiar about the experience; oddities—some subtle, others not—accrue until 
the driver is left convinced that somehow, the road came together differently in New 
Jersey than anywhere else in the country. First, there are tolls. While New Jersey is not 
the only state to feature tolls on I-95, they are not common along the eastern seaboard. In 
New Jersey, the tolls are frequent and significant. For a long stretch, it is not clear if the 
driver is on I-95, the New Jersey Turnpike, or somehow both at the same time. The signs 
simply do not make sense. Then there is the odd, nearly inexplicable, route the road takes 
through the state. If entering New Jersey from Delaware, the driver can travel a relatively 
direct path to New York. If entering from Pennsylvania, however, there is no way to get 
to New York without exiting I-95. If heading from New York south on I-95, one can exit 
the state via two different routes, both of which are labeled as I-95.  
 I-95’s odd state of existence in New Jersey is the result of a unique set of 
circumstances in play between the 1950s and early 1980s.  While Wilmington was one of 
the first cities to resist highway construction, New Jersey was one of the few places 
where opponents scored a decisive victory. This triumph, influenced by  and combined 
with local factors, resulted in I-95’s peculiar routing. Partly rooted in the context of 
highway revolts (alternatively called urban revolts), New Jersey’s efforts to oppose I-95 
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were colored with a heavy dose of local circumstance.  While many cities experienced 
highway revolts, very few of the campaigns were successful when Interstate Highways 
were the target. Opponents of urban road construction experienced some victories against 
state highways, secondary roads, and other projects, but Interstates appeared to be 
untouchable. Even though I-95 met resistance in Wilmington, Boston, Miami, Richmond, 
and other cities, residents were only able to completely prevent highway construction in 
central New Jersey.  
ANOTHER ROAD IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
When New Jersey residents looked at the first maps of the Interstate Highway 
System, many struggled to understand why the Garden State needed another road. By 
many accounts, asphalt and concrete already choked much of northern and central New 
Jersey, a product of the same conditions that made the state prosperous. Since colonial 
days, those traveling between New York, Boston, and other New England communities 
to Philadelphia, Wilmington, and farther south made their way through the townships of 
New Jersey. With time, New Jersey’s well-worn paths evolved into passable trails, then 
roads, and finally highways, with the New Jersey Turnpike standing as a model of 
engineering ingenuity and symbol of the automobile age. The history of I-95 in New 
Jersey begins not in 1959, when the first leg of the Interstate System bearing I-95 signage 
opened to the public, nor with the 1956 passage of legislation that permitted the 
construction of the road; rather, New Jersey’s complicated history with I-95 began in the 
early 1940s, with the construction of the New Jersey Turnpike.  
 New Jersey began planning the Turnpike in earnest in the 1940s, and the road 
opened to the public in 1952—four years before the Interstate Highway Act came to pass 
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and during a period when a federal Interstate Highway system seemed unlikely to come 
to fruition. New Jersey split the cost of building the Turnpike evenly with the federal 
government, the best financing deal available to states making infrastructure 
improvements in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Turnpike Authority operated the 
road as a toll road to recover the state’s investment (and make a profit). When the 
Interstate Highway System was born in 1956, and with plans to build I-95 in the vicinity 
of the Turnpike, New Jersey faced a dilemma. While the state did not want to miss out on 
the 90/10 financing split the Interstate Highway System offered, building I-95 also would 
have violated the agreements the state made with the Turnpike Authority and Turnpike 
bondholders. A Deputy Commissioner of the New Jersey State Highway Department, 
speaking before the United States House of Representatives in 1966, acknowledged, 
“There is no doubt in our minds that had the Interstate Program been set up in 1946 
instead of 1956, the Turnpike would today be in operation as a free highway.”192 
 Yet, the Turnpike was open to traffic in 1956, operated as a toll road, and was 
accountable to bondholders who had helped finance its construction. Still in its relative 
infancy, the Turnpike had not yet generated enough revenue to pay back its shareholders. 
The Interstate program—I-95 in particular—posed a threat to Turnpike bondholders and 
the Turnpike Authority, which raised considerable funds for the state of New Jersey 
through the collection of tolls. In early 1957, the Turnpike Authority Chairman “called 
attention to the fact that the federal highways program has brought nearer the time when 
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the Turnpike would face competitive, comparable free facilities.”193I-95 would 
essentially serve as a free alternative to the Turnpike, as initial renderings saw the roads 
enter and exit the Garden State at roughly the same location; if operated as a toll-free 
route, I-95 would certainly draw traffic off of the Turnpike, thus decreasing the toll 
revenue and ensuring lesser returns to investors. For a few years, the state considered two 
primary options. For one, New Jersey could disregard the agreement it had made with 
bondholders and build I-95 in parallel to the Turnpike. This option would have welcomed 
significant legal ramifications, and I-95 would have been delayed for years as the courts 
sorted out the matter. The second option was for New Jersey to build I-95 on a path that 
did not harm the Turnpike’s business. The option proved problematic because Turnpike 
advocates and New Jersey’s highway engineers could not agree how distant I-95 had to 
be from the Turnpike to present no competition. Additionally, the state was uncertain I-
95 could fulfill its objectives if built too far from the Turnpike. The corridor occupied by 
the Turnpike served as the most direct link between New York and the urban centers to 
New Jersey’s south. It also passed through the major urban areas of New Jersey, 
including Trenton. Noncompetitive routes would have been of far less benefit to the state, 
its citizens, or the millions who traveled through New Jersey each year.  
 The stalemate initially broke when the state of New Jersey and the Turnpike 
Authority agreed not to build I-95 until the Turnpike was “not only self-supporting but 
actually over-saturated with traffic.”194  Original plans to designate the Turnpike as I-95 
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were short-lived, however, as the Turnpike’s point of over saturation came much sooner 
than expected. By the early 1960s, it was abundantly clear that the Garden State not only 
could benefit from—but actually needed—another road in the same corridor as the 
Turnpike. A new route for I-95 approximately 10-15 miles to the west of the Turnpike 
was developed and met little resistance from the Turnpike Authority or Turnpike 
bondholders.195 
A SUCCESSFUL FIGHT 
 Initial plans for I-95 saw the road enter New Jersey on the Scudder Falls Bridge, 
where it would allow traffic from Pennsylvania to cross the Delaware River near Trenton. 
It would then proceed in a relatively straight line through Princeton, Franklin, 
Piscataway, and Newark before crossing into New York City at the George Washington 
Bridge. The Scudder Falls Bridge was complete in 1959, and New Jersey successfully 
built I-95 ten miles into the state, to the point it intersected U.S.1. The rapid process came 
to screeching halt, however, as the towns between U.S. 1 and New York City resisted 
construction of the road for decades, ultimately resulting in the unprecedented 
cancellation of the route in 1983. 
 The struggle to prevent construction of I-95 from U.S. 1 to Newark, a stretch of 
road commonly called the Sommerset Freeway, stands as arguably the most absolute 
victory for highway challengers in any of the many conflicts that arose regarding the 
construction of I-95. Opponents of the road in Boston and select other cities across the 
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east coast won small victories by managing to save their homes, churches, businesses, 
and so forth from the unrelenting progress of the superhighway. When these individuals 
won, however, the state highway planners usually responded by simply rerouting and 
destroying somebody else’s home or business. For example, residents of Boston so 
strongly fought a plan to route I-95 through the heart of the city that the governor 
cancelled the project in 1972. Rather than accept there would be a break in I-95 at 
Boston, however, engineers devised a new route that runs the perimeter of Boston until it 
reaches Canton, where I-95 had already been built. The Sommerset Freeway, however, 
was not replaced by an alternate route when the residents succeeded in killing the project. 
New Jersey State Highway Department officials did not simply move to the next town 
over for an easier fight. The state of New Jersey ultimately built small segments of 
highway that tied the extant New Jersey Turnpike into I-95 at the Delaware and New 
York state lines and labeled the Turnpike as I-95. The result is the only discontinuous 
segment of I-95 in the entirety of its nearly 1,900 miles. One can successfully drive 
across New Jersey without exiting I-95 if entering from Delaware. If driving into New 
Jersey from Pennsylvania, however, I-95 ends at U.S. 1, and the driver must use alternate 
routes to get back onto I-95 about twenty miles to the south. 
Princeton residents and those of neighboring towns had known I-95 would pass 
through for nearly a decade when serious debate began. It was common knowledge that I-
95 would connect Trenton and New York City from the George Washington Bridge “to 
near the Turnpike; then the Turnpike is the alignment from Ridgefield Park to the vicinity 
of New Brunswick; and from Scotch Road, mercer County to Scudder Falls Bridge across 
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the Delaware River near Trenton.”196 This required that the road pass somewhere near 
Princeton. Little serious opposition mounted in the earliest years because residents 
understood the importance New Jersey and federal officials placed on the road; residents 
accepted its inevitable presence since there was ample farmland in the immediate vicinity 
of the community. The road could be constructed, they assumed, without upsetting a 
significant number of people.  
 In 1964, the people of Princeton began to hear rumors of a specific route gaining 
favor among highway engineers. The Princeton Planning board opened an inquiry with 
the State Highway Department. In reply, State Highway Engineer J.R. Schuyler 
explained the routing process to quell concern. According to Schuyler,  the state of New 
Jersey began by drawing a straight line from the Scudder Falls Bridge to Route 287 in 
Somerset and Middlesex Counties. Engineers would then evaluate routes that were 
topographically feasible but followed the course of the straight line as closely as possible. 
Schuyler underscored that these feasibility routes were used for cost estimation only, and 
“there will be many studies and much deliberation before an alignment is established for 
design purposes.” 197 Schuyler forwarded hand-drawn sketches detailing a few of the 
routes used for estimating cost. 
 The straight line route between the Scudder Falls Bridge and Route 287 clipped 
the northwest corner of Princeton’s borders, a minor concern for most in Princeton, as a 
minor deviation from this path would allow the state to achieve its straight line objective 
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and keep I-95 out of Princeton proper. The feasibility route that remained truest to the 
straight line but also was topographically possible—the route New Jersey had been using 
for cost estimation—followed a course a few miles to the south of the straight line and 
cut through a much more significant section of Princeton. Rather than graze a corner of 
the community, this route would enter the community and run nearly half of its length 
before exiting the town limits and continuing its course.  
 While not particularly panicked by this information, the Planning Board of 
Princeton Township demonstrated enough concern to publish a January 1965 report on 
alternate routes in the vicinity of Princeton that would be preferable to the feasibility 
route. The report detailed the Board’s concerns with the route under consideration. First, 
the route would necessitate the construction of an interchange within Princeton’s borders. 
Interchanges were often subjects of debate because they required significant land and 
necessitated heavier traffic. Interestingly, the report does not take great issue with the 
presence of the interchange for these reasons but rather the pressures to commercially 
develop the area around the interchange. The Planning Board had already established 
guidelines which were to govern the development of the community. The guidelines 
dictated that “The focus of the Princeton Community shall be on development that 
contributes to its Educational-Research character, rather than on any effort to become the 
business center for a large tributary area.” More specifically, the guidelines expressly 
prohibited the type of development inherent with Interstate interchanges: “Business 
development shall be so controlled in location as to preclude ribbon development…the 
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amount of business use shall be geared to the needs of the Princeton Community rather 
than to those of a large hinterland area.”198  
 The Planning Board’s concerns were not limited to the type of development I-95 
would bring. The report also drew attention to the fact the route would pass through the 
highest value residential real estate in the community, with three subdevelopments and 
scores of additional homes in the vicinity of the route. Other issues were raised, such as 
poor drainage in the northern section of the town and desired traffic patterns. The 
overarching concern, however, was that I-95 would be injurious to the aesthetic Princeton 
wanted to cultivate. I-95, the report claimed, would “not be consistent with a sound 
pattern of land use and the natural attractiveness of the area.”199 
 Despite the concerns of the people of Princeton, state officials and regional 
planners looked at population growth projections along with the trend of automobile 
ownership and feared what would happen to New Jersey if road building did not keep 
pace with the development of the state. In 1966, the Tri-State Transportation 
Commission, comprised of civic engineers and other public administrators from 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, submitted to the governors of the three states 
an assessment of the region’s current infrastructure and its ability to serve the growing 
population. Facing a twenty-five percent population increase by 1986, the Commission 
believed it best to propose a future state for the region’s highways and rail system.200 It 
published its suggestions in a report entitled “1986: Interim Plan,” and circulated the 
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document to elected officials in all three states. According to this report, I-95 in New 
Jersey was critically important because it “fills large gap in regional highway grid [and] 
Relieves congested U.S. 1…[and] Serves fast-growing suburban area.”201 Other 1960s 
observers noted the importance of building Interstate Highways immediately, for fear that 
the pending explosion of residential, commercial, and industrial development would 
make all routes too expensive in the near future. A Deputy Commissioner for the New 
Jersey State Highway Department, for example, noted, “Ten years from now it will be as 
difficult—almost impossible—to locate and build an additional interstate Route in New 
Jersey as it is today in lower Manhattan.”202 Further incentivizing immediate construction 
was the ever-looming threat of insufficient funding of the Highway Trust Fund or 
reallocation of the funds to other initiatives.   
 According to the Tri-State Transportation Commission, the proposed route of I-95 
through Mercer, Somerset, and Middlesex Counties traced a corridor that was among the 
worst in the region when assessing the ratio of miles of controlled access routes to 
number of registered vehicles. While most of Connecticut had 3.9 or fewer registered 
automobiles per mile of controlled access highway, the I-95 counties in New Jersey had a 
ration of greater than ten.203 While many in the Garden State claimed that asphalt was 
already smothering the state, the fact was the number of automobiles was more likely to 
choke the state first. 
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The state of New Jersey also saw great benefit in I-95 beyond traffic congestion. 
In 1968, Wibur Smith and Associates of Columbia, South Carolina released a report the 
state had commissioned. Entitled “A Socioeconomic Study of Highway Development,” 
the report examined the anticipated effects of constructing I-287 and I-95 in the Garden 
State. Beginning with the idea that “the Interstate System is today pointing the direction 
for growth of population, commerce, industry, and government,” the report had few 
criticisms of the routes. Not only would I-95 benefit industry and commerce in Middlesex 
and Somerset Counties, Wilbur Smith and Associates argued, it would “expand the 
social, cultural, recreational, and employment horizons of those it serves.”204 
 Echoing many of the tried and true arguments in favor of Interstate highways 
championed by the AAA and the rest of the Road Gange (see Chapter 1), the 
commissioned report argued I-95 would be good for the country, good for New Jersey, 
good for business, and good for the people of the state and region. In short, it argued the 
highway would “expand the social, cultural, recreational, and employment horizons of 
those it serves.”205 Wilbur and Associates situated I-95 as an indispensable road given the 
anticipated state New Jersey would find itself in in the future. According the report, 1986 
would see New Jersey’s population grow by ten million people—a dramatic 44.6 percent 
increase. Extrapolating the observed settlement patterns of 1966, this translated to an 
entirely urbanized state. No Garden State county, the report argued, would have fewer 
than two hundred people per square mile. This burgeoning population would require 
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more and better highways, as 1986 would see a nearly 70 percent increase in the number 
of registered vehicles, and New Jersey’s nearly six million vehicles would drive 65 
billion miles within the state—an increase of an incredible 88 percent from 1966.206 
 Several New Jersey towns found themselves trying to balance the need for 
additional roads with a desire to maintain communities and preserve natural beauty. To 
this end, the Princeton Committee on I-95 solicited the support of renowned landscape 
architect Ian McHarg, then a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a founding 
partner of Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd. This agency put into practice what 
McHarg would later put to the page in the seminal 1969 Design With Nature. This book, 
a forerunner—and in some ways, a catalyst—of the late-twentieth century green 
movement, argued the “dominate and destroy” approach to modern American urban 
design was not sustainable. Instead, McHarg argued for urban design that emulated 
nature’s examples and accounted for the myriad ways the built environment and natural 
environment would interact. Without a doubt, Design with Nature was, in part, a result of 
McHarg’s work in central New Jersey.207 
 On behalf of the Princeton Committee on I-95, McHarg’s consulting firm 
authored “A Comprehensive Highway Route Selection Method Applied to I-95 Between 
the Delaware and Raritan Rivers.” The report employed an incipient Geographic 
Information System (GIS) by overlaying transparent maps of the region, each focusing on 
a different element. Twelve total parameters, including topography, residential quality, 
water value, physiographic obstruction, and recreational value were plotted on top of one 
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another. The consultants assessed each overlay with a score of one to three, with one 
being significant obstruction or damage caused by the highway, and three representing 
the least conflict between the road and the environment. When each layer of central New 
Jersey’s world were compiled, McHarg was able to clearly identify a route that connected 
the Delaware and Raritan Rivers by doing the least amount of harm to the environment 
and providing maximum social benefit. Notably, this route bypassed Princeton.208 
 The people of Princeton who opposed I-95 entering the town limits latched on to 
McHarg’s proposal. The McCullough’s, of Cedearbrook Terrace, cited McHarg when 
appealing to Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. for support. Calling the rest of New Jersey 
an “industrial and suburban wasteland,” they noted that McHarg’s ecological approach to 
civic engineering “must be adopted.”  McHarg also found supporters outside of 
Princeton. In a 1967 letter to Governor Richard Hughes, two of New Jersey’s 
representatives and both senators claimed “Many responsible persons and associations 
and a growing number of municipal governing bodies and school boards have contacted 
us…Most of these expressions advance support for a proposal put forth by Mr. Ian 
McHarg.”209 However, the McCullough’s and other opponents of New Jersey’s proposed 
route were not entirely satisfied with the route proposed by McHarg. Noting that his 
suggestion “does the least possible damage,” they would have preferred another 
alternative since “even his proposed route will damage the area irrevocably.” The 
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McCullough’s failed to explain what damage would be caused, but it seems as though any 
impact to Princeton was undesirable. Instead, the McCullough’s recommended a route 
well to the south and east of Princeton—far from their hometown and toward other parts 
of New Jersey the McCullough’s found more suitable for a highway.210 This notion that 
Princeton and its neighbors were exceptional among the communities of New Jersey was 
a frequent theme in the discourse surrounding the route of I-95. The mayor of Franklin 
Township told Rex Whitton, “I-95 will destroy the aesthetics of our zoning and planning 
and will destroy the monetary value of this fine residential area.”211 A resident of 
Princeton wrote, “The purpose of suburban living is to provide a measure of quiet and 
beauty” and argued that the construction of I-95 through the suburban towns of central 
New Jersey would cause New Jersey to be “irrevocably lost to true suburban living.”212 In 
this discourse, the people of central New Jersey’s affluent communities revealed that they 
valued the “least valuable” areas of their hometowns more than any community further 
afield. This is, to be sure, human nature at work, but it is important to note that many of 
the arguments employed when arguing for or against particular routes belied true 
motivations. While individuals spoke in terms of “least possible damage” and other ideals, 
and while they would cite environmental and other concerns, the true goal was often for 
I-95 to affect someone else’s community. 
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The earliest attempts at persuading New Jersey’s highway engineers to route I-95 
away from the communities of Princeton, Hillsborough, and Franklin seem to have fallen 
on deaf ears. In late 1966, the state released the exact route under consideration, called 
the “cost-estimate line.” The State was careful to note that the cost-estimate line was 
preliminary and was chosen only for the purposes of estimating general costs; 
nevertheless, the people of Princeton, Hillsborough, and other towns decided it was wise 
to preempt the finalization of the route since previous efforts had not convinced the state 
to consider alternate routings up to this point; the cost-estimate line projected I-95 to run 
through the heart of Piscataway, Princeton, Franklin, Somerset and Hopewell. From late 
1966 until the early 1980s, these communities mounted considerable opposition to the 
construction of I-95. While the earlier discourse over the route was heated, the release of 
the cost-estimate line drew many more people to the fight.  
Opposition to the road is abundantly clear in the correspondence citizens sent 
their representatives in Washington. Some opposition was routed in specific arguments 
against the route—environmental concerns and the desire to protect a specific building or 
geographic feature, for example. Most of the opposition, however, was the product of a 
desire to protect the suburban nature of the central New Jersey communities by routing I-
95 through a different part of the state. Jarvis Morris, Pastor of the Somerset Presbyterian 
Church, appealed to New Jersey’s elected officials as well as God in his attempt to have 
I-95 routed around the townships of Somerset and Franklin. In a letter to his earthly 
leader, Morris opposed the Highway Department’s route through Franklin because it 
would displace a few members of his congregation. He then claimed that he and other 
religious leaders in the community “are not asking God to have the road located in any 
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one place, but rather that it will be aligned so that it will do the least harm to the fewest 
people and the most good to the greatest number.” Despite the appeal to choose the best 
possible route, Morris was convinced the Highway Department’s route was not it, since 
he closed his letter by asking that “God, who is infallible, can impart his wisdom on 
[Highway] Commissioner Palmer and his Department.” 213 Others in the communities of 
central New Jersey showed little compassion for those in other parts of the state, 
frequently suggesting that I-95 would be of much better use to the state if it were routed 
through some other town. Or, if they were not being so deceptive, they would simply 
volunteer the other communities because fewer people would be inconvenienced in their 
estimation. For example, Rocco Cappeto of Somerset proposed the “vastly unpopulated 
areas of Manville” as a better option than his hometown.214 
 The most commonly voiced argument against the state’s route of I-95 was the 
continuation of the pre-1966 argument, namely, that routing along the cost-estimate line 
would despoil one of the few naturally beautiful areas left in New Jersey. Dr. George 
Gallup, founder of the American Institute of Public Opinion (more commonly known as 
the Gallup Poll), wrote to Senator Harrison Williams, Jr. in March of 1967 to beseech his 
support in dissuading the state from moving forward with its plans for I-95. Gallup lived 
in Princeton at the time. Noting that “New Jersey, as a state, has left a limited amount of 
land not taken over by housing, industry, commercial developments and the like,” Gallup 
posited, “I think it is our duty to try to preserve these areas which are still as they were in 
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earlier years.”215 A Piscataway resident made a similar appeal when she wrote to Senator 
Williams: “This proposed route would cut through the middle of one of the few areas still 
retaining its original natural beauty and wildlife in this part of the state.”216 The State 
Highway Department acknowledged the populations’ growing concern over the effect 
“yet another” highway would have on the aesthetics of the state. A 1967 document 
prepared to facilitate discussion at a public hearing on a stretch of I-95 in Hillsborough 
includes several lengthy passages explaining that the route under consideration produces 
as little noise pollution as possible and would be attractive due to wide shoulders and a 
sixty-foot-wide median. Additionally, the document assured residents “every effort has 
been made to blend the proposed alignment both vertically and horizontally with the 
surround topography.”217  
 The appeal to natural beauty is, perhaps, the most unique aspect of New Jersey’s 
I-95 debate. As the most road-choked state in the union, those residents who managed to 
maintain quiet residential communities removed from the din of highway traffic and 
unsightliness of highways in general had a reason to resist I-95 that did not arise 
frequently elsewhere on the east coast. These residents could not argue New Jersey did 
not need I-95—every growth forecast indicated New Jersey needed a far more expansive 
highway infrastructure—but they could argue the route should be reconsidered to 
preserve what was unique about the towns along the considered path. Since the previous 
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highways, including the New Jersey Turnpike, had not touched these communities, they 
maintained characteristics long lost to other parts of the state. By this logic, it made more 
sense to build I-95 immediately adjacent to the Turnpike since these communities had 
already suffered the destructive nature of highway construction, and many made this 
argument. A resident of Hopewell, for example, wrote, “Cannot any of New Jersey be left 
in a rural state. [sic] Must it all be developed and industrialized? Is there no end to it?” 
He continued, “The proposed I-95 portion through the Hopewell, New Jersey area is a 
disgrace. This is one of the few beautiful areas left in Central New Jersey…To build it 
through the remaining scenic rural areas and have them industrialized is a thought that is 
sickening.”218 
 Highway advocates and those with business interests tied to the construction of 
Interstate Highways were, by the late 1960s, used to resistance and trials of the 
roadbuilding project in the court of public opinion. In October of 1968, the opposition 
approached critical mass, and the Department of Transportation attempted to revise the 
Federal Register to address some of the growing discontent. The Register governed the 
activities of federal agencies, and the Department of Transportation proposed a change 
that would require a federal hearing in addition to state hearings prior to the 
commencement of Interstate construction.219 The Department of Transportation’s move 
to amend the Register seems counterintuitive, as it would only serve to slow down the 
construction of the Interstate System during a period when future funding was ever in 
doubt and timely completion was the primary objective. It stands to reason, however, that 
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the federal agency saw brief delays early in the process as preferable to delays once 
surveying was advanced or construction had begun. This was especially true in New 
Jersey, where limited space and high construction costs made it imperative that 
opposition was reconciled before investing significant money into construction. As ninety 
percent financiers of the program, it stands to reason the federal government wanted to 
protect its investment. It is also possible the Department of Transportation was 
responding to the nagging complaint that the route selection and approval methodology 
was undemocratic.  
 Despite good intentions, the Department of Transportation’s move elicited 
backlash by organizations who would either profit from the construction of I-95 or 
benefit once the road was complete. The New Jersey Retail Merchants Association, New 
Jersey Petroleum Council, New Jersey Automobile Dealers Association and myriad 
additional stakeholders appealed to New Jersey lawmakers in opposition to the 
amendment of the Federal Register. In a letter to Representative William Cahill, a 
Trustee of United Milk Producers of New Jersey argued, “It is our opinion that the 
traditional role of state highway departments in establishing hearing procedures should 
not be upset, since these departments are in a better position to decide highway needs of 
their jurisdictions than is the federal government.”220 It seems as though Washington, 
through the amendment of the Federal Register, was responding to highway opponents 
because of their highly visible resistance to the Interstates in some communities. While 
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this may have been a move to placate the vocal opposition to highway construction, it did 
not pass.  
 The towns of central New Jersey found other ways to delay highway construction. 
In 1967 and 1968, Hopewell, Franklin, and Piscataway filed lawsuits against the federal 
Department of Transportation and New Jersey’s Department of Transportation which 
successfully delayed construction. In the early 1970s, New Jersey’s highway engineers 
remained hopeful that the state and federal government would approve a route and 
construction could begin.221 However, the people of central New Jersey continued to 
oppose the road’s construction. When the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, recognizing 
the population growth projections that had initially led the group to drop its opposition to 
the construction of I-95 were overestimated, rejoined the fight, it proved too much for the 
state and federal forces who wanted to see I-95 built.  
By the mid-1970s, major players were forfeiting. The Regional Planning 
Association recommended cancelation in 1976: 
The plans for a new 30-mile expressway from Hopewell to Piscataway, opening a 
new traffic corridor through essentially rural parts of Somerset and Mercer 
Counties, should be cancelled. Instead, the New Jersey Turnpike should be 
designated as Interstate 95 from Edison to Bordentown, with the existing 
Pennsylvania Turnpike connection serving as the link to the Delaware 
Expressway, the present Interstate 95 in Pennsylvania.222 
 
In 1980, Governor Brendan Byrne announced the state of New Jersey would no longer 
pursue the construction of I-95 through Princeton and its neighboring communities. The 
federal government would not officially cancel the project until 1983. The result was the 
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only break in the entirety of I-95, a break created by a confluence of unique 
circumstances.  
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Figure 3.1: The Break in New Jersey’s I-95, route in red223 
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CHAPTER 4 
WAITING IN SOUTHEAST FLORIDA 
In the midst of the highway revolts, Florida Department of Transportation 
Director of Planning and Programming Ray G. L’Amoreaux attempted to understand why 
most organized resistance to highways seemed to occur in urban centers. L’Amoreaux 
sincerely believed modern highways were the United States’ best option to dramatically 
upgrade transportation speed and safety in a relatively short timeframe. Noting 
“transportation problems will not be solved by existing hardware,” L’Amoreaux ardently 
resisted attempts to repurpose highway funds for the support of mass transit systems and 
believed strongly in the aims of the Interstate Highway System. Yet, L’Amoreaux 
displayed a remarkable empathy for those who opposed highway construction.224 “There 
is a strong feeling that it [the highway] does not service the [urban] neighborhood it 
traverses but only provides a pathway for thousands of faceless drivers,” he wrote. 
Additionally, he acknowledged the noise and pollution urban residents often decried, and 
admitted some businesses and homeowners suffered economic hardship as the result of 
urban highways.225 Compassion for those negatively impacted by highways and a 
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willingness to acknowledge the negative aspects of Intersate construction distinguished 
L’Amareaux from his predecessors and many of his peers across the United States.
A break from planning based solely on cost and utility also indicates that the highway 
revolts had begun to sway the way engineers approached highway construction. But as 
urban planning became more empathetic, L’Amoreaux considered why rural and 
suburban routing had taken such a different form.  L’Amoreaux theorized non-urban 
America had not revolted because these communities had a different relationship with 
Interstates. Unlike urban residents, who understood Interstates as benefiting those outside 
the city at the expense of those in the city, most  rural and suburban residents believed 
their communities and livelihoods improved due to the roads. Interstate Highways, 
L’Amoreaux argued, brought economic growth and a means of accessing the outside 
world. “It is no barrier to mobility,” he wrote,” but is rather the only reasonable means of 
moving about. Rural citizens, in general, resisted the roads less vehemently because they 
had land to spare while suburban residents’ lifestyles relied upon the Interstate. 226 Rural 
Americans occasionally took issue with the state’s seizure of land for Interstate 
construction, but these grievances rarely manifested as anything greater than quiet 
confrontations between individuals and the state.  
 As the man responsible for negotiating highway routes, L’Amoreaux was inclined 
to paint a positive picture of Interstates outside of urban areas. He could not deny the 
resistance within the nation’s metropolises given the extensive media coverage highway 
protests had received, but a general lack of attention paid to the progress of Interstates 
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outside of cities meant few knew what kind of reception most of the miles were 
receiving.  The number of miles of Interstate Highways under contest was relatively 
minuscule compared to the System in total. Of the more than 40,000 miles of constructed 
and planned Interstates in the early 1970s, fewer than 100 faced any real threat during the 
freeway revolts. Since the media fixated on the events unfolding in Boston, Los Angeles, 
Minneapolis, and elsewhere, L’Amoreaux seized the opportunity to say that Americans 
greeted 99 percent of the system with open arms.  
 L’Amoreaux’s experience within the state of Florida fueled his inquiry into the 
apparent division between urban and non-urban responses to Interstates. In total, Florida 
was to construct nearly 1,400 miles of Interstates, and a majority of the mileage was 
under contract by the early 1970s. Yet, when L’Amoreaux surveyed the state, he saw 
little opposition to the Interstates outside of small portions of urban Tampa (I-75) and 
Miami (I-95).227 Quite to the contrary, the most significant debate surrounding  Interstate 
construction in Florida—one that dominated local and state elections in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s—concerned citizens who argued the state was delaying construction of I-
95 in a region that desperately wanted the highway. 
PROMISES OF PROGRESS 
 The six coastal counties immediately north of Miami-Dade County (Broward, 
Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, and Brevard) experienced explosive growth 
in the years immediately following World War II. The population of Fort Lauderdale, for 
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example, grew from 36,328 in 1950 to 83,648 in 1960. Then, it jumped again, to 139,590 
by 1970.228 Fort Lauderdale’s 284 percent population growth in two decades was not 
uncommon in South Florida, as Vero Beach, Fort Pierce, Stuart, and West Palm Beach—
all of which were along I-95’s planned route—experienced similar population gains. 
Much of the population growth resulted from the same forces that drove sunbelt growth 
across the south and southwest in the post-WWII years: a proliferation of air conditioning 
and other technological advancements that made the climate more inviting, increased 
geographic mobility, and other forces. However, as Raymond Arsenault, Michael 
Gannon, Godfrey Desrosiers-Laurzon and others have argued, beginning in the late 
1980s, Florida’s postwar development should not be treated as emblematic of other 
sunbelt development.229 Florida’s boom found fuel in a revitalization of the region’s citrus 
economy, which had receded significantly after a freeze destroyed the crop in the early 
1940s. As the oranges and grapefruits returned to the trees, workers moved to the area for 
work. Federal installations, such as NASA, further drove the economic growth. Far and 
away, however, the most significant driver in southeastern Florida’s population surge was 
tourism. 
 In comparing tourism in the United States before and after World War II, 
economic historian Thomas Weiss has noted, “For those who were critical of the sort of 
mass tourism that seemed to have materialized in the early twentieth century, the boom in 
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tourism after World war II would have been unfathomable.”230 The postwar years saw an 
economically empowered American middle class travel in unprecedented numbers, 
catalyzing the development of coastal communities from Texas to Virginia. Florida, 
which had attracted individuals since the early nineteenth century with its favorable 
climate and exotic scenery, transformed into the heart of beach tourism in the wake of 
World War II.231 Families purchased second homes, made annual pilgrimages to the 
coast, and took road trips down the Florida shoreline. Families were not the only source 
of tourism funds for Florida business. The spring break phenomenon among college 
students began in the years immediately following the War’s end and exploded with the 
1958 publication of Glendon Swarthout’s novel Where the Boys Are and its movie 
adaptation in 1960. By the mid-1950s, Fort Lauderdale hosted upwards of 20,000 college 
students each year. By the early 1980s, Fort Lauderdale was a town of just over 80,000 
and hosted over a quarter million college students per annum.232 Coastal Florida’s annual 
visitors gave rise to hospitality and other businesses that required thousands of workers, 
and, by extension, more housing and other development. According to the Miami-Dade 
Tourist and Convention Council, southeast Florida’s total number of rooms for rent  had 
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tripled and restaurant seating capacity doubled between 1946 and 1960.233 By 1955, one 
out of every five dollars earned in the state of Florida derived from tourism.234 
 A 1955 survey conducted by a University of Miami researcher highlights how 
important the region’s highway access was to this industry. From 1954 to 1955, seventy-
two percent of visitors to Dade County arrived via personal automobile. When bus and 
other transportation-for-hire services were taken into account, a full three-fourths of Dade 
County’s visitors arrived via the road.235 Southeastern Florida, however, lacked the 
infrastructure to support the growing population and tourism. While the region built 
schools, hospitals, homes, sewer systems, power lines, and other accommodations at a 
remarkable clip, roads were arguably the region’s most glaring deficiency. U.S. 1 was the 
region’s main thoroughfare. It struggled to accommodate the traffic volume generated by 
the booming tourist and residential population, and its safety was increasingly suspect. 
Like most of the highways built as part of the original United States Numbered Highway 
System, U.S. 1was challenged to handle the vehicles of the 1950s. In response, Florida 
began planning for the Sunshine State Parkway, which later became alternatively known 
as the Florida Turnpike, in 1953, and construction began in 1955. Many in southeast 
Florida resisted the Turnpike, believing a toll road would discourage tourism. When the 
Interstate Highway System came to reality in 1956, the region saw the future I-95 as 
preferable to the Turnpike, since it would not charge tolls and could accommodate more 
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traffic, and most of the funding would come from the federal government. Civic leaders 
and planners almost immediately came to see I-95 as a vehicle to alleviate the midcentury 
infrastructure strains in the region and hoped it would catalyze further development.  
 Some communities went so far as to secure land for the right-of-way and planned 
their construction around the future location of the route. This was a risky venture since 
the Florida State Road Department decided the route of all Interstate highways in the 
state. The action, however, reflects the way these coastal Florida communities viewed I-
95. With the luxury of being able to plan for the road, the communities believed they 
could reap the benefits of the Interstate highways while mitigating the negative aspects of 
the superhighway. Whereas many urban residents feared I-95 would claim right-of-way 
through the heart of the city (and in many cases, it did), South Floridians had the 
undeveloped land to accommodate I-95 far enough outside of residential areas to be 
tolerable but close enough to be useful. Few, if any, businesses would have to relocate to 
make way for I-95. In short, South Floridians believed they were in the perfect position 
with regards to I-95. From the early 1960s through the 1970s, however, the people of 
South Florida came to realize their plans were only as good as the level of cooperation 
they received from state highway officials and elected representatives.  
 When the Federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) released the first approximate 
renderings of the Interstate System, individuals noticed that I-95 in Florida would follow 
the same route as the Turnpike, which was originally planned to trace the entire Atlantic 
coast of Florida, from Jacksonville to Miami. From the moment Eisenhower signed the 
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, those with an eye on south Florida’s transportation 
plans noticed the potential redundancy between the Florida Turnpike and I-95. The BPR 
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requested that the Turnpike adopt the I-95 label and become part of the Interstate System, 
but the Florida State Road Department compromised with the federal government. The 
Florida State Turnpike Authority and State Road Department agreed to terminate plans 
for construction of the Turnpike north of Fort Pierce in October of 1956, and in return, 
the BPR allowed the construction of a road parallel to I-95 in south Florida. This move 
resulted in I-95 serving as the only modern highway along Florida’s east coast from 
Jacksonville to Fort Pierce, and dual highways from Fort Pierce to Miami. 
 Florida’s determination to build the Turnpike in south Florida stemmed from 
several factors. For one, the state began construction of the Turnpike in Miami Gardens 
in 1955, and the Turnpike was well underway by 1956. Second, Florida officials believed 
multiple multilane modern highways were necessary to handle the traffic volume 
expected in south Florida in the coming decades. Third, the state had a vested interest in 
the construction of both roads. State officials viewed the 90/10 cost sharing program for 
the Interstate Highways as essentially “free money” for the state. A Florida Department 
of Transportation internal memo from the early 1970s called the “earning power” of the 
state’s 10 percent investment “the most significant benefit” of the Interstate program. 
“This favorable matching ratio,” the report explained, “produces equivalent improvement 
mileage yet frees four dollars of State funds for other critically needed projects.”236 From 
Florida’s perspective, it made perfect sense to construct the Turnpike and I-95. I-95 was 
essentially ninety percent “free” and the Turnpike would pay for itself through tolls.  
                                                 
236
 State of Florida Department of Transportation, “An Assessment of Florida’s Interstate 
Program, Past…Future???” (1970?), Department of Transportation Division of Traffic and Planning 
Program Subject Files (Series 806), Box 1, SAF, 11.  
138 
 
 Federal highway professionals did not fully understand Florida’s desire to have 
two major highways through south Florida, as evidenced by a July 12, 1957 memo from 
B.D. Tallamy, the Federal Highway Administrator, and R.A. Anderson, the Interstate 
System’s Regional Engineer in Atlanta. Tallamy requested written confirmation from 
Florida highway officials that they fully understood the implications of hosting two major 
thoroughfares. In addition to written confirmation that the Florida Turnpike Authority 
had no objection to a parallel routing of I-95, Tallamy wanted “an agreement by the 
Turnpike Authority to include in future bond fund prospectus [sic] a notice that such a 
designation has been made.”237 The Turnpike had been initially financed through an 
issuance of bonds, and Tallamy demonstrated prescience in expecting bond holders to be 
angered that a competing route would be sanctioned by the state of Florida. Tallamy also 
wanted a written agreement between the Turnpike Authority and the Florida State Road 
Department stating they would cooperate on all matters related to I-95.238 
 Tallamy’s letter also demonstrated skepticism about the need for both highways, 
and he feared various factions within the state would derail the program once 
construction on I-95 had begun, thus wasting federal dollars and energy. Since the 
Turnpike Authority and the State Road Department sponsored the Turnpike and I-95, 
respectively, Tallamy wanted the Road Department to agree it “will not advance plans to 
construction stage unless the Turnpike is unable to conveniently carry the traffic and that 
the Turnpike Authority agrees that its I-95 construction will not jeopardize the financial 
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security of the Authority.” Finally, Bellamy wanted evidence “I-95 will be needed within 
a 16-year period.”239 Clearly, Tallamy’s letter demonstrates federal uneasiness with the 
plans as they progressed in south Florida.  
 In retrospect, the concerns expressed by Tallamy were well-founded, as the latter 
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s demonstrated a lack of clarity about what agreements had 
been made and what the actual plans were for southeast Florida’s transportation future. 
Years passed before construction began on I-95 in the area, despite clamoring from the 
people and businesses of the effected communities. The state initially did a poor job of 
communicating with the people of Florida, which led to a high level of tension. Then, 
politicians began to seize upon the turmoil to advance their agendas. By time state 
officials realized the need to clarify the situation to the public, they had lost all 
credibility. Many people of coastal Florida concluded the state had delayed the 
construction of I-95 in order to maximize toll revenue while the Turnpike operated 
without competition. Others assumed the state never planned to build the road. Nearly ten 
years after the initial plans for I-95 came to light, one West Palm Beach resident 
lamented: 
I am so confused and exasperated about the way the State Road Department, the 
Governor of the State of Florida, and possibly the Federal Bureau of Roads, have 
delayed and shadowboxed with the more than 500,000 people of Palm Beach 
County and Broward County in letting a contract for the construction of a section 
of I-95 in Palm Beach County since the inception of the Interstate Road Program 
some ten years ago that I hardly know what to say.240 
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The County Commissioner of Palm Beach County came to call I-95 “the most 
ridiculously managed project in the state of Florida.”241  
 Even in the earliest days of the situation, the disconnect between the people of 
southeast Florida and the various state road departments was apparent. After the Palm 
Beach Post-Times published articles on May 9th and 10th, 1957 claiming the Miami to 
West Palm Beach section of I-95 would be open within a few years, William H. Jones, 
Chairman of the State Road Department, wrote to Editor Ed Sumpf to correct what he 
perceived as a misstating of the facts. Jones provided Stumpf with his summary of the 
situation, including the events that led to the impasse in question. According to Jones, the 
state moved forward with completing the Turnpike even after the Federal Aid Highway 
Act of 1956 because “South Florida needed Turnpike relief immediately,” and the state 
could not be assured the funding for I-95 would be available in the immediate future. 
Additionally, bonds had been sold to the people of Florida “in good faith,” and both the 
Road Department and the governor’s office refused to do anything “that would jeopardize 
the interest of the bond holders.” Upon completion of the Turnpike, the state realized the 
region required an additional four lanes of limited access highway. The Turnpike 
Authority’s stance was clear: I-95 could not open until 1971 in order to ensure “no 
adverse effect on Turnpike bonds.”242  
 The desire to avoid upsetting bondholders put the state of Florida in a precarious 
position. The Turnpike did not solve all of south Florida’s transportation problems, as 
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evidenced by the fact Department of Transportation traffic counters did not see a 
significant decrease in congestion on U.S. 1 after the Turnpike opened;  however, the 
governor and some highway officials were unwilling to expedite construction of I-95.243 
The answer to Florida’s transportation problems could be purchased for only ten percent 
of the cost; yet the state could not or would not seize upon the opportunity. In light of the 
study showing the Turnpike did not relieve U.S.1 congestion, Jones intended to “step up 
our planning in the Palm Beach area considerably ahead of the 1971 completion date,” 
since he believed “that the Palm Beach section, rather than competing with the Turnpike, 
would actually help the Turnpike by facilitating movement of traffic to and from the 
Turnpike facility to the Palm Beach area.”244  
 Despite this assurance that Jones would look into expediting construction of I-95 
in south Florida, little happened in the ensuing years. Headlines appeared every few 
months declaring construction would begin imminently, and then the start date would be 
pushed out, often for very unclear reasons. When Paul Hrabko of West Palm Beach 
inquired about the most recent delay in 1961, Federal Highway Administrator Rex 
Whitton replied that Florida State Road Department had just concluded studies aimed at 
determining the proper location for I-95 in the Palm Beach vicinity, and that the State had 
just “been given authorization to proceed with its further development.”245 Relieved, 
Hrabko replied that “after three and one-half years of headlines stating that Interstate 
Number 95 would start in a couple of months, it is really good to hear that this route has 
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been approved.”246 To Hrabko’s chagrin, I-95 “moving forward” did not mean 
construction would begin. In fact, I-95 would not appear in Palm Beach until the 1970s. 
 To make matters worse, the Turnpike Authority, governor’s office, and State 
Road Department did little to temper the frustration and anger building in the beach 
communities along Florida’s Atlantic coast. In the absence of clear communication from 
these offices, the people of Florida reached their own conclusions. The most popular of 
these was that the state refused to build I-95 so that it could maximize profits from the 
Turnpike. As the people in southeast Florida simmered in frustration, the state made 
another decision that leant credence to the suspicion I-95 had been placed on semi-
permanent hold in order to maximize revenues from the Turnpike. In 1961, Governor 
Farris Bryant proposed extending the Sunshine State Parkway from Fort Pierce to 
Orlando. Unlike the 1956 proposal, which would have run I-95 and the Turnpike parallel 
for the length of Florida’s Atlantic Coast, Bryant’s proposed Turnpike extension did not 
put the road in direct competition with I-95; however, the proposal did seem to jeopardize 
the agreement made five years earlier. An extension of the Turnpike from Fort Pierce 
northwesterly to Orlando was, in fact, constructing the Turnpike north of Fort Pierce. 
Many coastal Floridians likely would have acquiesced to the Bryan plan under different 
circumstances. But since they viewed the existence of the Turnpike south of Fort Pierce 
as the reason I-95 had not come to be, they feared the Turnpike extension would all but 
ensure I-95 would not be constructed north of Fort Pierce, either.  
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CRAMER V. BRYANT 
 United States Representative William Cramer quickly emerged as the most visible 
opponent to the Bryant plan. Cramer’s office as a representative of Florida’s First District 
(the area surrounding Tampa) did not make him a representative of the communities 
affected by the delay of I-95. His reach into the politics of affairs outside of his 
jurisdiction drew suspicion among his detractors. Most, including Bryant, believed 
Cramer selected the issue because it was a political lightning rod that would put him in 
direct opposition to the Democratic Bryant Administration and would serve as the 
launching point for a more prominent career in national politics. In one exchange, Farris 
Bryant blatantly accused Cramer of “playing politics.”247 Cramer’s detractors were likely 
correct regarding his motivations; as a representative of a district on the opposite side of 
the Floridian peninsula, there was no ostensible reason for Cramer to take up this issue 
unless it was for personal advancement. Claims that Cramer aspired to be the party’s 
1966 nominee for governor and a failed 1970 senate bid corroborate this theory.248 
Regardless of his motivations, the people of eastern Florida rallied around Cramer as he 
advocated for what so many others in elected office seemed determined to deny—the 
construction of I-95. 
 Cramer observed the denial of I-95 south of Fort Pierce and concluded 
Tallahassee would obstruct the construction of the Interstate anywhere it rivaled the 
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Turnpike. Based on this assumption, he argued that if Bryant’s proposed extension of I-
95 from Fort Pierce to Orlando came to be, I-95 from Daytona to Fort Pierce would end 
up in the same state of perpetual limbo as I-95 south of Fort Pierce. This decision, Bryant 
would tell anyone who would listen, would cost Florida $60 million in “free” federal 
money, as the 135 miles of I-95 stretching from Fort Pierce to Daytona was estimated at 
$66 million.249 Cramer was not alone in rousing public outrage over the I-95 delays. The 
papers of southeastern Florida, namely the Miami Herald, Palm Beach Post Times, and 
the Fort Lauderdale News published articles and editorials further prodding the 
population. Most of these articles cited Cramer’s activities and arguments in favor of 
constructing I-95. 
 In 1961, Cramer was in this third term as a United States Representative. Over the 
course of his tenure in national politics, he had developed a reputation for demagoguery, 
with one rival Florida representative once stating Cramer was “little in stature and big in 
mouth.”250 The showdown with the Bryant administration over I-95 proved he was 
equally skilled in evidence-based rhetoric. Cramer knew how to solicit arguments that 
proved his case and was adept at making sure voters heard his message. The most 
ingenious tactic Cramer employed, however, was putting the Bryant administration in a 
position whereby it would have to reveal their real motivations for stymying I-95. Cramer 
knew the number of individuals desiring I-95’s construction was far greater than the 
number of bondholders. Since the Bryant administration would only cite a desire to be 
fair to bondholders as reason to wait on constructing I-95, Cramer made a series of 
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proposals that sounded reasonable to the voting public. First, Cramer proposed that the 
governor receive a commitment “unequivocally stating that Interstate 95 between 
Daytona Beach and Fort Pierce will be approved, despite the existence of the toll 
Turnpike.” This vow was meant to prevent the state from doing business as they had five 
years earlier, when they agreed to build both I-95 and the Turnpike south of Fort Pierce 
and then backing out of constructing the Interstate after the Turnpike opened. Second, 
Cramer appealed to Floridians’ sense of majority rule, asking if bondholders should 
“determine the highway future” of the state. Finally, Cramer proposed that all future 
bonds include language clearly stating that Florida would pursue Interstate highways in 
conjunction with toll roads.251 
 In order to preempt counterarguments by the governor’s office, Cramer also 
sought and found a federal highway official who would support his claim: Frank Turner, 
a thirty-year professional of the Bureau of Public Roads then serving in the capacities of 
Deputy Commissioner and Chief Engineer. Cramer claimed Turner viewed I-95 between 
Fort Pierce and Daytona and the proposed Turnpike extension as parallel routes even 
though the latter directed traffic to Orlando instead of towns further up the coast. 
According to Cramer, Turner believed “there would not be enough traffic to warrant both 
routes.”252 Turner never denied these statements. Cramer also appealed to the most 
visible highway professional in Washington, Bureau of Public Roads Administrator Rex 
Whitton. Whitton, according to Cramer, believed I-95 would not be approved until the 
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state “obtain[ed] permission from the holders of the bonds…thereby conceding that the 
two routes are competing.”253 
 Cramer successfully mobilized the people of Florida, and their various 
expressions of support reveal that they accepted Cramer’s accusation that the state had 
been underhanded in its management of I-95. In August 1961, the President of the 
Daytona Beach Chamber of Commerce wrote to Bryant to urge the construction of I-95. 
The letter refers to “published accounts of efforts to adjust highway locations to show 
greater economic feasibility for the Tollpike extension,” even though Cramer was the 
only public figure making these accusations.254 As evidence that Cramer’s efforts in east 
Florida had a state-wide audience, one man from Cramer’s district wrote Bryant 
requesting that “I-95 should be cleared up, and I-95 saved, before the bonds on the 
Turnpike are validated and it’s too late.” The man clearly accepted Cramer’s charge that 
the state had engaged in a conspiracy at the expense of the people of Florida; he 
requested assurances that “no secret agreements precluding such construction be entered 
into with the bond buyers.”255 
 Publicly and in exchanges with the voting community, the Bryant administration 
and its Democratic allies denounced Cramer as a rabble rouser using the Turnpike 
extension as an opportunity to increase his profile outside of his home district. After 
Cramer circulated a “Congressional Bulletin” to the people of Florida in early July, 1961, 
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advising them of his activities and vilifying the governor, the Bryant administration 
wasted little time defending itself. In a memo to the press corps date July 15, the 
governor’s office refuted Cramer’s claims, stating, “Cramer’s latest effort to place a 
political road block in the path of our highway progress has clearly shown him to be 
willing to twist facts and embarrass dedicated public servants to service his own 
purpose.” The memo also argued Cramer’s activities had earned him “the ire of the 
citizens there [Florida’s east coast] who resent his attempts to use them as pawns in his 
latest gambit.”256 One Bryant staffer wrote, “I have no doubt that Bill will find another 
vehicle to ride in his search for state-wide headlines.”257 There is, however, little 
evidence the people of east Florida opposed Cramer’s efforts. 
 The Bryant Administration’s claim that Cramer faced resentment among the 
people of east Florida seems to be a purely rhetorical maneuver. When the Bryant 
Administration found it difficult to convince the people of Florida that Cramer’s views 
were unpopular, it attempted to make his campaign look petty. On August 24, Bryant 
held a press conference where reporters pressed him on the charges levied by Cramer. 
Bryant weathered the first few questions diplomatically, but when a reporter asked if the 
state would provide the Bureau of Public Roads firm conditions under which it would 
begin constructing I-95 (one of Cramer’s many challenges to the governor), Bryant lost 
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his patience, likely because he sensed the reporters sided with Cramer. Bryant snapped 
back, “This situation would be funny if so many people didn’t take it seriously.”258 
 At the heart of the Bryant and Cramer feud was politics. Bryant was undeniably 
correct when he accused Cramer of using the issue to advance his political profile.In the 
early 1960s, Florida was in the midst of transitioning from a solidly Democratic state to a 
divided electorate as large numbers of northerners moved into the state. In particular, the 
non-panhandle districts began to sway to the Republican side of the spectrum. Cramer 
brilliantly found an issue that put the people of these districts at odds with the Democratic 
governor, further separating the communities from the rest of the state and positioning 
Cramer as a leader in the burgeoning Florida Republican Party. Cramer’s strategy was 
clear to the Bryant Administration. In a confidential letter to other leading Democrats in 
Florida, Bryant said of Cramer, “He has projected himself into a statewide publicity 
campaign…for the sole purpose of putting the construction of roads on the basis of a 
Republic-Democratic issue.”259 In a letter between Bryant staffers, John Evans told 
Executive Assistance James W. Kynes, “The upshot is…Cramer has made it appear that 
we are bumbling, and building, roads. He has projected himself into a state-wide spotlight 
which could have effect on the 1962 Senatorial campaign.”260 
 Most residents of Florida recognized the debate for what it was, even if they did 
overwhelmingly side with Cramer. One I-95 proponent wrote to Bryant to echo his 
                                                 
258
 Press conference excerpted in letter Farris Bryant to Spessard Holland, 29 August 1961, 
Governor C. Farris Bryant Papers, Series 756 Administrative Correspondence, Box 129, SAF.  
259
 Bryant to Sikes, Peek and Kynes, 21 August 1961, Governor C. Farris Bryant Papers, Series 
756 Administrative Correspondence, Box 129, SAF.  
260
 John E. Evans to James W. Kynes, 19 August 1961, Governor C. Farris Bryant Papers, Series 
756 Administrative Correspondence, Box 129, SAF.  
149 
 
support for Cramer. He opened, “The taxpayers of Florida are stirred and nauseated by 
the politics involved” in the issue, and then echoed most of Cramer’s arguments against 
the Bryant Administration. This constituent believed it would be foolish for Florida to 
pass on sixty million dollars by not building the Interstate and therefore wanted bond 
buyers’ interests overlooked in favor of the people of coastal Florida.261  
 The Bryant Administration, recognizing Cramer’s antics as a political threat, 
responded in a political fashion. While Cramer’s charges that the Administration was 
favoring Democratic districts over Republic districts by taking a course of action that 
would deprive the latter of a desperately needed highway stirred voter sentiment, there is 
no proof this was the motivation. The record demonstrates the Bryant Administration 
truly believed both roads would be built because the Turnpike extension would serve a 
completely different purpose than I-95 from Daytona to Fort Pierce. One Bryant ally, 
taking aim at Cramer’s premise that the diverging Turnpike extension and I-95  were 
parallel, asked, “Have you studied the new Cramer Geometry? I’m much impressed with 
his understanding of ‘parallel.’”262  
 Instead, the record reveals great frustration among Bryant staffers with the BPR. 
They believed Frank Turner’s comments on the conflict between I-95 and the Turnpike 
served Cramer’s basis of legitimacy and, without it, his campaign would have fizzled in 
its earliest stages. “Our problems with Cramer,” Jimmy Kynes wrote to John Evans, 
“have been directly related to the apparent willingness of the Bureau of Public Roads to 
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say to anyone in an official capacity the things they want to hear.”263 Publicly, Bryant 
accused Cramer of using “conversation with a subordinate in the Bureau of Public Roads 
as the basis for an attack on the entire Turnpike Extension Program.”264  
 Bryant responded to the threat presented by Cramer by using the power of the of 
the Governor’s Office. In an August 26, 1961 letter to Governor Bryant, Democratic 
Senator Spessard Holland hypothesized Cramer could be silenced if the Bryant 
Administration pushed through a small segment of I-95 north of Fort Pierce. Noting that 
any construction north of Fort Pierce approved by the Public Roads Administration 
would “cut the ground from under Congressman Cramer,” Holland had all Florida 
Democrats in Washington ready to support construction.265 A memo circulated between 
Jimmy Kynes, Bob Sikes, and other Florida Democratic Representatives outlined the 
strategy that would be employed to silence Cramer. The memo did not hide that the 
Florida Democrats believed the BPR and Rex Whitton, in particular, would be willing to 
help them. As Kynes had noted previously, the BPR was more than happy to make others 
happy, even if this required sending conflicting messages. The memo states that “in order 
for the public to be convinced of firm, aggressive, and positive action on behalf of the 
state and national Democratic administrations,” they would need Rex Whitton to publicly 
enter the Florida Turnpike/I-95 conversation. The Democrats wanted Whitton to publicly 
state the construction of the Turnpike would not deter the BPR from building I-95, that 
                                                 
263
 James Kynes to John E. Evans, 19 August 1961, Governor C. Farris Bryant Papers, Series 756 
Administrative Correspondence, Box 129, SAF.  
264
 Memo to the Press Corps. 
265
 Spessard Holland to Farris Bryant, 26 August 1861, Governor C. Farris Bryant Papers, Series 
756 Administrative Correspondence, Box 129, SAF.  
151 
 
there was “no reason to assume that I-95 and the Turnpike will be serving the same traffic 
corridors,” that there would be enough traffic to warrant both roads, that Cramer had 
falsely represented previous comments from the Bureau of Public Roads, and that Florida 
had always planned on building I-95 from Jacksonville to Miami.266 Bryant wanted 
immediate action, noting, “Any indecision on these…matters results in loss of confidence 
of the Democrats and feeds fuel to Cramer’s furnace.”267Whitton’s comments in 
conjunction with construction of a small segment of I095 would undercut Cramer. 
 Interestingly, Cramer also saw Whitton as the key to ensuring his transportation 
plan for east Florida came to fruition. In an August 3, 1961 letter to Governor Bryant, 
Cramer offered something of a truce. If Bryant’s office could secure, from Whitton, 
written confirmation that construction of the Turnpike extension would “not be a basis 
for Public Roads withholding approval of construction projects on IS-95,” Cramer would 
back down.268 The Bryant Administration refused, almost certainly because it knew 
Cramer would use this letter to push for immediate construction of the route, thus 
depriving the state of toll revenue and putting Farris in a compromising position with the 
Turnpike bondholders. There is no evidence Whitton acquiesced to either Cramer’s or the 
Florida Democrats’ wishes. Instead, Whitton remained silent on the matter, allowing 
Florida to settle the matter internally.  
 As 1961 drew to a close, Florida had completed I-95 through Jacksonville, and a 
very short stretch of the road was open to traffic in north Miami. In the ensuing years, the 
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state connected Jacksonville to Daytona Beach, thus providing the state with a contiguous 
stretch of I-95 in north and central Florida. The remainder of the highway—nearly 260 of 
Florida’s planned 382 miles of I-95—remained in limbo. The state was no closer to 
beginning construction on I-95 than it was in 1956, and many began to wonder if south 
Florida would ever see the complete Interstate built. Communities along the Atlantic 
coast south of Daytona desperately wanted the new highway—there is very little 
evidence of opposition to the road—but this was not enough to overcome the political 
impasse that had stymied the project since the day funds were made available from the 
federal government.  
 By 1970, the project remained threatened by inaction. The second half of the 
previous decade had only seen the state build the twenty-seven mile segment of I-95 that 
connected Fort Lauderdale to Miami. The entire stretch from Fort Lauderdale to Daytona 
found itself relying on the Turnpike and U.S. 1 south of Fort Pierce and on U.S. 1 
exclusively north of the town. As the population continued to grow, the problems 
recognized by residents twenty years earlier had come to fruition. Traffic was simply 
halted on a regular basis, and local businessmen believed tourism was held back because 
of insufficient infrastructure. The towns of Vero Beach, Port St. Lucie, Stuart, Jupiter, 
and Delray Beach, which had attracted tens of thousands of new residents since the close 
of World War II with their paradise appeal were becoming miserable places to live due 
simply to traffic. 
 A writer for the Fort Lauderdale News summarized the frustrations of coastal 
residents well in 1974: 
Over the years, Interstate 95 has not exactly endeared itself to the hearts of many 
Broward residents. After all, it’s been 16 years—16 years!—that they’ve been 
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hearing about it. It’s 16 years since Congress first appropriated money for the 
interstate system. Sixteen years of hearing about yet another snafu, another 
relocation problem, another hassle over rights of way, another hang-up with 
funding and, sigh, just one more blankety-blank reason why the blankety-blank 
highway is held up.269 
 
The reasons for the continued inaction on I-95 were myriad. For one, the Turnpike 
Authority and Florida’s Democratic leadership continued to resist any road that 
threatened to reduce toll revenues. In 1969, Spessard Holland had informed the County 
Administrator of St. Lucie County that “there is much yet to be done at the state level 
before the Bureau of Public Roads can act with any degree of finality on approval of the 
entire plan for I-95.” Holland specifically cited the need for an “agreement from the 
Turnpike Authority that construction of I-95 would not jeopardize the Authority’s 
bonds.” He emphasized “this is of primary importance.”270 State highway officials also 
cited difficulty securing rights to land, the need for multiple environmental studies, and 
other obstacles, but highway departments across the country had proven time and again 
their ability to overcome these requirements when determined to build a stretch of 
Interstate Highway. In Southeast Florida, however, construction did not begin because 
state leaders were incentivized to delay commencement of the project. Toll revenues and 
the demands of bondholders proved more compelling than the residents of Southeast 
Florida’s coastal communities. 
 The Turnpike Authority’s ability to block I-95 construction ended abruptly in July 
1969. Republican Governor Claude R. Kirk, a resident of West Palm Beach, created the 
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Florida Department of Transportation and dismantled the Turnpike Authority, whose 
responsibilities were assumed by the former. The Florida Department of Transportation 
viewed Florida’s road network holistically and was not biased toward ensuring maximum 
profits for the Turnpike, nor was it beholden to the Turnpike bondholders. Freed of these 
influences, the Florida Department of Transportation pursued a course of action it 
believed best met the transportation needs of the state. Finally, after thirteen years of 
political wrangling, south Florida was prepared to build the road it had so desperately 
needed. 
 As the Florida Department of Transportation began in earnest to plot the course of 
I-95, the people of Florida remained suspicious of the state’s actions. After years of 
politics preventing the construction of the highway, many viewed any delay, even if for 
valid purposes, to be evidence the political problem did not truly cease with the 
disbandment of the Turnpike Authority. In 1972, the Miami Herald published a front 
page exposé which reinforced the public’s suspicions. The author, Bruce Giles, claimed 
he had located an “official statement” from the Turnpike Authority to bondholders clearly 
stating that I-95 would hurt Turnpike revenues. The document, he claimed, served as 
proof the Turnpike Authority, with backing from Tallahssee politicians, had purposefully 
deprived south Florida of I-95 since the 1950s.271 The people of south Florida were not 
surprised by the findings, as the state’s inability to provide any consistent reason for the 
delay that held up to scrutiny led them to this conclusion long before Giles found the 
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smoking gun. Yet, as one Herald reader put it, “The people who have long believed there 
must be some reason for this [delay] now at least have the satisfaction of knowing they 
were right.”272 With their distrust validated, south Floridians stepped up their vigilance of 
the progress of I-95.  
As such, the Miami Herald exposé haunted the administration of Reubin Askew, 
who succeeded Kirk in the governor’s office.  One Boca Raton resident, Ralph Brooks, 
wrote to Governor Reubin Askew, Noting the “desperate need” the people of Broward 
and Palm Beach Counties had for the highway. Brooks eyed the Florida Department of 
Transportation as an “entrenched bureaucracy” causing additional delays.273 Askew’s 
response suggests his office received countless letters in the wake of the Herald exposé, 
and his reply included a two-page argument that the Turnpike and its associated bonds 
did not cause the delay of I-95. Whether Askew believed the claim or not, he could not 
admit the state had withheld I-95 from south Florida, as many of the Turnpike Authority 
employees were now employed by the State Highway Department, and many of the 
politicians involved still served as leaders of Askew’s Democratic Party. While all were 
quick to profess the innocence of the Turnpike Authority, state officials never got on the 
same page in regards to the reason for the delay. Florida Department of Transportation 
official Edward Mueller claimed it was “the federal procedural mechanism.”274 Askew at 
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one point argued it was a shortage of available homes for those displaced by I-95.275 At 
another time, Askew argued Florida did not have enough appraisers on staff to facilitate 
the land acquisition, and this had caused delays.276  
Regardless of the causes of prior delays, highway supporters on the Florida coast 
were excited by the prospect of finally moving forward with construction. They would 
soon discover, however, that the Turnpike Authority had been just one hurdle in their 
quest to build the superhighway. With the Authority out of the way, the struggle to build 
I-95 now ran into a bevy of new problems which had to be dealt with in turn. For well 
over a decade, those who advocated for the road had focused so much of their energy on 
the Turnpike Authority that they began to believe it was the only impediment to the 
highway’s construction. In reality, the removal of the Authority from the equation only 
meant south Florida was now ready to deal with the many obstacles that I-95 encountered 
just about everywhere it went. Namely, south Florida now had to work out the specifics 
of I-95’s route between Daytona Beach and Fort Lauderdale. Ironically, the many 
obstacles cited by those refusing to acknowledge the real reason the state had delayed 
building I-95 became actual delaying forces in the 1970s. To be sure, this further 
frustrated the residents of Southeast Florida and deepened their mistrust in the 
government.   
 In total, it took five years after the dismantling of the Turnpike Authority to clear 
the required milestones and begin construction of I-95. Most of the time was not spent 
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resolving disputes with individual landowners, but rather additional requirements that had 
not existing—or were generally ignored—in the 1950s and 1960s now consumed 
considerable time. Environmental impact studies, which were usually conducted by 
interest groups under particular circumstances in the earliest years of Interstate 
construction, were mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, and the 
responsibility to ensure protection of the environment now fell to state officials. In the 
wake of the freeway revolts, state highway departments were much more diligent about 
holding the public hearings required by law than they had been in the early years of 
Interstate construction. Martin, Palm Beach, and St. Lucie Counties required twenty-one 
public hearings before the route could be finalized. On December 15, 1975, nearly twenty 
years after south Floridians began their pursuit of “immediate” construction of I-95, the 
Federal Highway Administration granted the last approval required to begin 
construction.277 
 As a means of concluding his exploration of the reasons communities responded 
differently to Interstate construction, Ray G. L’Amoreaux saw engineers as well-
positioned to ensure the state and its residents grounded their discussions in facts rather 
than emotion. “I see the role of the professional as a fact gatherer, a conclusion reacher, a 
recommendation maker—but above all, a communicator and a explainer of facts,” 
L’Amoreaux wrote. He continued, “If the engineers and planners do these things well, 
they should then have little difficulty in assuring that the decisions that result are 
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compatible with the goals and objectives of the citizens they are dedicated to serve.”278  In 
the early 1970s, when L’Amoreaux  put these thoughts to paper, the communities of 
southeast Florida had, under his supervision, already experienced nearly two decades of 
delays at the hands of Florida leaders. Whether L’Amoreaux intended to mask the 
activities of Florida’s political leaders or gently prod them for their actions is unclear. 
One thing is certain. Florida’s highway engineers did not allow facts, but rather political 
motives, to drive their activities in regard to I-95. L’Amoreaux’s characterization of 
highway engineers as apathetic, black-and-white arbiters of objective correctness is, in 
hindsight, almost laughable. At best, Florida’s highway engineers were powerless to 
stand up to machinations of the Sunshine State’s politicians and creditors; at worst, they 
were complicit in neglecting the wants and needs of millions along the state’s Atlantic 
coast.  
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Figure 4.1: I-95 in Florida279 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTRASTATE SPARRING IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Driving north on I-95 from Georgia, one enters South Carolina halfway across the 
Savannah River. The drive through the state is, in general, boring. I-95 skirts the small 
towns of Hardeeville and Ridgeland, passes just outside the somewhat larger town of 
Walterboro, and bounces around Florence before crossing into North Carolina just north 
of Dillon. Along the way, there is not much to see. The route mostly traverses pine 
forests and farmland; the topography was not much different prior to the arrival of I-95. 
In the absence of much else to see, the driver finds himself or herself paying more 
attention than usual to the countless billboards—most of them advertising a rest stop and 
roadside attraction called South of the Border—as they attempt to build a sense of 
excitement belied by the desolate landscape. One such billboard beckons the motorist 
with “I-95’s best kept secret?” while another exclaims “You Never Sausage a Place!” 
The large bratwurst stretching from one side of the billboard to the other suggests the 
campiness that awaits.
South of the Border attempts to capture travelers who otherwise use I-95 in South 
Carolina for one purpose: to get through the state as quickly as possible. Without major 
towns or tourist destinations along the way (the beach is at least fifty miles to the east 
throughout the state), I-95 is a conduit for drivers heading to historic Savannah, Georgia 
or the beaches and other amusements of Florida. Despite its efforts at marketing—and the 
sombrero atop a 165-foot tall water tower—the tourist trap cannot change the fact that 
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South Carolina’s segment of I-95 is a 200 mile tour through some of the most 
undeveloped land in the state.280  
Most of South Carolina’s 198 miles of I-95 appeared without controversy or 
fanfare. The route does not utilize federal lands, threaten state parks or wildlife reserves, 
does not mar scenic landscapes, and does not bring unwanted traffic to otherwise 
congested areas. In fact, very few people were inconvenienced by the arrival of I-95 in 
the state. Neither newspapers nor the correspondence of elected officials reveal 
significant disputes about land acquisitions; presumably the rural landowners found the 
right-of-way remuneration sufficient.281 There has been speculation since the 1960s that 
Alan Schafer, the owner of South of the Border, used political influence to ensure I-95 
would be routed in such a way that his business would benefit, but this debate was held 
largely after the road had been constructed.282  
I-95’s otherwise uneventful introduction to South Carolina saw one flurry of 
debate and controversy in 1962 and 1963, when two of the larger towns in the vicinity of 
the highway’s proposed route engaged in a heated contest to sway the final path toward 
their respective zone of influence. Two camps, one based in Florence and the other in 
Charleston, lobbied the South Carolina Highway Department to have the Interstate 
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System’s primary north-south path routed to pass through their respective economic 
zones. In the absence of a historical voice by any who opposed the road, and no other 
episodes resulting in a historical record, the Charleston/Florence routing controversy 
stands as the only story of I-95’s history in South Carolina that speaks to the relationship 
between the people of the state and the superhighway. As such, the routing debate is the 
only window of insight modern researchers have to understand how South Carolinians 
viewed the road and what informed those views. Ultimately, the South Carolina routing 
controversy reveals that, at a point when Interstate highways met considerable resistance 
elsewhere in the country, many South Carolinians viewed the road as a force of good and 
fought to have the highway built closer to their communities. The intensity of the battle, 
the resources applied to the efforts, and the activism of citizens speak to exactly how 
desirable I-95 was among South Carolinians. Of course, what caused South Carolina to 
view the road positively as opposed to communities elsewhere in the country is a product 
of local circumstance. 
South Carolina began planning a new highway through the state’s eastern corridor 
over a decade before the Interstate Highway System received legislative approval. The 
South Carolina Highway Commissioners approved the route that would later become 
South Carolina’s portion of I-95 on October 18, 1945.283 This plan called for a route 
“beginning at the North Carolina line south of Laurinburg and extending via 
Bennettsville, Hartsville, Bishopville, and Sumter, Summerton, St. George, Walterboro, 
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and Ridgeland in the direction of Savannah.”284   The route stayed in the development 
phase until 1956, when the Federal-Aid Highway Act provided the funding necessary to 
move the highway network forward from the planning stages, where it had remained for 
over a decade. At that time, the federal Bureau of Public Roads, whose consent was 
required for all Interstate routes, had approved a less specific description for the north-
south thoroughfare that read, “From the South Carolina-Georgia State line north of 
Savannah via Summerton and a junction with F.A.I. Route 302 [now I-20] near Florence 
to the South Carolina-North Carolina State line northeast of Dillon.”285 This route was the 
first one widely released to the press, and some interested groups in Charleston expressed 
dissatisfaction with the projection, but as the Highway Department stood by its claim that 
all routes were subject to change and that nothing was official, these parties found 
contestation difficult. For the next five years, debate faded as South Carolina first 
undertook the projects of constructing I-20, I-85, and I-26.286 
In early 1962, with construction of the three other highways well under way and 
groundbreaking on I-95 imminent, the Greater Charleston Chamber of Commerce still 
wanted the road pulled closer to the coast. While the Highway Department continued to 
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be evasive when asked about specifics of the route, Charleston had no doubt that I-95 
would follow an inland path connecting Fayetteville, North Carolina and Savannah, 
Georgia by way of Florence. Sensing that the time was fast approaching when it would be 
too late to affect the road’s course, the Greater Charleston Chamber of Commerce 
decided to launch a formal campaign to have the highway rerouted.   
Charleston had every reason to believe I-95 would bring prosperity to a city and 
region struggling to gain a solid economic footing. The area immediately north of 
Charleston, which had once been home to a host of defense-related industries and 
military installations, was suffering as the peace following World War II forced these 
entities to scale back or leave. The city had watched enviously as the construction of I-85 
and I-26 had recently brought a host of industries to Spartanburg.287 Charleston’s civic 
and business leaders believed bringing the junction of I-95 and I-26—which was already 
scheduled to terminate in the city—within the city’s economic zone would bring them 
similar benefits.288 Additionally, scores of reports had been published since the inception 
of the Interstate System, and they overwhelmingly predicted positive economic effects 
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for those regions lucky enough to receive the ribbons of asphalt.289 And finally, I-95, due 
to its course through the major industrial centers along the east coast, would have 
connected Charleston to a majority of the American population and brought the city into 
the most significant economic zone in the United States. Better access to I-95 would have 
allowed Charleston to market itself as a port city with market accessibility that rivaled 
Savannah, Norfolk, and other east coast ports. 
Charleston had spent the first months of 1962 attempting to influence its luck by 
assembling an alliance of interested groups in the greater Charleston region. Ultimately, 
the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, the Charleston Planning Board, the area mayors, 
the City of Charleston, Charleston County, the Charleston Merchants Retail Association, 
the Charleston Real Estate Board, and a handful of other organizations pledged support—
financial or otherwise—to the rerouting effort. On May 9, 1962, members of the 
Charleston Planning Board met in Columbia with South Carolina Highway 
Commissioner Silas Pearman to present an alternative route for I-95 that had been 
developed by the organization at the request of the Charleston Development Board. The 
alternate route placed the road farther east, passing east of Florence, by Kingstree, 
Moncks Corner and across Interstate 26, south of Walterboro to Pocotaligo (Figures 1 
and 2 illustrate the routes under consideration). This route brought the junction of I-26 
and I-95 twenty-seven miles closer to Charleston. After hearing the proposal, Pearman 
“stated frankly that any consideration of an alternative route would have to be based upon 
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sound economics and sound engineering.” Upon hearing of Pearman’s comment at a May 
meeting, the Greater Charleston Chamber of Commerce’s Board of Directors agreed the 
logical next step was to hire an engineering firm to study the virtue of the alternative 
route, and the Board voted to form a committee to this end. William W. Humphreys and 
W. Harold Butt volunteered to research and recommend engineering firms, Thomas C. 
Stevenson took the task of finding the funding to pay for the study, and Dr. George G. 
Durst, who had connections at the Department of Defense, agreed to meet with them and 
gain the Department’s support for the alternative route. The Board found this last step 
critical because the Interstate System was supposed to allow for rapid evacuation of cities 
in the case of an atomic attack, and support from the Defense Department would preempt 
one of the State Highway Department’s criticisms of Charleston’s proposal. Before 
adjourning, the newly formed steering committee agreed to “proceed as quickly as 
possible.”290   
At the next month’s Board of Directors meeting, Durst announced he had 
successfully acquired support from the Defense Department. Stevenson unveiled 
financial contributions of $5,000 each from the City of Charleston and Charleston 
County; $2,000 from the Charleston Development Board; and $1,000 each from the 
Charleston Real Estate Board, the Charleston Retail Merchants Association, and the 
Greater Charleston Chamber of Commerce. Butt and Humphreys recommended Arthur 
D. Little & Company of Cambridge, Massachusetts to perform the engineering study.291 
A well-reputed company, the firm only agreed to take on the job after performing a 
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preliminary study in order to determine the route proposed by Charleston showed 
promise of meeting Pearman’s requirements.292 The company’s preliminary study, 
performed in early June, “indicated that there is sufficient economic justification to 
warrant a more detailed study,” and the firm commenced a more comprehensive 
evaluation.293 
The finished report—called the “Little Report” by all involved—arrived in 
Charleston in late October. It concluded maximum benefit for South Carolina as a whole 
would be achieved by building I-95 on the more easterly route proposed by Charleston. 
In evaluating the possible routes, the Little Report “evaluated…on a comparative basis 
from the viewpoint of the two general objectives for the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways, as well as from the viewpoint of the specific aim defined by 
Congress.” The “general objectives” mentioned were to service projected traffic for the 
year 1975 and to serve the defense needs of the United States, while the Congressional 
viewpoint was that local needs be considered and accommodated, when reasonable, by 
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the Interstate Highways.294 The Little Report also stated that the needs of “tourism, goods 
movement, and local transportation” were taken into account.295 
The Little Report’s primary argument regarding tourism became a chorus of the 
Charleston lobby; the report argued United States Route 301 followed roughly the same 
path as the Highway Department’s plan, and tourists used it heavily. Rather than override 
the existing route with a new road, the report argued, the more easterly I-95 path would 
allow for a tourism industry to develop in an otherwise underdeveloped region and would 
provide travelers with an option when traversing the Palmetto State. Failure to offer this 
boon to the eastern region “would tend to retard realization of the full tourist income 
possibilities of the numerous attractions of the coastal and near coastal areas,” the report 
claimed.  Further, the Little Report contended that the Highway Department’s corridor 
did not offer sufficient attractions for tourists to visit, while the alternative route would 
encourage north-south travelers to venture into Charleston.296 
The report went on to argue that the more easterly route better served both the 
commercial and residential traffic needs of South Carolina. In terms of commercial 
traffic, the report claimed the Highway Department’s route served the needs of a handful 
of freight companies based in the Sumter and Orangeburg areas, while the Charleston-
backed route served the ports in Charleston, which had a larger impact on the entire state. 
In order to raise the stakes of the decision, the report framed the decision in terms of an 
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inter-state rivalry, pitting the Port of Savannah, Georgia against the ports in Charleston. 
“Failure to provide truck traffic with an Interstate highway that links the State’s ports 
with the hinterland markets will…give the Port of Savannah—a strong competitor of 
South Carolina ports—a decided advantage,” the report claimed.297  
Noting that seventy-percent of the Palmetto State’s non-farm employees used 
private automobiles for commuting to and from work, the Little Report went on to argue 
for the high degree of importance that should be placed on the route’s effect on 
residential traffic. With the aid of I-95, the report said, commuter trip times could be 
more drastically reduced for Charleston-area residents, and this would consequently 
allow for a growth in the area’s labor market of 1,600 people, or 2.4 percent. The 
Orangeburg labor market, on the other hand, would only grow by 130 people, or 0.7 
percent.298 The Report went on to conjecture that the area where I-95 and I-26 intersect 
could develop into an important industrial center if the junction happened in an area with 
an available labor force and “physical requirements for industrial growth” and claimed 
the Charleston-backed route rendered this industrial development more likely.299 The 
report also claimed, given the Charleston area’s higher population density, gross 
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population, and investment in new industry, the more easterly route would allow for more 
overall economic development. And finally, noting the United States Department of 
Defense’s approval of both routes, but lack of committal to either, the Report took the 
position that Charleston-backed route was the more logical because of the city’s 
important military installations. In 1963, Charleston was home to a Military Airport 
Transport Service (MATS) base, a significant Army Depot and the Charleston Naval 
Base was becoming the “primary fleet ballistic support complex on the East Coast 
including the only Polaris base in the United States.”300 
Many of the Little Report’s claims are supported by data. The more easterly route 
traversed counties with a total population of 519,155, while the Highway Department’s 
route entered counties with a total population of 422,801 people. The Charleston-backed 
route also would be accessible to 24,712 members of the armed forces, 25,924 
government workers, and 210,460 city dwellers, while the westerly route affected only 
5,916 military personnel, 12,685 public servants, and 107,0001  urbanites.301 Moreover, a 
survey of American manufacturers performed in 1958 revealed that the Charleston route 
would add additional manufacturing value to the state’s economy of $147,862,000 per 
year while the Highway Department route would add $143,972,000 annually.302 
In the end, the Little Report argued that, even in the absence of I-95, the 
population of the Charleston area stood to grow more in the coming decades and had the 
greater potential for industrial development than the Pee Dee and Midlands regions of 
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South Carolina.303 Routing I-95 through its backyard, therefore, was the logical choice 
because it would allow for even greater future economic prosperity. The Report also 
claimed this benefit could be achieved at a negligible cost. The alternative route would 
require an additional 14.5 miles of Interstate construction—3.5 miles on I-95 and 11 
miles on I-20—and could be completed for under $124,000 in construction costs plus 
incremental maintenance costs. This number was even less significant, the report 
concluded, because within eight years of completion, 25 percent of the additional 
maintenance costs per year would be paid by additional gas tax revenues collected by the 
state due to the increased number of work trips the easterly route would permit. 
Armed with the documentation it believed would sway Pearman and his Board of 
Commissioners, the Charleston Chamber of Commerce made the rerouting of I-95 its 
primary objective for 1963.304 The Chamber of Commerce forwarded a copy of the Little 
Report to Commissioner Pearman at the end of 1962. Pearman, in addition to handling 
the efforts of the Charleston lobby, now received pressure from individual citizens. 
Working parallel to the Chamber of Commerce and its allies was Samuel C. Craven. 
Craven, a Charleston lawyer with aspirations of election to the South Carolina House of 
Representatives, began personally lobbying Pearman in a letter dated April 16, 1962. In 
the letter, Craven took issue with the Highway Department’s recommended route on 
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grounds that it violated U.S.C.A., title 23, Section 103 (D). This piece of the Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1956 mandated that the Interstate Highways “shall be so located as to 
connect by routes, as direct as practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and 
industrial centers, to serve the national defense, and to the greatest extent possible, to 
connect at suitable border points with routes of continental importance.”305 Craven 
argued that the “legislative requirement and the existing highway needs negates any other 
location than that which would approximate Myrtle Beach, Charleston and Beaufort.”306 
The route he advocated differed from that supported by the Chamber of Commerce, as he 
recommended a route that “followed a line somewhat east of state route 41 through the 
counties of Horry, Georgetown, Berkeley, Charleston, and on to Beaufort and 
Savannah.”307 Craven forwarded the letter to Pearman to Charleston Mayor J. Palmer 
Gaillard, Jr. and requested his support in the rerouting effort.  
Perhaps frustrated by the lack of immediate response and undoubtedly motivated 
by learning of the Chamber of Commerce’s efforts in area newspapers, Craven wrote to 
Gaillard, Durst, and John White, Chairman of the Chamber’s Highway and Bridges 
Committee, on May 23, 1962. He copied the letter to the Charleston Development Board, 
the Charleston County Planning Board, sixteen city aldermen, the News & Courier, the 
Evening Post, the West Ashley News, and the North Charleston Banner. While 
acknowledging that the “Craven Plan” and the plan recommended by the Chamber of 
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Commerce differed in routing, he pointed out the common objective.308 He went on to 
“earnestly request that we present a solid front in this matter, rather than a group of 
varied thoughts and ideas.”309 And then Craven dropped something of a bombshell—he 
revealed that he had filed a lawsuit on the behalf of the citizens of Charleston County. 
The lawsuit petitioned the State Highway Department and the Bureau of Public Roads for 
all “records, information and data” pertaining to the route of I-95.Craven recommended 
that the Little Company waited until he had acquired these records before commencing 
its study, as the information would “enable the Firm to adequately ferret out the 
weaknesses in the present location [that is, the planned route of I-95] and also avoid 
unnecessary duplicity in their studies.”310  
Mayor Gaillard wasted no time in responding, and his tone reveals a significant 
level of frustration with Craven. He wrote, “I agree with you that we must all present a 
solid front to the Highway Department for any change of this route. This, of course, is 
impossible now that a law suit has been instituted.”311 He also pointed out Craven’s error 
in implying the Little Company had been hired to validate Charleston’s claim for the 
rerouting, noting instead that it had been employed to supply “competent technical 
assistance in evaluating, on an unbiased basis, the facts.” He went on, “To my 
knowledge, all are in agreement that we believe the Highway should be located nearer the 
coast…I personally do not feel qualified, nor do I believe the Chamber of Commerce is 
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qualified, to state categorically where such a highway should be located.”312 Gaillard 
concluded that, since he and the Chamber did not ask to be party to Craven’s lawsuit, he 
did not want to supply the Little Company with any information acquired through it.313 In 
the end, Craven’s case did not go to trial. Pearman must have been happy to have Craven 
out of the picture, because 1963 brought a new level of intensity from the Charleston 
lobby.  
The Little Report armed the Charleston lobby with a host of expert-backed 
arguments to use as it lobbied the State Highway Department, and it fueled an intensified 
campaign initiated in mid-March. On March 16, 1963 Pritchard forwarded a copy of the 
Little Report’s executive summary to South Carolina Governor Donald Russell and asked 
for his support as the debate intensified.314 In a March 27 article, the News and Courier 
quoted W. Harold Butt, then serving as Chairman of the Charleston Development Board, 
as saying his organization had grown concerned that the public was not informed enough 
to realize how vital the rerouting was. The lobby confederation organized a meeting to 
drum up popular support. In the article announcing the meeting, Butt summarized the 
issue and said, “Our objective right now is to start our people thinking about the 
importance of this highway in the years to come, and to invite outspoken support for our 
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Chamber of Commerce Highways and Bridges Committee,” which was officially 
carrying on the discussion with the Highway Department.315   
On March 28, the News and Courier joined Butt and company in recruiting 
support. That edition of the paper featured a cover story and an editorial dealing with the 
I-95 rerouting. The cover story carried the title “Route of I-95 Vital To City” and pointed 
out that if the Highway Department’s route came to fruition, Charleston, the state’s 
largest population center, would not be serviced by a north-south Interstate route.316 The 
Federal-Aid Highway Act required that Interstate highways, as much as feasible, 
connected major population areas. Charleston saw the Highway Department route as 
neglecting this mandate and was especially bothered by the fact that Savannah, Georgia; 
Petersburg, Virginia; and Benson, North Carolina, all with smaller populations, 
anticipated I-95 construction—the latter two were scheduled to be sites of Interstate 
highway junctions.   The article went on to enumerate the potential benefits for the city: 
increased port traffic, tourism, and industrial development, and myriad others. The News 
and Courier, realizing increased pressure from Charleston would surely awaken support 
in areas laying claim to the Highway Department route, sought to preempt their 
arguments. “Either of the routes,” the article claimed, “would serve the Florence and 
Walterboro areas equally well, since neither route passes through these towns.”317 The 
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editorial announced, “The News and Courier heartily endorses a movement to swing 
Interstate Highway 95 closer to the South Carolina’s principal seaport.” It then continued 
the feature article’s preemptive strike against Florence and Walterboro. Anticipating 
criticism of Charleston for coveting I-95 when I-26 already entered the city, the editor 
claimed, “Basic needs of transportation require full service to centers of communication. 
The juncture of traffic streams from north, south and west over Highways I-26 and U.S. 
17 is an argument for making I-95 as accessible as possible to through traffic between 
New York and Florida.” It went on, “We cannot imagine that the State highway 
Department…would want to discourage travelers from pausing within the state’s 
borders.” While being certain to garner popular support, the editorial ended on an 
optimistic note: “The facts of geography and population ought to prevail. The road should 
be rerouted now, while ample time is available.”318 
The News and Courier was correct in anticipating an alarmed opposition. On 
March 29, the Florence Morning News alerted residents of the Pee Dee region to 
Charleston’s machinations. It reported, “The Charleston Chamber of Commerce is 
engaged in a full-scale effort to divert Interstate Highway 95 from its present scheduled 
route immediately west of Florence to one not-so-immediately east of Florence.” The 
editorial went on to say its aim was to “alert Florence City Council, the Greater Florence 
Chamber of Commerce, and all those interested in seeing that no change is made in the 
route as presently planned.”319 Florence had long thought of itself as a “transportation 
city,” as the crossing of major north-south and east-west rail lines had given birth to the 
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city in the nineteenth century. Florence’s positioning at the junction of these railways had 
directed its economic development for over a century. Industries moved to Florence to 
capitalize on the transportation benefits, and the city developed a sizeable service sector 
to accommodate the railroad workers.320 Civic and business leaders had anxiously 
awaited the prosperity crossing Interstates would bring since 1956, hoping to see an 
economic rebirth and bring Florence into a prosperous position as the automobile 
replaced the train. They counted on not only increased industry but also “tourist dollars,” 
the money that motorists would bring through their purchases at restaurants, gas stations, 
motels, and other travel-related businesses. The threat now lurking in the Lowcountry 
stood to deprive the city of this economic boon.  
Despite the Florence Morning News’ alarmist tone, the Florence City Council and 
Chamber of Commerce seem to have initially followed a wait-and-see approach to the 
threat posed by Charleston. Their immediate response was not to drum up regional 
support or organize into an official lobbying front to counteract Charleston’s efforts. The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear. Thomas E. Thornhill, President of the Charleston 
Chamber of Commerce in 1963, believes the reticence apparent in the newspapers of the 
day is actually evidence of Florence Mayor David McLeod and his brother, a powerful 
Walterboro attorney, quietly pulling political strings in Columbia. There seems to have 
been something happening behind the scenes, because an April 3 Florence Morning 
News editorial cited a “usually well-informed source” who led the newspaper to claim, 
“Interstate Highway 95, apparently, is going to follow original plans…It’s just about 
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certain the original plans will be followed. People in the Florence area need not have any 
fears long that line.”321 Despite its early optimism, however, the Florence Morning News 
and other area newspapers monitored the situation very closely and kept their readers 
abreast of the situation. 
Small town newspapers also weighed in on the debate. The Dillon Herald, for 
example, took issue with Charleston’s claim that the alternative route better met the 
defense needs of the nation by claiming, “All its arguments about…the greater service it 
would render to national defense has a hollow ring. [sic] Isn’t national defense served 
better by keeping throughways removed from the point of explosion than by drawing 
them to it?”322 The Manning Times took a more sardonic tone: 
While we do not wish to belittle our great port city, we do believe that there are 
other places in South Carolina besides Charleston, and it would be nice if things 
could be arranged so that something, once in a while, would benefit an area in our 
State other than Charleston. It is splendid that the coastal area has grown as much 
as it has; perhaps if the western route is utilized, the central area will show more 
growth as well.323 
 
Accusations of inland neglect in favor of Charleston were common in the small towns 
backing the State Department plan. They viewed Charleston as being in a privileged 
position among lawmakers and receiving disproportionate resources from the state. 
Always defensive, small town newspapers in the Charleston area also joined the fight. 
The Tri City Times, which served the Mount Pleasant area, took the position that the 
highway should best meet the needs of the state: “Every taxpayer has an investment in 
the State Ports Authority facilities here, at Port Royal, and at Georgetown—including 
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Highway 301 interests. Or did they buy stock in Savannah firms?”324 These papers 
argued that a Charleston victory in this fight would actually benefit the towns that felt 
neglected—that state tax dollars would be used to make the entire state wealthier. 
Regardless of the talking points the newspapers employed, their involvement indicates a 
widespread positive view of the Interstate Highways and the economic potential they 
represented. 
The News and Courier, more than any other South Carolina paper, used language 
to incite its readers. Its reporting on the March 29 meeting in Charleston was replete with 
bellicose language. The gathering at the Francis Marion Hotel was a “council of war.” 
Former mayor and prominent lawyer Thomas P. Stoney was “called back to active duty,” 
as he and another attorney, E.K. Pritchard agreed to argue Charleston’s case pro bono in 
all future meetings with the Highway Department.325 And finally, the article reported that 
the meeting’s “speakers left little doubt that the battle is fast nearing the ‘shooting 
stage.’” The meeting was important for more than just the sensationalist journalism it 
attracted. The Charleston Innkeepers Association, representatives of Charleston’s 
shipping companies, the Ports Authority, and city and county officials from neighboring 
areas added their support to what was—by now—an expansive coalition.  Nearly a dozen 
men spoke at the gathering, including legislators, the mayor, and representatives of 
shipping, tourism, and mercantile interests.326  
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 A dominant theme at the meeting—and one that received corroboration from the 
Little Report—was the notion that the Highway Department’s route benefited the Port of 
Savannah more than the Charleston ports. This was the major point in Stoney’s speech, as 
he argued, “I can’t imagine that our state would spend $19 million on our port facilities in 
Charleston and then stand idly by and give the preference in mileage to Savannah.” 
Employing hyperbole for effect, he continued: “I take my hat off to Savannah and what 
those people have done. But if we give that city a 45-to-50 mile advantage on a straight 
line highway—it’s goodbye Charleston.” Stoney’s comments were seconded and 
expounded upon by Thaddeus Street of Carolina Shipping.327 In subsequent weeks, the 
News and Courier echoed this message. A March 31 editorial claimed “South Carolinians 
have a big investment that they need to protect…Unless the arc between Florence and 
Pocotaligo is swung nearer to the sea, truckers hauling freight for ocean shipment will 
whiz past Charleston to the Georgia docks. This outcome would represent a loss to every 
South Carolinian.”328 
 Pearman, who received a copy of the Little Report in January, had set his 
engineers to the task of completely reevaluating the route of I-95, taking both the original 
route and Charleston’s alternative route into account. Pearman had to acknowledge the 
attention the controversy had been receiving throughout the state; not only were 
newspapers devoting pages to the issue, but Stoney and the mayors of Lake City, Moncks 
Corner, St. Stephen, Kingstree, and Summerville, calling themselves the Highway I-95 
Citizens Committee, had begun an advertising campaign in state newspapers. In early 
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May, with his reevaluation report ready, Pearman encouraged the Charleston Chamber of 
Commerce to release the Little Report to the press “due to the publicity on I-95.”329  
Charleston obliged and released the report on May 20.  
 At this time, the Chamber of Commerce suspected Pearman was going to reject its 
proposal. Much of this suspicion stemmed from a meeting State Senator T. Allen Legare 
and State Representative Arthur C. Baker had had with Pearman in mid-May.330 
Corroborating their hunch was a Clarendon County official who told the Manning Times 
he had seen the Highway Department’s report and that it favored the original path.331 
John White preemptively asked the Little Company to produce a rebuttal report and 
organized an effort to delay the announcement of Pearman’s decision by 90 days.332 Not 
waiting for any official action, the News and Courier’s editorial page went on the 
offensive: “With plans for Interstate Highway 95 leaking out to the public, it now appears 
that the State Highway Department had just as well build a tunnel from the North 
Carolina line to Georgia insofar as the economic needs of South Carolina are concerned,” 
it blasted. It then continued, “We don’t understand why our Highway Department has to 
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work for Georgia instead of South Carolina.”333 Amidst the firestorm, the Highway 
Department released the reevaluation at the end of the month. 
The report systematically refuted each of Charleston’s claims. It stated 
categorically that the westerly route best served the traffic needs of South Carolina and 
revealed that the Highway Department had secured a letter from Rex M. Whitton, Federal 
Highway Administrator, saying the Department of Defense “preferred inland locations 
because of the vulnerability of coastal areas.”334 In terms of tourism, the study concluded 
that choosing the easterly route would “create undue hardships” on the motels, 
restaurants, and other tourism related industries in the Highway 301 corridor. It went on 
to claim that—if anything—the westerly route would benefit Charleston tourism because 
it would not draw people away from U.S. 17, which funneled many tourists directly into 
Charleston.335 The report then posited that the original route would attract more industry 
because it represented the shortest route from the North Central states and Great Lakes 
region to the coasts of Georgia and Florida and that the Port of Charleston would be 
adequately served by I-26 and other routes, noting that not all ports on the eastern 
seaboard would be serviced by Interstate Highways.336 Perhaps the strongest case made 
by the Highway Department was a drastic revision to the modest $124,000 additional cost 
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figure presented by the Little Report. The Highway Department reevaluation estimated 
additional costs amounting to $21,094,300. 337 
The Highway Department’s report drew significant response. The Florence City 
Council finally broke its silence and passed a resolution in support of the Highway 
Department’s decision. In the resolution, the City Council noted that it had “always found 
the State Highway Department, not only cooperative, but highly competent in its 
decisions, plans, and constructions.”338 The News and Courier published a flurry of 
editorials and letters to the editor criticizing the Highway Department. The Florence 
Morning News contained editorials encouraging a quick reconciliation and prompt 
groundbreaking. The Columbia Record supported the Highway Department’s decision 
and other small-circulation newspapers from around the state weighed in.  
In early June, the abeyance White sought manifested as a resolution in the South 
Carolina House of Representatives. It called for a 60-day delay so the Lowcountry 
interests could formally present their case before the Highway Commissioners. When the 
House voted 43-16 to deny the resolution, Representative Hall Yarborough of 
Orangeburg motioned to send the resolution back to committee, effectively killing it. 
George E. Campsen then took the floor and argued the Charleston lobby was never heard 
before the full Highway Commission and that insufficient time had been permitted for the 
Little Report to produce a counter report.339 Even though Charleston’s efforts to stall the 
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official decision failed, the Highway Department relented to and allowed for one—final, 
it emphasized—appeals hearing. 
Upon learning of the appeals hearing, the Florence Morning News chastised 
Charleston for failing to accept its defeat: “There is added evidence here that the 
commission has and continues to listen patiently and with long-suffering to a constant 
repetition of arguments on which that body has already formed competent judgment.”340 
No one supporting the Highway Department was invited to the July 17 hearing, but those 
whose interest lay with the original route refused to remain silent any longer.  At a late 
June meeting in Manning, at least 100 people convened to strategize. Some wanted to 
formally “condemn” Charleston, but ultimately, those in attendance passed a more 
positive resolution to be delivered to the Highway Commissioners. The convention chose 
a group headed by Mayor McLeod of Florence to appear before the Highway 
Commissioners. This group planned to arrive at the appeals hearing at two o’clock, the 
same time Charleston was scheduled to be heard, and it anticipated an audience with the 
Highway Commissioners after Charleston had pled its case.341  
The July 17 meeting, held in Dillon, drew over 150 people, including twenty 
members of the South Carolina General Assembly, a dozen or so reporters, and over 100 
concerned citizens.342 Charleston spokesman E.K. Pritchard first praised Pearman and his 
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staff and then criticized them for arriving at a decision that, by his account, delivered 
suboptimal benefit to the state. In a presentation that lasted an hour, Pritchard accused the 
Highway Department of using misleading figures, of lying to various businessmen to 
garner their support for the original route, and of giving the port in Savannah an 
enormous advantage over the Port of Charleston. In a heated retort, Joe Rogers of 
Clarendon County said Pritchard had pinned a badge on Pearman “and then ripped it off 
and put him on trial.” David McLeod  continued the criticism of Charleston: “In all of 
this mileage and the expenditure of such a vast sum of money, the ability of the Highway 
Department has never been questioned…It is our sincere belief that the highway 
department has more than bent over backwards to insure every consideration to 
Charleston’s request.”343 In what was the Board of Highway Commissioners first closed-
door meeting in well over a decade, it took the commissioners one hour and forty minutes 
to decide on the original route in an untallied—but not unanimous—vote.344 In what was 
meant to serve as a stamp of finalization, the Commissioners concurrently appropriated 
$300,000 to begin land acquisition in Dillon County. 
The day after the hearing, criticism arose that Pearman had been responding to 
“pressure” throughout the process. Given the Highway Department’s unquestioned 
authority in all prior road routing decisions, some believed Pearman’s job was in 
jeopardy over the I-95 controversy.345 A spokesman for the Highway Department quickly 
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deflected the criticism, and the story faded as the media began focusing on the decision’s 
fallout. Pritchard complained the Commission had “made a terrible mistake” while the 
News and Courier expressed “thanks on behalf of the people of a region that asked for 
and in our judgment deserved a better deal.”346 Thornhill, the Chamber President, initially 
looked to the bright side, saying the Charleston effort was “one of the finest united 
community efforts witnessed in many years”347 but later acquired a more jaded tone, 
saying, “We lost in…what turned out to be a strictly political battle.”348 Meanwhile, the 
President of the Dillon County Motel Association and Allen Schafer, proprietor of the 
South of the Border roadside attraction and tourist service center, anticipated a 
prosperous future, as the coming stream of travelers represented millions of future dollars 
in income.349 
PROMISE AND PROXIMITY 
Much of the existing literature on Interstates overlooks episodes like the South 
Carolina I-95 routing controversy, choosing instead to focus on the resistance Interstates 
faced in cities across the country. Consequently, the myriad reasons some communities 
desired the roads are overlooked and what emerges instead is a picture of a nation 
standing in opposition to Interstate Highways. Rather than resist I-95, however, those in 
South Carolina who expressed their opinion about the road overwhelmingly supported 
the project and wanted it built as close to their communities as possible. Or is this just 
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what the historical record suggests? One must question whether Charleston would have 
supported the road if it had been rerouted all the way to the coast, bisecting the historic 
city. Or whether Florence would have defended its claim to the road if state highway 
officials planned to route I-95 through the downtown. Florence and Charleston were 
ultimately fighting to have I-95 constructed within their zone of economic influence, not 
within their city limits. The communities risked little by having I-95 pass near—but not 
in—the city. They profited the economic development, increased labor mobility, and  
other benefits without experiencing many of the downsides to the presence of Interstate 
Highways. The noise, pollution, and unsightliness was contained outside of the city. The 
experience of the rest of the country strongly suggests South Carolina benefited from an 
abundance of undeveloped and low-value land.                                                                                                                                                                                         
The economic status of Charleston and Florence led the communities to support I-
95 routing in their favor, and both communities had abundant underdeveloped land 
outside of the city limits on which to build the highway. One might question whether 
these positives would be enough to overcome the fact I-95 represented a significant 
intrusion of the federal government and outsiders into Southern communities during a 
period when interregional tensions were high. No government program of the twentieth 
century was bigger and arguably none did more to change the fabric of Southern society 
more than the United States Interstate Highway Program of the 1950s and beyond. 
Perhaps more than any other icon of the late 1950s and 1960s, the Interstates represented 
progress, a link between the regions of the United States, and big government.350 Modern 
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roads built to handle the vehicles of the day and the future; to make the United States 
more navigable, and thus, to pull disparate regions into a closer economic and social 
sphere; and mandated and largely financed by Washington, the Interstate Highways were 
progressive in myriad ways. And, despite this, South Carolina wanted I-95 enough to 
fight over who would be more impacted by the project.351 This suggests that 
Charlestonians and Florentines either perceived the benefit of I-95 to outweigh the threat 
the highway presented to the communities’ ways of life or the communities believed they 
could welcome I-95 without feeling the full impact of increased federal involvement in 
their lives. In From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt, Bruce Schulman traces the relationship 
between federal economic intervention in the South and the region’s economic 
development over the course of the twentieth century. Schulman finds that Southerners 
were able to engage Washington in matters of economic development in a way that 
allowed them to take what they wanted (money for economic growth and development) 
while denying the government its objectives (social change). By taking federal money for 
defense institutions, airports, highways, and myriad other programs, Southern 
politicians—Neo-Whigs, as Schulman calls them—achieved their objective of economic 
development, but were able to successfully evade the federal stipulations that 
accompanied them. In so doing, they successfully navigated the fine line between 
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accepting outside interference and maintaining Southern distinctiveness.352 It was only 
for the reward of economic prosperity that Southern elites would sacrifice their regional 
independence.353 With I-95, however, South Carolinians did not risk forced social change 
because I-95 existed in rural areas. Charleston and Florence could reap the economic 
reward without any risk upsetting their way of life.  
In 1958’s “The Search for Southern Identity,” C. Vann Woodward spoke of 
“traditionalists,” those who despised the symbols of progress that threatened their way of 
life. “The traditionalist,” he said, “who has watched the Bulldozer Revolution plow under 
cherished old values of individualism, localism, family, clan, and rural folk culture has 
felt helpless and frustrated against the mighty and imponderable agents of change.”354 To 
look at the saga of I-95 planning in South Carolina, however, these traditionalists are 
nowhere to be found. Instead, one sees economically-minded individuals battling for 
proximity to I-95.  
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Figure 5.1: Route Options in South Carolina355 
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Figure 5.2: Detailed South Carolina Routes356 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INTERSECTION OF I-95 AND BLACK WALL STREET 
As dusk settles in on a hot July evening, the street comes alive. Music emanates 
from a large dancehall, a simple melody played against the rhythm of a symbol. The 
latest model cars—Nash 400’s and Ford Model T’s—rumble by as women in flashy 
dresses walk arm-in-arm with their suitors. The music suddenly syncopates, the trumpet 
sailing above the rest of the band. The dancehall doors swing open, and the music more 
fully fills the street. At first the automobile sounds clash with the music and then—
somehow—the music adopts the noises, making idling engines just one more member of 
the band. The open door reveals a smoke filled room. Scores of well-dressed African-
American men and women watch the band play. 
 Surprisingly, this is a not a scene set in Harlem amidst its storied Renaissance of 
the 1920s. Rather, it is a contemporary snapshot of a distant and unexpected place—
Richmond, Virginia’s Jackson Ward. Indeed, a walk through the 500 block of 
Richmond’s 2nd Street—called the “Deuce”—and the surrounding neighborhood in the 
1920s and 1930s might have left the wanderer wondering if he or she had somehow 
ventured into New York’s most famous neighborhood. During the day, the streets of 
Jackson Ward were abuzz with shoppers popping in and out of quaint stores, men 
catching up with the newspaper at coffee shops, and neighbors chatting on the sidewalk. 
The community sounded alive. Cash tills opened and closed with regularity, providing a 
rhythm to the relatively prosperous life of the citizens. New automobiles
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occasionally clamored by as church bells marked the passing of hours. At night, different 
music filled the streets. Jazz, blues, and gospel spilled from the Hippodrome Theodore 
and neighboring clubs. Some of the giants of the age—Lena Horne, Billy Holliday, Cab 
Calloway, Richmond’s own Bill “Bojangles” Robinson, and later, Nat King Cole could 
be spotted signing autographs between sets. For those seeking a quieter evening, the 
Deuce offered a movie theater and restaurants as well. 
 Jackson Ward was a neighborhood as rich in civic organizations and educational 
establishments as entertainment venues.  It was home to Armstrong High School, the 
only black high school in Richmond for many years, as well as Virginia Union 
University. The community also provided a number of churches to meet the religious 
needs of the denizens. The True Reformers, a beneficial society organized in the late 
nineteenth century, left many marks on the neighborhood. The group organized the True 
Reformers Bank in 1889, making it the first black-organized bank chartered in the United 
States. The True Reformers also established a mercantile and industrial association, a 
weekly newspaper, a hotel, a home for the elderly, a building and loan association, and 
real estate agency.  When the True Reformers collapsed at the turn of the twentieth 
century, another benevolent organization, the Southern Aid Society, stepped in to keep 
the True Reformers’ efforts alive well into the twentieth century. The Order of St. Luke 
added a second bank, a weekly magazine, and additional retail and commercial 
enterprises to the community.357 By 1930, five black-owned banks operated in in 
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Richmond.358 The community was home to several barbershops, haberdasheries, beauty 
parlors, and grocery stores. The relatively affluent citizens of Jackson Ward gave rise to a 
thriving black middle class in the early twentieth century, with dozens of dentists, 
lawyers, doctors, and other professionals taking up residence in the community. 
 The section of Richmond that became Jackson Ward had long been the city’s 
“black” neighborhood. In the late eighteenth century, the community gained a reputation 
as the settling place for freed slaves and blacks living as the property of other blacks, 
often to skirt Virginia’s laws requiring freed blacks to leave the state.  The end of the 
civil war saw many of Richmond’s newly freed blacks move to the community. After 
Reconstruction, Jackson Ward developed into a successful and prosperous community 
precisely because African-Americans were limited or outright excluded from many 
aspects of white Richmond. Jim Crow loomed over black Richmonders, restricting where 
they could live, what could they do for work, how they conducted themselves, and by 
extension, how they spent their time.359 One history of Jackson Ward posits two reasons 
Richmond’s black citizens made Jackson Ward successful: either “the separatist 
philosophy of the day” demanded that “black entrepreneurs and profession people 
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remained active” or Richmond’s African-Americans built a prosperous community out of 
spite.360 
 As the rest of Richmond’s society became increasingly hostile to African-
Americans in the early twentieth century, Jackson Ward stood as the one community 
where black men and women could feel relatively safe and build lives for themselves. By 
1920, 93 percent of the city’s black residents lived in Jackson Ward.361 The concentration 
of individuals facing similar oppression gave birth to the aforementioned cultural and 
economic vitality of the community. In this way, Richmond’s black community built a 
society that led many observers to compare to New York’s Harlem, which was in the 
midst of its Renaissance at the same time Jackson Ward emerged as a symbol of black 
success in the land of Jim Crow.  To many, Jackson Ward was “the Harlem of the South.” 
Alternatively, the neighborhood was called “the birthplace of black capitalism.” Despite 
Jackson Ward’s long standing as Richmond’s black neighborhood and its reputation as a 
key cultural and economic hub of America’s black community by the 1930s, Jackson 
Ward was never a fully secluded community, much like Harlem experienced its cultural 
explosion in front of black and white audiences. When it was founded in the late 
eighteenth century, freed blacks and newly arrived immigrants shared the community. 
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Even as time passed and the black residents became increasingly homogenized, whites 
frequented the community’s jazz clubs and other establishments.362  
 To drive through Jackson Ward today, however, one would not find the obvious 
vestiges of a once great economic and culture center. Today’s Jackson Ward is half of its 
pre-World War II size, and, despite considerable effort and resources on the part of  the 
people and government of Richmond to revitalize the community since the 1980s, 
Jackson Ward still shows signs of economic distress and little evidence of cultural output. 
Instead of housing a vibrant and prosperous community, Jackson Ward now feels like a 
community that is supposed to be up-and-coming. A proliferation of government offices 
and public housing stands next to restored Victorian homes, but the symbols of success 
feel alien, as though they were implanted in the neighborhood by outside forces (because 
they were). While Jackson Ward does not feel organically successful today, it is doing 
significantly better than thirty years ago, when the neighborhood was home to some of 
the poorest of Richmond’s residents. The jazz clubs were boarded up, the beneficial 
societies disbanded, along with their many philanthropic and civic pursuits. The Jackson 
Ward of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s had little in common with the same community 
mere decades earlier. The renewal efforts have made the community better, but walking 
down the Deuce today, one would find it very difficult to believe the neighborhood once 
enticed the likes of Lena Horne. If one walks to far north, he or she encounters an 
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artificial barrier in the community, one that was not present prior to World War II and 
brazenly carves a path through what had been homes and businesses. To many, I-95 
stands as a living—and heavily used—symbol of the fact Jackson Ward is not the same 
community it once was. Everything to the north of I-95 was once Jackson Ward; now it is 
poor, full of public housing projects and little else. It has even taken a new name, Gilpin, 
which only serves to accentuate how the highway divided the community into completely 
separate entities. In 1977, one man described the “face” Richmond presented to visitors 
who entered the city by exiting I-95 in Jackson Ward as “pimpled and the smile 
disfigured by the absence of a few teeth.”363 
 There is no doubt I-95 profoundly and irreparably transformed Jackson Ward. 
Physically, the highway cut the community in two and consumed entire city blocks in the 
process. Residents of Jackson Ward, like residents of other urban communities in which 
I-95 appeared, were displaced, and some institutions, such as churches, did not survive 
the construction. By time construction of I-95 was complete, the neighborhood looked 
and felt far different than it had in the 1920s and 1930s. The cultural scene turned 
stagnant, the people noticeably less affluent.  
The appearance of I-95 at approximately the same time Jackson Ward began 
showed significant signs of deterioration has led many to conclude the superhighway 
caused the fall of Jackson Ward.364 In its official account of the history of the 
neighborhood, the city of Richmond first attributes its post-World War II problems to I-
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95, saying “The northern part of the neighborhood was cut off, with much physical 
destruction, by the Turnpike developed in the 1950s.”365 Many of the brochures aimed at 
bringing tourists to Jackson Ward explain the neighborhood’s hard times by pointing 
directly to I-95.366 The residents of Jackson Ward remember I-95 as the harbinger of 
decay for their community. Outside consultants working with the city of Richmond in 
1987 noted, “We understand there is a history of change that has created a climate of 
skepticism and distrust within the community.”367 In reality, however, the construction of 
I-95 was only one of the post-war changes in Jackson Ward that coincided with the 
community’s decline, and Jackson Ward was rapidly decaying prior to the arrival of I-95. 
In other words, the popular account of the role of I-95 in Jackson Ward is incorrect. A 
few accounts of the neighborhood’s history mention other forces that contributed to 
Jackson Ward’s fall, but I-95 receives first mention and most of the blame more often 
than not. Here, there are two stories to tell. First is the account of how I-95 was forced 
upon the residents of Jackson Ward, without consent and without input from the 
community. Second is the way in which the stories of I-95’s arrival and Jackson Ward’s 
decline have become intertwined into an inaccurate historical rendering. 
The myth that I-95 destroyed a thriving Jackson Ward is rooted in the fact that 
state highway departments did use Interstates—including I-95—to pursue racist policies 
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throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In some urban areas, new highways 
destroyed enough black homes to swing congressional districts; in other areas, the roads 
purposefully served as barriers physically separating communities. Most often, highway 
planners constructed through black neighborhoods because they presented little, if any, 
opposition.368 Building through black communities allowed planners to actualize the holy 
grail of road construction; they achieved the most cost-effective route and enjoyed 
minimal resistance. The fact that they also allowed some public officials to realize a 
vision of urban space that was racially segregated made them too good an opportunity to 
pass.369 As Tom Lewis noted, engineers “took their cues from Robert Moses, who each 
year leveled the homes of tens of thousands of blacks to make way for ever more miles of 
expressways around and through New York.” According to Lewis, African-American 
property was the easiest to destroy because “black citizens did not share in a city’s power 
structure, and as a consequence lacked a sense of civic cohesiveness.”370 While Lewis 
may understate the political influence of black Americans—even if it was de facto 
influence in many parts of the country—there is no denying black Americans experienced 
much more difficulty than whites when trying to protect their homes from the bulldozers 
                                                 
368
 See: Arnold R. Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl, Urban Policy in Twentieth Century America; 
Joe T. Darden and Richard W. Thomas, Detroit: Race Riots, Racial Conflicts, and Efforts to Bridge the 
Racial Divide (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013); Charles E. Connerly, The Most 
Segregated City in America: City Planning and Civil Rights in Birmingham, 1920-1980 (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2005),  
369
 Eric Avila’s excellent Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight, for example, makes  a 
convincing case that city planners, acting on the behalf of private interests, pursued initiatives in the mid-
twentieth century that purposefully destroyed multicultural communities in order to create a more racially 
segregated Los Angeles. Among the institutions studied is the Los Angeles Freeway. Eric Avila, Popular 
Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in Suburban Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004), 206-223. 
370
 Lewis, 189. 
200 
 
and wrecking balls. Many of Robert Moses’ critics claimed he cared more about roads 
than people; history has overlooked the fact that many others were guilty of this as well. 
The Urban Land Institute, a national organization of professional real estate developers, 
may have been even more divorced from the human toll of highway building than Moses. 
One member, James W. Rouse, claimed, “Major expressways must be ripped through the 
central core” as a means of clearing “our nation’s worst slums.”371 
 The fact that black communities proved easy targets for engineers seeking the 
most economical route through urban area—and the fact that some engineers pursued the 
objective with almost gleeful malice—has led many scholars to take for granted the 
complexity of the urban black experience when confronted with Interstates. African 
Americans—and in some instances, other minorities—were so victimized by the highway 
building process that scholars have slipped into concluding, without scrutiny, that the 
white arguments in favor of a route that traversed black segments of the community were 
completely without merit. The foremost expert on the Interstate’s relationship to the 
American city, Raymond Mohl, enumerates instances of black homes falling before the 
Interstates’ momentum in urban areas. He notes that African-Americans homes were 
razed in Baltimore, Milwaukee, Indianapolis, St. Paul, Miami, New York City, Kansas 
City,  Nashville, and other locales over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. The implicit 
message is that in every one of these cases, black property was targeted over white 
property.372 In many, if not all, of these cases, this was true. State and community 
officials frequently misled, deceived, or outright lied to see black homes fall instead of 
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those of whites at an alarming rate. Of the impact Interstate Highway construction had on 
America’s cities, one transportation scholar noted the roads “subjected cities…to major 
surgery on a scale without precedent in American history.”373  
The metaphor of surgery is apt; the roads sliced open cities and removed entire 
portions, leaving behind permanent scars. The plight of displaced people was significant; 
entire lives were thrown into chaos. In many cases, individuals who had spent their whole 
lives in one home had to start over after the highway came through. This meant finding a 
new place to live and establishing ties with new neighbors. For children, it meant forging 
an identity at a new school. In some communities, churches and other community 
establishments also fell to the highway. In these areas, the sense of loss was even greater. 
One could make the case that eminent domain, the policy under which the government 
seized land for highway construction, was unconstitutional as well as unethical.374 
Nonetheless, if one accepts that the Interstate System needed to traverse urban areas in 
order to accomplish its objective of tying together American’s metropolitan areas, one 
also must accept that some people living in cities and businesses operating beside them 
would need to be displaced. In some cases, African-Americans occupied the land that 
made the most sense for claim via eminent domain. 
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 Regardless, there is no denying African-Americans were displaced in 
disproportionate numbers. While one could make the case that this made logical sense 
since the land they occupied could be acquired most economically, it overlooks the 
human toll of highway construction. Those who were most economically disadvantaged 
and least capable of adjusting to major life changes had to do so in the highest numbers. 
While the government’s balance sheet may indicate officials made the right decision, an 
ethical evaluation would certainly be less favorable.  
 Jackson Ward makes for a particularly interesting case study because both the 
popular memory of I-95’s introduction to the city and the historical accounts of the 
interaction are misaligned with reality. The aforementioned history of Jackson Ward 
published by the city of Richmond noted the Turnpike “cut off” and physically destroyed 
the northern section of Jackson Ward.375 In his comparative study of black urban 
communities at mid-century, Christopher Silver noted that, as a result of I-95, “the 
physical integrity of Jackson Ward was destroyed, and with it went the social and 
economic core of Richmond’s black community.”376 One study of Richmond’s 
architectural heritage noted that many “buildings have been lost in the erosion of the 
Jackson Ward neighborhood by…the construction of the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike 
[I-95].”377An oral history project conducted by students at Virginia Commonwealth 
University saw many long-time residents of Jackson Ward remember the community of 
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the 1950s fondly. Many of these individuals spoke at length about a period of Jackson 
Ward’s history they would have experienced only as children, if at all. They spoke of the 
interracial mingling that occurred in the neighborhood’s jazz clubs; they looked back 
even further to the roots of the community as a place where free blacks forged prosperous 
lives during Reconstruction and early Jim Crow; they remembered Jackson Ward as 
being a thriving community immediately before I-95 arrived. One woman distinctly 
remembered that I-95 ruined a prosperous community still had the cultural and economic 
strength often attributed to it during the jazz age, noting “It was the people that were 
expendable.”378  
 The Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike did destroy several blocks through the heart 
of Jackson Ward. Many people were dislocated. I-95 was, without any doubt, a 
destructive force. However, it is important to note that the Jackson Ward I-95 bisected in 
1958 was not the same Jackson Ward frequented by Billy Holiday in the 1930s. By the 
1950s, Jackson Ward was, by almost any measurable characteristic, a poor and struggling 
community. Those inclined to do so could argue the neighborhood constituted a slum. 
Nobody should downplay the impact I-95 had on human lives and cultural heritage when 
scores of buildings were torn down in its path, but the myriad accounts of I-95 
demolishing an economically strong, culturally thriving community are, at best, 
misinformed, and, at worst, outright wrong.  
 It makes sense that longtime residents would conflate the good times with the era 
in which they saw their community torn asunder. This trick of historical memory allows 
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the individual to erase from his or her memory a period in which the city was anything 
less than impressive and allows for the construction of a single, tangible culprit. Blaming 
Jackson Ward’s struggles on I-95 rather than the complicated forces that actually 
precipitated its physical destruction is simpler, and ultimately, more gratifying. Those 
with more distant connections to Jackson Ward’s golden age, such as individuals who 
came of age in the 1940s and 1950s but had vague memories of the prewar, flourishing 
era, may have latched on to the “I-95 as destroyer” tale as a means of coping with life in 
a community that, by all accounts, had once been great.  More troubling than the locals 
who misunderstand or misinterpret the neighborhood’s history are the historians who 
presume the story that played out in New York and Miami also manifested in Richmond. 
In these two cities, white officials used Interstate Highways for the express aim of 
accomplishing racially motivated objectives, and there is a historical record to prove it. 
Scholars have been too quick to associate temporal correlation with causality when it 
comes to Jackson Ward. The state of Virginia did build I-95 around the same time 
Jackson Ward fell to ruin, and the completion of I-95 certainly left a wake of destroyed 
buildings and a bifurcated community; however, Jackson Ward had ceased being a 
beacon of black prosperity before I-95 appeared.379 Whether the promulgation of this 
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errant history of what transpired in Richmond is the result of lazy scholarship or an 
innocent, albeit mistaken, relaying of inaccurate information, is unclear.  
 There is no denying that the decision to route I-95 through Jackson Ward forged 
an intersection of politics and race. Not only had Jackson Ward historically been 
Richmond’s black neighborhood, as previously discussed, but it had seen a surge in its 
black population during World War II. “Black” became increasingly synonymous with 
urban” during the conflict, Eric Avila has noted.380 The arsenal of democracy’s insatiable 
demand for labor drew many African-Americans out of the rural South and toward cities.  
While most African-Americans migrated to cities in the northeast, midwest, and west 
coast, southern cities also attracted black men and women seeking better jobs. As one of 
the most industrialized cities south of the Mason-Dixon Line in the 1940s, Richmond’s 
black population grew significantly during the war years, from a population of 
approximately 55,000 in 1930 to over 70,000 by 1950.381 
 When the war came to an end, Richmond was caught up in many of the same 
forces that altered cities across the United States. First, Jackson Ward experienced an 
incredible population shift out of the city center and toward the suburbs. This movement 
experienced across the nation, frequently called white flight, was permitted by the growth 
of the personal automobile, which allowed white urbanites to capitalize on more available 
space, less expensive housing, newer amenities, and lower taxes in the suburbs. Some 
whites certainly used the opportunity to move away from the diversity of the city center 
and toward homogenous enclaves just outside the city’s limits. Historians have varied in 
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their treatment of white flight and the whites who flew, from Kenneth Jackson’s and 
Thomas Sugrue’s measured account of the phenomenon to Kevin Kruse’s more 
unsympathetic treatment.382 Regardless of how one understands the motivations for white 
flight, there is no denying the deleterious effect it had on those left in the cities.  
 It is also important to note that white flight did not happen spontaneously; instead, 
a confluence of policies, historical developments, and social trends resulted in the 
residential shift. Thomas Sugrue has argued that “the shape of the postwar city…is the 
result of political and economic decisions, of choices made and not made by various 
institutions, groups, and individuals.” He is careful to point out that while any number of 
changes—technological shifts, increased or decreased demand for manufactured goods, 
changing tastes, and so forth—have the potential to alter the landscape of cities, it is the 
decisions people, businesses, governments, and other organizations make relative to these 
changes that alter the city’s reality. The aggregation of all the decisions made produces 
the contour of a city’s development; as Sugrue succinctly explains, “The relationship 
between structure and agency is the dialectical and history is the synthesis.”383 In the case 
of Richmond, a number of decisions led to Jackson Ward’s decline. Unlike many other 
southern cities, Richmond did not pursue public housing projects on a significant scale 
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until the 1960s, which led to overcrowding in Jackson Ward as the black population grew 
before and during the war years. Then, when the Public Works Administration considered 
Richmond for federal public housing initiatives in 1935, black homeowners in Jackson 
Ward resisted until the government decided to invest its resources elsewhere.384 
Consequently, Richmond did not have enough housing for its growing black population, 
and the realities of Jim Crow made migration to other Richmond neighborhoods 
impossible. Overcrowded and aging, the historic buildings of Jackson Ward began to 
deteriorate. When the war ended, much of the employment in Richmond dried up, and 
there were not enough jobs to sustain the now much larger black population. With little 
labor and residential mobility, Jackson Ward, which had once been a relatively strong 
black community on a national scale became “the symbol of manifold social and 
economic problems confronting impoverished blacks.”385 
 Richmond’s economic problems were exacerbated by the outmigration of whites, 
as the changing residential patterns deprived Richmond of the tax dollars needed to fight 
the growing poverty in its black communities. At a time when racial segregation was 
making worse, if not causing, Richmond’s economic and social problems, a number of 
federal policies hardened the border between black and white Richmond. The Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation, Federal Housing Administration, and the Veterans’ 
Administration all adopted “red lining” when evaluating potential loans. Under this 
practice, neighborhoods that were mostly non-white were deemed to have low property 
value, and the organization would not back loans for individuals looking to purchase 
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there. This accomplished two things: first, gentrification was held at bay. Wealthier 
individuals could not purchase homes in cities even if they wanted to, thus solidifying the 
wealthy/suburban, poor/urban dichotomy. Second, the red line mindset led the 
organizations to encourage practices that kept blacks out of white neighborhoods for fear 
property values would decrease.386 
 The Interstate System itself was arguably the federal initiative with the most 
deleterious impact on city centers. Tom Lewis has stated, “Without the new mobility of 
the automobile and the highway, the suburban housing boom never would have spread so 
wide.”387 Highways—especially Interstate Highways—allowed for more affluent 
individuals to live farther outside the city than ever before, as commuting was easier. 
Without access to personal automobiles, many African-Americans had no choice but to 
stay closer to their jobs within the city limits. When companies began seizing upon lower 
taxes and other incentives to move operations into the suburbs, the urban black 
community found itself stranded in an environment with few jobs. The cities found 
themselves unable to provide services due to a dwindling tax base.  
 If anything, Richmond may have been more negatively impacted by white flight 
than other cities precisely because the black community had been so successful during 
the height of Jim Crow. Since Jackson Ward has achieved relative prosperity during the 
height of segregation, the community had further to fall than other black neighborhoods 
across the country. White flight increased in intensity after the fall of segregation. As 
blacks slowly found themselves able to shop in once-white stores, entertain themselves in 
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once-white movie theaters, and eat in once-white cafes, many of the businesses that once 
catered to the black-only cliental began to fold. Even the Hippodrome and Globe slowly 
faded. 
 The irony of Jackson Ward’s decline does not stop there. Jackson Ward’s success 
may have also contributed to its decline. Richmond’s Department of Planning posited this 
theory in its account of Jackson Ward’s history, stating, “Segregation in a sense made 
Jackson Ward, and the leadership nurtured in the Ward helped to unmake segregation.”388 
Indeed, many of Jackson Ward’s residents played critical role in dismantling Jim Crow in 
the 1940s and early 1950s. As a hub of black intellectualism in the state of Virginia and 
as home to most of Richmond’s African-American attorneys, most of the seminal 
litigation aimed at ending segregation was directly connected to Jackson Ward. Oliver 
Hill and Spottswood William Robinson III, who argued the anti-segregation case in 
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (1952), one of the main cases 
combined into Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954). Additionally, 
Samuel Wilbert Tucker, who used the courts to ensure desegregation in Richmond’s 
schools after the Brown ruling, was a principal member of the Hill, Tucker, and Marsh 
law firm, which established its office in Jackson Ward. 
 In 1958, the city of Richmond recognized the threat of white flight, and the City 
Planning Commission authored a study entitled, Shall We Stop Here to propose strategies 
the city might take. The report acknowledged the city would be unable to prevent the 
movement of the middle class from the city to the suburbs, arguing Richmond’s best 
strategy was to annex the suburbs. Noting “the city limits is [sic] merely a line on a map” 
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and “there is no law that prevents the purchase and use of property beyond the corporate 
limits,” it is clear the Planning Commission believed Richmond’s best chance and 
remaining financially strong was to follow the money as it flooded out of the city.389  
If Richmond opted to remain the same size, the report continued, the city had no choice 
but to “bolster our revenues and to improve and protect property values.” When it came 
to strategies about how Richmond may go about achieving this goal, the report provided 
only one option: slum clearance.390 
 It is important to note that the report did not blatantly equate the notion of slum 
with African-American neighborhood. In fact, there is no mention of race anywhere in 
the report. Instead, the report charges city leaders with remedying the “decay and rot of 
spreading slums” in order to save property values, thus mitigating the risk to tax 
revenues.391 Other accounts of Richmond’s slum problem directly associated “slum” with 
“African-American neighborhood.” One memo that circulated among Richmond civic 
leaders viewed the entire slum issue in terms of demographics. The memo began by 
highlighting the incredible outmigration of Richmond’s residents to the suburbs. “Even 
more startling,” the memo interjected, “is the increase in the area occupied by Negroes 
within the corporate limits.” In other words, the author of the memo thought it better that 
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whites leave Richmond en masse and leave the city largely abandoned than have African-
Americans move into the city and occupy these empty buildings.392 
  To the author’s dismay, Richmond’s black population was increasing and 
spreading simultaneously. In 1940, 90.8 percent of Richmond’s African-American 
population lived on twenty census tracts. A mere ten years later, the exact same census 
tracts housed 5,000 more black residents, yet the tracts contained only 83.6 percent of the 
city’s black population. To make matters more startling to the author, twenty-five 
additional census tracts contained fewer white people in 1950 than in 1940.393 The 
memo’s author did not see black population growth as the cause of white flight, but rather 
white flight as facilitating black population growth. The “increased birth rate and in-
migration” rendered the black community in need of additional housing. Since 
“practically all new housing is being built in the fringe areas,” the homes they abandoned 
had been “rapidly absorbed by the demand for Negro housing.”394 
 While there may have been additional housing available for Richmond’s growing 
black population, the loss of tax revenues, jobs to the suburbs, and potential customers 
left black Richmonders in an economically vulnerable situation. The businesses that once 
thrived due to segregation and white interest in black culture had collapsed, and all jobs 
were moving to the suburbs along with Richmond’s white population. By 1953, these 
forces had already brought Jackson Ward to ruin. 
                                                 
392
 “Negro Occupied Land” in John W. Pearsall Papers, 1917-1989, Accession 40281 Box 1, 
Library of Virginia (Richmond, VA), The memo is not complete, and there is no date; however, all context 
suggests the memo was written in the mid-to-late 1950s.  
393
 Ibid. 
394
 Ibid. 
212 
 
 Richmond’s Redevelopment and Housing Authority, in conjunction with outside 
consultants and cooperation from the USA Housing and Home Finance Agency, set out 
in 1953 to assess the best way to deal with Richmond’s slums. Their findings illustrate a 
picture of Jackson Ward that is hard to imagine in comparison with the town that existed 
just a decade earlier. The “Carver Report,” as the findings came to be known, found that 
79 percent of Jackson Ward’s 2,085 residents lived in “substandard” housing according 
to Richmond’s Sanitary Housing Ordinance. 75 percent of the 556 buildings were 
dilapidated; 74 percent had no private bath and/or no flush toilet; 24 percent had no 
running water, and 30 percent were overcrowded. “Typical photographs” included in the 
report illustrate the squalor. In one image, laundry hangs from a wire connecting two 
boarded-up buildings. Beneath the clothing, mounds of debris and garbage litter the 
alley.395   
 The authors of the report saw little reason to invest resources in turning the 
community around. The community yielded tax revenues of $33,000 each year but the 
cost of public safety alone was over $39,000, as the community was a “veritable hotbed 
of crime and delinquency.”396 The Carver Report suggested the community could be used 
for light industrial zoning, but heavily favored routing the then-theoretical Richmond- 
Petersburg Turnpike through the community.397 City and state leaders saw little reason to 
disagree with the Carver Report. The need for a downtown route had already been agreed 
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upon by all the major players, and of the possible routes, Jackson Ward was not only cost 
effective, it would help the city solve two “problems” at once. While there is no evidence 
of Richmond’s officials routing I-95 through Jackson Ward to achieve racist objectives, 
this story proves that urban routing always hinged heavily on race.  
 The people of Jackson Ward, disenfranchised, deeply impoverished, and largely 
outside the political realm, put up little resistance, and I-95 appeared through the heart of 
the community.398 Jackson Ward, once a vibrant testament to what African-Americans 
could build even while oppressed, was now a splintered city. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED 
 While pundits, lobbyists, and politicians waxed poetic about the economic, 
military, and social benefits of I-95 and the greater Interstate System, many Americans 
saw the network for what it could do for them personally. Many likely believed that the 
more efficient transportation of goods would benefit them in the form of lower prices, 
and if the Cold War should ever turn hot, many likely appreciated that the System would 
grant the country greater military mobility. However, structural economics and doomsday 
military scenarios were intangible and not certain to benefit the average American. The 
most direct and accessible benefit offered by the Interstate Highway System was a safer, 
less expensive, and faster means of moving about the nation.  
 The 1950s and 1960s saw personal automobile ownership become one of the 
defining symbols of the middle class. At the same time, as Anthony J. Stanonis has noted, 
“Americans began to recognize automobile travel as a national rite. Distant places and 
cultures, especially those in the warm climates of the South, gained notice.”399 Americans 
used the increased expendable income of the postwar years to travel the country; the 
“road trip” in its modern sense was born. National park tourism, engineered scenic 
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drives, and roadside Americana all peaked during the decades immediately following 
World War II and were all fueled by the millions of Americans taking to the road in 
unprecedented numbers.400 In time, tourism became less about the journey and more 
about the destination. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Interstates came to be during this 
time period because of the mounting public need for modern highways, largely due to the 
growing popularity of driving vacations and other long-distance travel. The Interstates 
provided travelers with an inexpensive, speedy, and relatively safe means of traveling to 
the desired destination.  
 Highway boosters often promoted the Interstates by noting that stopping was 
infrequent when traveling on the modern routes; if not for the need to refuel, they often 
noted, drivers could get between any two points in the country without a break. A New 
York World-Telegram article from 1964 informed readers of how the drive from New 
York City to Florida was changing as a result of the Interstates opening to the public, 
segment by segment. At that time, the traveler could choose between U.S. 1, the Tobacco 
Trail, and the Ocean Highway (U.S. 17) as primary routes, and could use I-95 where it 
had opened. The article noted that the “slower speed” of the older routes, “makes the trip 
unduly expensive with extra stops.” The underlying message of the article was that speed 
was better when it came to the drive to Florida, and travelers could maximize speed 
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where I-95 had opened to the public. In other words, non-Interstate travel detracted from 
the time families could be spending in their destination.401 
 The shift from driving as the vacation to driving as a means of getting to the 
vacation had grave consequences for the many communities that had built their 
economies, whether in part or in total, around the tourists. Some scholars have 
acknowledged the Interstates negatively affected communities that serviced the roads that 
predated Interstates. Tom Lewis, for example, mentions cities such as Hackberry, 
Arizona and North Platte, Nebraska, but he does not explore the impact of the bypass on 
the towns in any detail.402 Lewis’ choice to overlook these stories is easily defensible; 
Lewis—and others who have attempted to write the history of the Interstate System—set 
out to tell the story of the roads themselves; the communities that do not lie on the 
immediate path of these roads did not fall into the scope of these studies. However, there 
is no doubt the Interstates’ zone of influence goes far beyond the asphalt itself. This is 
especially true considering the arrival of the Interstates did more to hurt some towns than 
any other event in the nation’s history. 
 Other historians have limited their attention to this very important aspect of 
Interstate History to one route, namely I-40 and the impact it had on U.S. 66. The works 
on this topic are of relatively minor import, but they are significant in that they approach 
a phenomenon with implications elsewhere in the country. The attention paid to the 
impact of I-40 on these towns is almost certainly driven by the nostalgia inspired by 
Route 66; it is the desire to explore what came of quintessential roadside Americana after 
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the arrival of the Interstate that motivates these works. To write Route 66: The Highway 
and Its People, Quinta Scott, a historian, and Susan Croce Kelly, a photographer, traveled 
along Route 66 in the 1980s, after I-40 had drawn most traffic away from the 
communities between Chicago and Santa Monica. The motivation for the work is made 
clear in the book’s opening pages, when they state, “The book contains photographs of 
places you cannot visit and reports of conversations with people you cannot meet.”403 
Route 66 serves as a eulogy for communities Scott and Kelly considered fondly. Since 
most Interstate routes bypassed communities less celebrated than those along Route 66. 
After all, there are not songs enumerating the towns one passes while driving down U.S. 
31 from Mackinaw City to Mobile. 
 Of course, towns across America were similarly impacted, even if scholars have 
been delayed bringing their stories to light. While communities along U.S. 1, 17, 301, and 
myriad other highways may not be as fondly remembered as the storied communities of 
Route 66, the residents were just as compelling and their hardships just as real. While the 
old numbered highways remained in use after the Interstates appeared, the traffic on them 
dropped dramatically. To be sure, this was the goal of engineers and policy makers, but 
few people outside of the effected towns seemed to consider this as the Interstate System 
was conceptualized, promoted, and ultimately constructed. In the case of I-95, one of the 
regions most negatively impacted by the construction of the highway was coastal 
southeast Georgia, where the economy and the lifestyle was largely formed by U.S. 17. 
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 Melissa Fay Green’s celebrated Praying for Sheetrock, a stylized account of 
McIntosh County, Georgia’s transition from life as a U.S. 17 highway town to a 
community left behind by I-95, brilliantly captures the effect of I-95 from the perspective 
of McIntosh County residents: 
Between 1973 and 1975, the last links of I-95, the four-lane interstate, were 
completed through McIntosh. Ten miles west of U.S. 17, it arched over the county 
like a suspension bridge. Sterile, bald, and white, I-95 scooped up the southbound 
high-speed cars in Boston, New York, and Hartford and shot them straight into 
Florida. If the cars can be imagined as silver balls on a pinball machine, and the 
new highway a fast chute on the far left, then the ledge labeled ‘Darien, 10 
points,’ illustrated by a shrimp boat, no longer rang its bell, no longer bounced the 
cars along their way.404 
 
In order to fully appreciate the metaphor, one ought to step back and understand how the 
communities of McIntosh County, especially the town of Darien, developed around U.S. 
17. 
 For most of the twentieth century leading up to 1980, McIntosh County was home 
to fewer than 8,000 people, and more than half of them were African-American. Almost 
all of the white citizens lived in the county seat, Darien, and most of the black population 
lived in hamlets scattered throughout the pine forests around the town. In the early 
twentieth century, McIntosh County’s economy centered on these pine forests, as lumber 
was the area’s primary export. When over harvesting took its toll, the fishing and 
shrimping industries took over, capitalizing on the county’s miles of Atlantic coastline. 
Those who did not make a living off of the water found ways to extract money from 
travelers on U.S. 17, which had brought outside money to McIntosh County since the 
1920s. By time I-95 came through, tending to the needs of highway travelers was 
McIntosh County’s largest source of income. 
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 U.S. 17 provided a relatively direct means of getting from the coastal north to 
Florida through Georgia. The “moveable feast of Yankees on wheels,” as Melissa Fay 
Greene calls it, gave rise to the heart of the McIntosh and Darien economies.405 Many of 
the businesses within Darien were legitimate and served the needs—and curiosities—of 
individuals. Souvenir shops sold everything from locally grown cotton to alligator 
wallets. Archie’s, which served southern style meals to northern visitors, and a profusion 
of fish camps, fed the weary travelers. Two motels, the Old South Manor and Plantation 
Estates, provided the tourists a place to rest their heads. The establishments were all 
locally owned, and the money the employees and proprietors earned through the 
businesses mostly stayed in the community. If Yankee dollars were the lifeblood on 
which McIntosh County sustained itself, U.S. 17 was the femoral artery pumping them 
through.  
 Not all of the businesses built around U.S. 17 were as reputable; some were not 
even legal. Just outside of Darien, a slew of businesses arose each night and disappeared 
come morning. Nestled among and behind the myriad fruit stands north of Darien, in the 
heart of the land occupied by blacks since before the Civil War, brothels, gambling 
venues, and other establishments of ill repute tempted travelers. While most northerners 
en route to Florida strategically stopped in Darien for their gasoline, food, and rest, many 
broke up the monotony of a long drive with roadside poker, shell games, dice, or the 
fleeting company of a woman. 
 McIntosh County’s legitimate and illegitimate businesses succeeded primarily 
because of the county’s isolation. Driving southward, there was a forty-five mile stretch 
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of U.S. 17 between Richmond Hill and Darien with no amenities—no place to eat, sleep, 
refuel. There was hardly a place to stop and stretch one’s legs. McIntosh County 
benefited from drivers who had no choice but to stop if hunger or weariness struck. 
Brunswick was another twenty miles to the south. 
 The gambling houses and prostitution shacks operated in the open and without 
fear of the authorities. McIntosh County attracted less-than-legal businesses because the 
law—or at least those tasked with enforcing it—was on their side. From 1948 until the 
1980s, McIntosh County’s version of “the law” took the form of one man, Sheriff Tom 
Poppell,. Like Archie’s, the Old South Manor, and the gambling houses along U.S. 17, 
Poppell made his living by capitalizing on the isolation of McIntosh County. State 
officials demonstrated very little ability or will to control Poppell’s activities, and he 
capitalized. Greene characterized him as a despot, as he seemingly made the laws, 
decided how to punish those who broke them, and used fear of the law to exact favors, 
land, and significant wealth from the people of McIntosh County. Among Poppell’s many 
acts of extortion, he frequently made legal infractions disappear in exchange for land and 
allowed the gambling and prostitution houses to operate without legal interference in 
exchange for kickbacks.406 Lester Maddox, who served as Governor from 1967 to 1971, 
fielded countless complaints from the more innocent northerners who found themselves 
the victims of scams while driving through the rural section of McIntosh County. During 
Maddox’s short term in office, he received thousands of letters from travelers who had 
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been victimized while driving through Georgia.407 The establishments preying on these 
northerners had been operating since the 1920s. It follows that tens of thousands of 
northerners fell victim before I-95 drew traffic away from U.S. 17, each victim enriching 
Tom Poppell. 
  Despite his authoritarian status in McIntosh County, Poppell was loved by many. 
In 1961, not long after moving to Darien, her new husband’s hometown, Emily Davis 
desperately wanted to go to a Christmas party in Atlanta. She had commitments until late 
in the afternoon that day and did not like to drive at night. Davis had befriended Poppell’s 
sister, however, and through the connection, the sheriff heard of Ms. Davis’ plight. He 
called her one evening: “Honey, if you want to get Atlanta, I’ll have the Georgia 
Highway Patrol relay you there. Just let us know the time you want to leave.”408 Always 
one to abuse his power in service of the people of McIntosh County, Poppell had few 
enemies within southeast Georgia.  
 Poppell was especially loved by the African-American community who saw him 
as a protector in a society that easily could have turned violent. As Greene eloquently 
noted, “For most of this century the McIntosh County black people lived much as they 
had since emancipation. They relied on the Lord, the sheriff, and the neighbors.”409 The 
African-American population of McIntosh County traveled into Darien during the day, 
where they worked as cooks, housekeepers, and janitors. At quitting time, they returned 
to their enclaves in the pine forests north of the town. The races lived according to the 
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terrible oppression of Jim Crow; yet, to Poppell’s credit, McIntosh County’s record on 
race relations was far better than most of the South, especially for relatively isolated 
communities. The black residents, while acutely aware of their circumstances and the 
privileged place McIntosh County’s white population enjoyed, did not dissent, did not 
resist, did not organize for better treatment. So long as Poppell was sheriff, U.S. 17 
brought Yankees through the County, and they did not disrupt the order of society, 
McIntosh’s black residents understood they would live in peace and would have more 
opportunity than elsewhere in the country. 
 But while Poppell maintained order and ensured a level of security for McIntosh 
County’s black population, he was also a key player in the machinery of oppression.In 
1971, nearly one-hundred percent of McIntosh County’s black population was registered 
to vote and actively exercised their right; yet, in the century since Reconstruction ended, 
they never elected a black sheriff, councilman, or county commissioner. Poppell hired 
black deputies to help keep his version of the peace, and made sure the black residents 
had just enough to be complacent. Wayward trailers full of goods would end up 
conveniently abandoned in northern McIntosh County, and in times of need, the black 
residents always found Poppell happy to lend a helping hand. In return for his support, 
the black denizens of McIntosh County kept Poppell in power, lined his pockets, and did 
not push back against Jim Crow.  
 McIntosh County was, according to almost every account, resistant to change. By 
and large, the white residents of the County were successful in keeping the pace of 
change tortoise-like. This is especially impressive considering the incredible opportunity 
for change introduced by outsiders McIntosh County faced. U.S. 17 was “bumper-to-
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bumper traffic” for much of the 1950s and 1960s, and as a standard (not limited access) 
highway, travelers had the opportunity to interact with the communities.410 McIntosh 
County was a place people stopped out of necessity, and they stopped an interacted in 
large numbers. Most recognized McIntosh County far removed from other communities, 
and, in the eyes of many, was beyond changing. Even if visitors were offended by the 
racial norms of the community, there are no accounts of U.S. 17 bringing in individuals 
who wanted to change the community; most were on vacation, and they only cared about 
McIntosh County to the extent that it could provide food and lodging. 
 The divide between McIntosh County and the rest of the country became 
especially pronounced during the turmoil of the 1960s, when television and radio 
broadcasts introduced the white residents of Darien to the events elsewhere in the county, 
including other southern towns. But, as Greene explains, “When messages from the 
outside world began to leak into McIntosh County about riots and civil disobedience and 
racial confrontations…Darien willfully sank deeper into its own ladylike foliage of 
magnolia and tupelo and wisteria, and maintained a sweet-as-honey, slow-as-molasses 
pace of life, wishing the outer world would go away.”411 When U.S. 17 was the town’s 
only real connection to the “outer world,” Darien’s wishes largely came true. Poppell 
stayed in power and wealthy because of the enterprise built up around the highway, and 
Poppell maintained the racial order. White Darien did not have to fear black resistance so 
long as Poppell maintained the law because had the African-Americans living around 
Darien become inspired by the civil rights movement underway elsewhere, Poppell 
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would have had less incentive to maintain the peace. McIntosh County’s black 
population, while relegated to a second-class status, did enjoy a peaceful existence and 
Poppell saw to their needs. Joining the greater trend of disobedience, which contained the 
promise of living as equals among white neighbors, also brought the risk of seeing the 
quality of life degrade. While not ideal (or fair), many blacks saw Poppell’s version of 
racial peace as preferable to the way of life in many other southern towns. 
 If Poppell’s hegemonic control of McIntosh County was ever in doubt, it is 
important to note that he was the leader of the County’s first official black community 
organization. Poppell founded the McIntosh County Civic League to comply with federal 
guidelines for revenue sharing; while much of white Darien wanted nothing more than to 
look inward, Poppell was wise enough to look to the rest of the county. He saw the 
direction the country was headed, and used his authority to ensure he would weather the 
civil rights storm. When federal money became available for minority organizations, 
Poppell ensured McIntosh County met all of the requirements—minority membership, 
minority preparation of the grant request—by choosing who would join the McIntosh 
County Civic League. In order to give the illusion of racial progress—and to keep the 
federal government out of his affairs—Poppell created a county commission seat and 
ensured a black man won the seat. Poppell also hand-picked the man who occupied the 
seat, a seventy-eight year old, marginally-literate man who would do as the sheriff bid 
him. 
 State officials were aware of of Poppell’s activities, but for many years chose to 
turn a blind eye to the activities in the southesst corner of Georgia. As out-of-state 
travelers increasingly became victimized by the activities, however, the state could no 
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longer turn a blind eye to Poppell’s operations. Maddox was arguably the first governor 
who made an effort at cleaning up McIntosh County, but he quickly realized shutting 
down Poppell would require upsetting much of the area’s economy. “I didn’t want a 
police state in McIntosh County,” he said, “but the first time I went down there I warned 
them people I’d rather put Sheriff Poppell in jail than you business people.” 
Unfortunately, Poppell’s corruption had spread far in McIntosh County. A real cleanup 
was going to require far more action than removing the man at the top. 
 McIntosh County and Tom Poppell found ways of making money that went 
beyond business of both the forthright and illicit types. U.S. 17 also provided ample 
opportunity for the County to fill its coffers through fines, especially for speeding. From 
the 1950s through the early 1970s, McIntosh County was one of the most notorious speed 
traps on the eastern seaboard, one that drew the ire of many travelers and the attention of 
the national press. Nobody is certain exactly how much money McIntosh County brought 
in through traffic fines, largely because Poppell refused to share the information even 
though Georgia state law required him to do so. Reporters from the Savannah Morning 
News who conducted the most thorough investigation into the U.S. 17 speed trap 
estimated McIntosh County brought in $34,520 per year in fines for speeding and other 
traffic violations. They also projected that two-thirds of this amount was paid by non-
Georgians. To put this in perspective, McIntosh County collected $70,450 in property 
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taxes in 1957; through fines, out-of-staters added as much money to McIntosh’s coffers 
as nearly half of McIntosh’s residents paid in property taxes each year.412 
 Unfortunately for those driving through McIntosh County, the laws of Georgia 
incentivized sheriffs to create speed traps due to a profit-sharing fee system, whereby the 
local sheriffs’ office received one-third of the money brought in from traffic fees. In 
counties like McIntosh, where the sheriff had almost complete control and operated free 
of any checks on power, this meant one-third of the revenue collected from travelers went 
straight into the sheriff’s pocket. According to the Savannah Morning News, speed traps 
“do not exist where this is no profit motive.”413 An earlier article claimed, “If coastal 
Georgia wanted to draw up a set of operating procedures favorable to speed traps, they 
couldn’t have done a better job.”414 
 The speed trap harmed Georgia’s reputation and, according to some, larger 
tourism industry. The editor of the Savannah Morning News noted the fines did provide 
benefit for the residents of McIntosh County, but the costs outweighed the benefits: “As 
impressive as the county-by-county figures on fines and forfeitures is, the grand total is 
but a pittance as compared to the potential addition to the state’s economy if more 
tourists could be induced to stop a few days and see something of the many attractions we 
have to offer.”415 The 1957 series on the speed trap published by the Savannah Morning 
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News included many examples of non-Georgians who harmed the tourist economy of the 
state by discouraging others from traveling to or through the state as a result of their 
experience with the speed traps. One North Haledon, New Jersey resident wrote to the 
Ocean Highway Association, a tourism booster organization, claiming she was falsely 
accused of speeding by a man wearing a sweater and showing no identification as an 
officer of the law. Other victims noted fines were paid in a “shanty” next to the road. 
McIntosh County’s sheriffs, who monitored the traffic on U.S. 17, extracted the fines 
from travelers under questionable circumstances. Travelers were usually confronted with 
an option of paying a forty dollar fine upfront or spending the night in jail before 
appearing before the judge, who was never available the same day. Since most of the 
people pulled over were on vacation or traveling for business, they did not have the time 
to wait around for the judge and almost universally chose to pay the exorbitant fee for the 
sake of convenience.416 The counties of southeast Georgia—especially McIntosh—
collectively filled their coffers at the expense of the wider economy. Individuals on their 
way to or from Florida might have stopped in Savannah or Brunswick had they not been 
enraged by the rural sheriffs. 
 Despite the negative effects of thee speed traps in McIntosh and neighboring 
counties, state officials declined to insert themselves into the situation and shut the 
operations down. Marvin Griffin, who was governor in the late 1950s, suggested that 
honest businessmen band together “and launch some program against the practice,” 
although it was never clear what the program would be or how it would work.417 Griffin’s 
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half attempt and providing a solution speaks to the political clout of Poppell; even the 
most powerful politician in Georgia refrained from engaging in open confrontation with 
the McIntosh sheriff.  
 In total, U.S. 17 facilitated, either directly or indirectly, every facet of life in 
McIntosh County. It brought tourists—the single most significant catalyst of the 
economy—in each day, giving rise to businesses who accommodated these guests. It also 
lined the pockets of Tom Poppell, who maintained the racial status quo in exchange for 
the riches he reaped from the illicit businesses and speeding tickets along U.S. 17. When 
I-95 entered the county in the early 1970s, McIntosh County found itself coming to terms 
with a world it had not operated in previously. By drawing traffic off of U.S. 17 and 
cutting off the revenue the old highway brought in, the empire of Tom Poppell—and, in 
fact, the entire way of life in McIntosh County, ended. I-95 brought a new reality to 
coastal Georgia. Whereas disgruntled travelers, Georgia governors, and the FBI had been 
unable to end Poppell’s reign, I-95 did so with remarkable efficiency.  
A NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN 
 McIntosh experienced the reign of Poppell and the U.S. 17 economy longer than 
it otherwise should have. Georgia was among the nation’s leaders in Interstate Highway 
construction for much of the twenty years following the Interstate Highway Act of 1956, 
but opted to build I-95 last among its many miles of Interstate Highway. Initially, I-95 
was deferred in favor of Interstates that connected the state capital, Atlanta, to various 
corners of the state. Since I-95 hugs the Atlantic Ocean throughout Georgia and 
effectively connects Savannah, Georgia and Jacksonville, Florida, it was prioritized lower 
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than I-85, I-75, and I-20.418 When Georgia was ready to turn its attention to I-95 in the 
mid-to-late 1960s, it found federal funding more difficult to obtain. A 1968 letter from 
Federal Highway Commissioner Rex Whitton to Governor Herman Talmadge 
highlighted the complexity of highway funding once the Highway Trust Fund became a 
subject of political battles. Whitton expressed his “belief” funding would be approved to 
allow for commencement of the $46.8 billion project, but he was not certain it would 
happen.419 In another letter to Governor Talmadge written at the end of 1968, Whitton 
cited “the need for reducing Federal expenditures as a contribution to the Vietnam effort 
and the resultant effort to reduce inflationary pressures” as a reason for the difficulty 
accessing the requisite funds to begin construction of I-95.420 Through the years of 
uncertainty about whether I-95 would ever be built, the people of McIntosh County 
waited, not knowing what to expect of their future. 
 Eventually the United States Congress agreed to continue funding the Trust Fund, 
and I-95 moved from the planning stage to the construction stage. The highway was to be 
built a few miles to the west of U.S. 17; traffic would no longer funnel through the heart 
of Darien. Instead, it would enter McIntosh County in a field, bypass Darien as it blazed a 
straight shot across creeks and undeveloped land, and exit the county in another field. 
Even if one looked beyond the borders of McIntosh County, I-95 essentially permitted 
travelers to drive from Savannah to Jacksonville without seeing a single town of more 
than a few hundred people. I-95 served as a high-speed shortcut from South Carolina to 
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Florida, and the people taking this shortcut would could no longer serve as the economic 
fuel for Poppell’s McIntosh County.  
 Many in McIntosh County were slow to realize the profound impact I-95 would 
have on their community. Many could not conceive of a world in which people did not 
utilize U.S. 17 en masse. The road had been the lifeblood of the economy for so long, it 
seemed impossible that one day the flow of traffic would simply stop. Those who 
recognized I-95 might pull some traffic away still believed enough drivers would 
continue to use U.S. 17 that McIntosh County would survive. Others may have 
anticipated the devastating effect I-95 would have on the County but felt helpless to do 
anything. 
 According to one longtime resident of McIntosh County, many residents believed 
I-95 would benefit them in the longrun. The highway, they figured, would bring more 
people through the county, and a good number of these people would venture a few miles 
off the Interstate into Darien. In this way, I-95 would serve as a high speed, slightly-out-
of-town conduit for traffic and would allow McIntosh County to prosper even when the 
economy shifted away from US 17.It is easy to understand why some people thought this 
way. Prior to the construction of I-95, there was not a single chain restaurant or motel in 
all of McIntosh County. I-95 would have several junctions within the County, and there 
was not a single building at any of the future intersections. Travelers would need food, 
shelter, and fuel, these people thought, and they would have no choice but to venture into 
Darien.  
 Much of the land I-95 would consume was owned by Union Camp Corporation, a 
paper company that owned extensive tracks of forest in the state of Georgia. Union Camp 
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consequently owned all the land at the I-95 intersections in McIntosh County. 
Acknowledging the development that had occurred along the Interstates elsewhere in the 
county, Union Camp officials made an effort to develop McIntosh County’s rest areas 
with a local flavor. They contacted Archie Davis first and asked if he would be interested 
in either moving Archie’s a few miles out of town to I-95 or, if he preferred to keep the 
original in operation, to open a second location to serve Interstate travelers. Davis 
declined primarily because of the time commitment required to run a second location. 
Rather than move the sole operation to the interchange, Davis opted to keep the sole 
location in town. Like many McIntosh residents, Davis could not imagine that I-95 would 
drastically change Darien’s way of life. Davis had faith the locals would still frequent his 
restaurant and assumed travelers would venture a few miles off the road.  Emily Davis 
acknowledges it was a difficult decision for her husband to make and retrospectively 
acknowledged,  “It wasn’t the wisest financial decision we ever made.”421 The passers-by 
simply did not enter Archie’s the way they had when U.S. 17 was the only route through 
town. Even the locals dined at Archie’s with less regularity, as everyone who made a 
living off of travelers on U.S. 17 suffered. 
 Archie’s was on the only business to suffer. The locus of McIntosh County’s 
economic activity gravitated away from U.S. 17 and toward I-95 at an alarming rate. The 
intersection of Highway 251 and I-95, not quite two miles from U.S. 17 in Darien, saw 
near-immediate development. A McDonald’s and Wendy’s appeared, and then a chain 
motel. By the mid-1980s, exit 41 had developed into a small community, complete with a 
small shopping mall. Downtown Darien, on the other hand, struggled to find itself in a 
                                                 
421
 Emily Davis interview. 
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post-I-95 world. Without tourists and truckers entering via U.S. 17, the community’s 
restaurants either closed down or adapted to being local eateries. Motel owners shuttered 
their businesses.  
 The fall of U.S. 17 also spelled the end for Tom Poppell. As I-95 opened to the 
public over the course of the 1970’s, Poppell’s ability to provide favors in return for 
black compliance waned. The protective barrier that had ensconced Poppell since 1948 
was no more. The series of events that led to the outcome is not clear, but Poppell found 
himself the target of separate lawsuits by the NAACP and the Georgia Legal Services 
Program at the same time the FBI charged Poppell with federal crimes (thus removing 
him from the Georgia “good ol’ boy” network that had stymied their efforts in the past). 
To some extent, Poppell’s fall was inevitable, as the FBI had been building a case against 
him for decades. The efforts of the NAACP and Georgia Legal Services Program, 
however, were almost certainly enabled by the opening of I-95. When U.S. 17 could no 
longer sustain McIntosh County’s way of life, its black citizens began to stir from the 
longstanding complacency. The civil rights movement arrived years after it began 
elsewhere. Black men took office, and McIntosh County began to resemble a democracy 
rather than a kingdom.  
 In time, Darien learned to prosper despite the existence of I-95. Since tourists no 
longer unwillingly found themselves serving as the fuel of McIntosh County’s economy, 
the people of Darien rebuilt their community to attract passersby. Capitalizing on the 
town’s beautiful waterfront and antebellum buildings, Darien emerged in the 1990s as a 
charming coastal town. I-95, in the end, became the means for outsiders to get to the 
destination of Darien. 
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CONCLUSION 
A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF I-95 
 Researching a dissertation on the history of I-95 necessitates extensive travel 
along the road. Over the course of several years, I was able to experience first-hand some 
of what my subjects experienced, not the stresses of losing my home to eminent domain, 
nor the trauma of seeing my hometown dramatically altered by the opening of a new 
highway, but rather the spectrum of emotions one could feel toward a highway. I was 
initially excited about the prospect of traveling up and down the Atlantic Coast, and since 
time is money, I was thrilled I-95 was there to allow for safe, reliable, timely travel 
between archives. After sitting in a Sunday night Washington, D.C. traffic jam that 
seemed to have no cause, I came to resent the road for the illusion of fast, reliable 
passage. At certain points I marveled at the road’s engineering achievements and at 
others, I mourned the communities I-95 had clearly harmed.  Somewhere along the way, I 
came to understand why some individuals thought my project was “really cool” and why 
my father-in-law could not ask about my progress without reminding me that “I-95 
sucks.” After the first thousand miles on the road—somewhere between the tobacco 
fields of North Carolina and the endless suburbs of Washington, I ultimately came to 
discover the underlying message of this dissertation: what makes I-95 interesting is the 
intersection of the road with place. 
 To an extent, the relationship of I-95 with place was visible and immediately 
apparent. In some communities, I-95 somehow seemed like it belonged, as if the 
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community had grown up around it or—more likely—had redeveloped around it. In other 
places, I-95 cut through communities like a scar, leaving nothing but blight in its wake. In 
some places, I-95 provided a scenic tour through bucolic valleys, and elsewhere the 
scenery was indistinguishable from any other place I had been during my travels.  
 I had my first real understanding of the relationship I-95 has with the places it 
traverses while eating dinner just outside of Darien, Georgia. Following a month of 
research in Tallahassee, Athens, and Savannah, I was exhausted and eager to get home. 
More interested in eating quickly than anything else, I stopped at a Ruby Tuesday’s an 
eighth of a mile from the I-95 interchange. Not quite realizing where I was when I made 
the decision to stop, I soon determined that I actually knew quite a bit about this 
particular exit. The mall across the parking lot from the restaurant and some of the 
neighboring hotels developed when I-95 bypassed the town of Darien; I had read quite a 
bit about the area while researching my Georgia chapter.  The Ruby Tuesday’s arrived 
later than the other businesses, to be sure, but there I was, voluntarily but not knowingly 
being the person that caused Darien’s world to turn upside down some decades before. 
By traveling along I-95 and not the neighboring highway, I was rewarding development 
outside of the community. 
 Inside the restaurant, the interplay of road and place became even more apparent. 
Alone, tired of reading, and waiting for food to arrive, I found myself inadvertently eaves 
dropping on the conversations surrounding me. To my immediate left, an elderly couple 
seated in a booth interrogated the waitress about the menu. “Do you prefer the burgers or 
the seafood?” “What’s your favorite dish?” “Can I substitute a salad for the fries?” The 
waitress’ replies eventually prompted the female customer to inquire about the source of 
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the shrimp. “Where are they from?” she asked. And then, as if willing the response, “Are 
they local?” “No,” the waitress replied. “They come frozen.”  
 I chuckled. The ocean was fewer than ten miles away.  
 McIntosh County Georgia had, since the days of Tom Poppell, rebuilt its 
economy around tourism, timber, and seafood. Yet, I could not get local seafood at the 
restaurant positioned as the place most out-of-towners would visit on their way to other 
places. These individuals would stop in, and their singular experience in McIntosh 
County would have very little to do with the place. I-95 somehow had accomplished the 
paradoxical feat of bringing individuals to McIntosh County and preventing them from 
experiencing McIntosh County at all.  
 Despite I-95’s ability to somehow negate “place” from places, I witnessed other 
communities that had benefited greatly from I-95. On lonely miles of road twenty miles 
past one city and forty miles to the next, factories, distribution centers, and other engines 
of the economy appeared, providing jobs to communities that otherwise would have had 
little opportunity. Some communities, such as Florence, South Carolina and College 
Park, Maryland found ways to turn I-95 into a defining characteristic of one section of the 
city while maintaining vibrant economic and cultural scenes in other portions of town. In 
the vicinity of I-95, these communities have experienced significant commercial 
development. 
 At the end of the day, whether one has a favorable opinion of I-95—or, like my 
father-in-law—would rather drive an extra ten hours than spend thirty minutes on the 
highway, there is no denying the transformative role the road has played on the 
communities it touches. Some of these changes were good, some bad, some were a little 
236 
 
of both. In some places, I-95 has served to enhance a sense of place, in others (like 
Darien, Georgia), it has dramatically changed the notion of place. Everywhere, however, 
the arrival of I-95 created a new sense of place. 
  
237 
 
REFERENCES 
BOOKS 
Altshuler, Alan and David Luberoff, Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban 
Public Investment. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 2003. 
Ambrose, Stephen E.  Eisenhower: The President. Vol. 2. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1984. 
Arsenault, Raymond. St. Petersburg and the Florida Dream. Norfolk, Virginia: Donning, 
1988. 
Avila, Eric. Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in Suburban 
Los Angeles. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 
Chase, Susan Mulchahey, David L. Ames, and Rebecca J. Siders. Suburbanization in the 
Vicinity of Wilmington, Delaware, 1850-1950; A Historic Context. Newark, 
Delaware: Center for Historic Architecture and Engineering, 1992. 
Chauncey, George. Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay 
Male World, 1890-1940. New York, Basic Books, 1994. 
Collins, Robert. More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Connerly, Charles E. The Most Segregated City in America: City Planning and Civil 
Rights in Birmingham, 1920-1980. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2005. 
Darden, Joe T. and Richard W. Thomas. Detroit: Race Riots, Racial Conflicts, and 
Efforts to Bridge the Racial Divide. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
2013. 
Davies, Richard O. The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, The Freeway, and the Condition 
of Metropolitan America. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. 
Dedek, Peter B. Hip to the Trip: A Cultural History of Route 66. Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press, 2007. 
Desrosiers-Laurzon, Godfrey. Florida’s Snowbirds: Spectacle, Mobility, and Community 
Since 1945. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011.
238 
 
 
 
Freehling, William. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina, 
1816-1836. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. 
Gannon, Michael. The New History of Florida. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2012.
Gillespie, Angus K. and Aaron Rockland. Looking for America on the New Jersey 
Turnpike. Piscataway, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992. 
Graham, Guilbert R. South Carolina Economic Impact of an Interstate Highway Land 
Values and Uses, Guilbert R. Graham and C. McFerron Gittinger, eds. Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina,1963. 
Grantham, Dewey W. The South in Modern America: A Region at Odds. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1994. 
Greene, Melissa Fay. Praying for Sheetrock. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2006. 
Grivno, Max. Gleanings of Freedom: Free and Slave Labor along the Mason-Dixon 
Line, 1790-1860. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2011. 
Haebuer, Douglas H. The Baltimore Expressway Controversy: A Study in the Political 
Decision-Making Process. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974. 
Hirsch, Arnold A. and Raymond A. Mohl, eds. Urban Policy in Twentieth Century 
America. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993. 
Hoffman, Steven J. Race, Class, and Power in the Building of Richmond, 1870-1920. 
Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland &Company, 2004. 
Hokanson, Drake. The Lincoln Highway: Main Street Across America. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1999. 
Hutchinson, George. The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White. New York: Belknap 
Press, 1996. 
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Jakle, John A. and Keith A. Sculle, Motoring: The Highway Experience in America. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009. 
Kay, Jane Holtz. Asphalt Nation: How the Automobile Took Over America and How We 
Can Take It Back. New York: Crown Publishers, 1997. 
King, Wayne G. Rise Up So Early: A History of Florence County, South Carolina. 
Spartanburg, SC: Published for Florence County Historical Commission by the 
Reprint Co, 1981. 
239 
 
Krim, Arthur. Route 66: Iconography of the American Highway. Santa Fe: Center for American 
Places, 2005. 
Kruse, Kevin M. White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 
Leavitt, Jane. Superhighway—Superhoax. Garden City, NY: Ballatine Books, 1970. 
Lewis, Tom. Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming 
American Life. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.  
McHarg, Ian L. Design with Nature, 25th Anniversary Edition. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1991. 
McNichol, Dan. The Roads that Built America. New York: Sterling, 2006. 
Meyer, Jon R. and Jose A.Gomez-Ibanez. Auto, Transit and Cities. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981. 
Moore, John Hammond. The South Carolina Highway Department, 1917-1987. 
Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1987. 
Mowbray, A.Q. Road to Ruin. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968. 
Mueller, Peter O. “Transportation and urban Form: Stages in the Spatial Evolution of the 
American Metropolis.” In The Geography of Urban Transportation. 3rd ed. Edited 
by Susan Hanson and Genevieve Giuliano, 59-85. New York: Guilford Press, 
2004. 
Mumford, Lewis. Technics and Civilization. 2nd edition.Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010. 
Perrier, Diane. I-81: The Great Warriors Trace. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
2010.  
———. Interstate 95: The Road to Sun and Sand. Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2010. 
Preston, Howard L. Dirt Roads to Dixie: Accessibility and Modernization in the South, 
1885-1935. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991. 
Richardson, Selden and Maurice Duke, Built by Blacks: African American Architecture 
and Neighborhoods in Richmond. Charleston, South Carolina: The History Press, 
2008. 
Rose, Mark. Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989. Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990. 
240 
 
Rosenman, Samuel I. Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Vol. 8. 
New York:  The Macmillan Company, 1941. 
Sanford,  James K.,  ed. Richmond: Her Triumphs, Tragedies & Growth. Richmond: 
Metropolitan Richmond Chamber of Commerce, 1975. 
Scott, Quinta and Susan Croce. Route 66: A Highway and Its People. Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1988. 
Seely, Bruce E. Building the American Highway System: Engineers as Policy Makers. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987. 
Seley, John E. “The Kink in Nashville’s Interstate-40.” In The Politics of Public-Facility 
Planning. Edited by John E. Seley. Lexington, MA: Rowan & Littlefield, 1983. 
Silver, Christopher. The Separate City: Black Communities in the Urban South, 1940-
1968. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995. 
Stanonis, Anthony J., ed. Dixie Emporium: Tourism, Foodways, and Consumer Culture 
in the American South.. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008. 
Starnes, Richard D. ed. Southern Journeys: Tourism, History, and Culture in the Modern 
South. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003. 
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar 
Detroit. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Swift, Earl. The Big Roads: The Untold Story of the Engineers, Visionaries, and 
Trailblazers who Created the American Superhighways. New York: Mariner 
Books, 2012. 
Tyler-McGraw, Marie. At the Falls: Richmond, Virginia and its People. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 
Wells, Christopher W.  Car Country: An Environmental History. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2012. 
Whisnant, Anne Mitchell. Super-Scenic Motorway. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006. 
Woodward, C. Vann. The Burden of Southern Identity, 3rd ed. Baton Rouge: Lousiana 
State University Press, 1993. 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
DiMento, Joseph F.C. “Stent (or Dagger?) in the Heart of Town: Urban Freeways in 
Syracus, 1944-1967.” Sage 8, no. 2 (2009), 133-161. 
241 
 
Hathorn, Billy. "Cramer v. Kirk: The Florida Republican Schism of 1970." The Florida 
Historical Quarterly, No. 4 (April 1990), 403-426. 
Mohl, Raymond A. “The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of 
Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973.” The Journal of Policy 
History 20, no. 2 (2008), 193-226.  
———. “Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities.” Journal of Urban History 
30 (2004): 674-706. 
Weiss, Thomas. “Tourism in America before World War II.” The Journal of Economic 
History 64, no. 2 (June 2004), 289-327.  
OTHER SECONDARY SOURCES 
Ginn, Richard Henry. “Interstate-40 Through Overton Park: A Case Study of Location 
Decision-Making." Master’s Thesis. University of Tennessee, 1970. 
Hilles, W.C. “The Good Roads movement in the United States, 1880-1916.” Master’s 
Thesis. Duke University, 1958. 
Koser, Laura. “Planned by Pedro: South of the Border, 1950-2001.” Master’s Thesis. 
University of South Carolina, Columbia, 2004. 
Laurie, John. “Spring Break: The Economic, Socio-Cultural and Public Governance 
Impacts of College Students on Spring Break Host Locations.” Dissertation. 
University of New Orleans, 2008. 
MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS AND ARCHIVES 
American Automobile Association Archive. Heathrow, Florida.  
Bryant, C. Farris Papers. State Archive of Florida, Tallahassee.  
Byrne, Brendan T. General Filings and Non-Counsel Staff. New Jersey State Archive, 
Trenton. 
Cahill, William T. Congressional Papers. Rutgers University Libraries Special 
Collections and University Archives, New Brunswick. 
Carvel, Edwin N. Papers. Delaware Public Archive, Dover.  
Daniels Collection. Delaware Historical Society, Wilmington. 
Florence City Council Minutes. Florence City Hall; Florence, South Carolina. 
242 
 
Florida Department of Transportation: Division of Traffic and Planning Program Subject 
Files, 1970-1972. State Archive of Florida, Tallahassee.  
Florida State Turnpike Authority Correspondence. State Archive of Florida, Tallahassee.  
Frank, Bill Collection. Delaware Historical Society, Wilmington. 
Frelinghuysen, Peter H.B. Papers. Princeton Rare Books and Special Collections. Seeley 
G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton. 
Gailard, J. Palmer Papers. City of Charleston Records Management Division, Charleston. 
General Holdings. New Jersey State Library, Trenton. 
General Holdings. Princeton Historical Society, Princeton.  
General Holdings. South Carolinana Library, Columbia. 
Governor Papers, G to H. Delaware Public Archive, Dover. 
Governor Papers, H to J. Delaware Public Archive, Dover. 
Governor General File, 1963-1964. Maryland State Archives, Annapolis.  
Governor’s Office. Department of Transportation Files. State Archive of Florida, 
Tallahassee.  
Governor’s Office. Government Liason Department of Transportation Subject Files. State 
Archive of Florida, Tallahassee.  
Greater Charleston Chamber of Commerce Records, North Charleston. 
Holland, Spessard L. Papers. P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Tallahassee. 
Jackson Ward Historic District Folder. Virginia Historical Society, Richmond. 
New Jersey Turnpike Authority Minutes. New Jersey State Archive, Trenton.  
Pearsall, John W. Papers. Library of Virginia, Richmond. 
Reardon, Jr., Timothy J. Papers. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston. 
Russell, Donald Papers. South Carolina State Archives, Columbia. 
Salinger, Pierre E.G. Papers. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston. 
Smathers, George A. Papers. P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Tallahassee.  
Sorensen, Theodore C. Papers. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston. 
243 
 
Stanley, Thomas B. Papers. Library of Virginia, Richmond. 
Talmadge, Herman E.  Collection. Donald B. Russell Library for Political Research and 
Studies, University of Georgia, Athens. 
Townes, Jr., Clarence L. Papers. James Branch Cabell Library. Virginia Commonwealth 
University, Richmond. 
Warren, Fuller Papers. Claude Pepper Library. Florida State University, Tallahassee.  
Valentine Richmond History Center, Richmond. 
Vertical File-Neighborhoods, Jackson Ward. Virginia Historical Society, Richmond. 
Warner, Irving Papers. Hagley Museum, Wilmington.  
White House Central Subject Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston. 
Williams, Harrison A. Papers. Rutgers University Rare Books and Manuscripts, New 
Brunswick. 
WRVA Radio Collection, 1925-2000. Library of Virginia, Richmond. 
 
NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES 
American Motorist 
Atlanta Journal 
Dillon Herald (Dillon, South Carolina) 
Fort Lauderdale News 
Holiday 
Florence Morning News (Florence, South Carolina) 
Journal Every Evening (Wilmington, Delaware) 
Landscape Architecture 
Manning Times (Manning, South Carolina) 
Miami Herald 
New Highways 
244 
 
New York Times 
New York World Telegram 
News and Courier (Charleston, South Carolina) 
Philadelphia Inquirer 
Richmond News Leader 
Richmond Times Dispatch 
Savannah Morning News 
Savannah News-Press 
Tri-City Times (Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina) 
U.S. News and World Report 
Wilmington Evening Journal 
Wilmington Morning News 
Wilmington Sunday Bulletin 
OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES 
National Research Council (U.S.). Economic Impact of Highway Improvement: 
Conference Proceedings, March 18-19, 1957. Washington, D.C.: National 
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Highway Research Board, 
1957. 
South Carolina State Highway Department. A Re-Evaluation of the Location for 
Interstate Route 95 in South Carolina. Columbia, SC, 1963. 
Thornill, Thomas. Interview (29 October 2009). North Charleston, South Carolina. 
Thornhill, Thomas Private Papers.  
U. S. Bureau of the Census. “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States, 2004. 
———. “Characteristics of the Population, Florida, 1960. 
———. “Characteristics of the Population, Florida, 1970. 
